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ABSTRACT  
Forward-looking financial disclosure (FLFD) is potentially uninformative if it does not 
change from the previous year, especially after a significant change in firm 
performance. This study uses a sample of UK narrative statements of the annual reports 
over the period from 2005 to 2011. It employed the automated content analysis 
technique to measure change in FLFD over years to answer three research questions. 
First, to what extent does change in firms’ earnings performance drive managers to 
change FLFD over years? Second, what are the other drivers of the change of FLFD 
from year to year? Third, do investors use information revealed by the change in FLFD? 
The study finds a positive association between change in FLFD and change in firm 
earnings performance. However, it finds weak evidence that firms with larger changes 
in their earnings performance are likely to change their FLFD more than those with 
smaller performance changes. In addition, when we distinguish between well-
performing and poorly performing firms, it finds that the change in FLFD is more 
positively associated with poorly performing firms compared to well-performing firms.  
Furthermore, it finds that change in FLFD is positively (negatively) associated with firm 
size, (competitive environment), (litigious environment), and (percentage of managerial 
ownership). In addition, the role of the auditor in overseeing narrative reporting is not 
appearing for all sample firms or for well-performing firms, however, it is observable 
only in poorly performing firms.  
Finally, the study uses firm value three months after the release of the annual report to 
examine investors’ responses to the changes in FLFD. It finds that the value of a firm 
decreases as long as it changes its FLFD from the previous year. However, when we 
distinguish between well and poorly performing firms, it finds that the change in FLFD 
has no effect on the value of well-performing firms, while, it negatively affects poorly 
performing firms.  
The results suggest that FLFD in UK narratives includes some content about firm 
performance. However, it neither affects the value of well-performing firms nor 
enhances investors’ valuation of poorly performing firms.  
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CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION  
1.1 OVERVIEW  
Financial statements are not likely to satisfy different users’ needs for information 
(Merkley 2014). They focus only on quantitative and short term results of the business 
(Beattie, Mcinnes, & Fearnley, 2004). Therefore, the types of information that firms 
provide in their annual reports to the users are being changed. Instead of simply 
providing quantitative financial information, companies began to disclose more detailed 
qualitative information with forward-looking orientation to accommodate their 
investors’ needs. One form of information that is qualitative in nature is narrative 
reporting
1
.  
Narrative reporting allows firms’ managers to present a soft talk discussion and analysis 
about their firms’ performance. Therefore, it complements the financial statements, and 
provides a channel for managers to convey textual information about their firms to 
market participants (Merkley 2014). Nonetheless, the market participants analyse 
narrative statements when making their decisions. They help participants bridge the gap 
between the financial statements amounts and the economic reality of firms’ 
performance (Feldman, Govindaraj, Livnat, & Segal, 2010; Merkley 2014). Thus, it 
provides a useful context for understanding the financial figures in the financial 
statements (Li, 2010b).  
The Operating and Financial Review (OFR) is considered a key narrative disclosure 
medium required by the Accounting Standard Board (ASB) for financial reporting in the 
                                                 
1  Throughout the current study, the terms narrative reporting, narrative disclosure, narrative statements, 
and narratives are used interchangeably to discuss this type of information in company annual report. 
However, the contents of narrative reporting are qualitative, it is, where appropriate, associated with 
supporting figures. Therefore, narrative reporting contains both qualitative and quantitative information. 
This will be discussed throughout chapter 2. 
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United Kingdom (UK). It is introduced to encourage managers of companies to provide 
narrative reporting within which directors could discuss and analyse the main factors 
underlying their companies’ performance and financial position (ASB, 2005; ASB, 
2006). Furthermore, the ASB recommends that analysis of the business in the OFR 
statements should have a forward-looking orientation (ASB, 2005; ASB, 2006). This 
type of information would help investors to assess a firm past and current financial 
performance and to predict its future earnings (Hussainey, Schleicher & Walker, 2003). 
Hence, the value relevance of narrative reporting arises from its ability to provide 
analysis and discussion of a firm performance from the eyes of its board of directors. 
Consequently, this narrative analysis and discussion are more likely to change in 
response to changes in firm performance. If narrative reporting does not reflect changes 
in firm performance, it is mainly boilerplate reporting (i.e., standard disclosures with 
little firm-specific content). Recently, the International Accounting Standard Board 
(IASB) has worried about how informative narrative reporting is and has advised firms 
to avoid providing boilerplate and immaterial disclosures that make the more important 
information difficult to find (IFRS, 2010). 
A natural question is whether narrative reporting statements have informational content 
or simply boilerplate disclosures. Narrative reporting might not be as informative as 
intended for several reasons. First, managers have flexibility in choosing the breadth 
and depth of information that is disclosed
2
. Hence, after taking into account the cost of 
preparing long narrative document, managers may simply use the previous year’s 
narrative statements as templates for current and future years (Brown & Tucker, 2011). 
                                                 
2  Disclosure breadth means the extent of disclosure of different topics and how firms spread the 
disclosure across different topics. While, disclosure depth concerns the question of what information is to 
be disclosed in each topic (Anis, Fraser, & Hussainey, 2012). 
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Second, the soft talk qualitative nature of narrative reporting makes it difficult to be 
audited and, therefore, many include substantial boilerplate disclosures, generic 
language, and immaterial details (SEC, 2003; Bloomfield, 2008; Li, 2010a, Li. 2008)
3
. 
Nevertheless, narrative reporting will not be informative and serves its function unless 
firms’ managers are willing to change their narrative discussion and analysis in response 
to change in their firms’ performance (Brown & Tucker, 2011; Merkley, 2014). This is 
because as long as a firm changes its narrative reporting relative to prior year, it will 
include relatively new information. Hence, relevant information is disclosed to 
investors. 
This study uses change in forward-looking financial disclosure (FLFD) in OFR 
statements from the previous year to examine the informativeness of these statements in 
the UK narratives.  
The reminder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 highlights the 
motivations and the research gaps of the current study. Section 1.3 presents the research 
questions, research objectives, and research hypotheses. Section 1.4 details the research 
methodology. Section 1.5 presents the key findings and the contribution of the study. 
Finally, the structure of the current study is discussed in section 1.6. 
 
 
                                                 
3  Pava and Epstein (1993) examine narrative statements of a group of companies and find that most 
companies accurately describe historical events, and very few provide useful and accurate forecasts in 
their narratives. 
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1.2 RESEARCH MOTIVATIONS AND GAPS IN RESEARCH  
The motivations for the current study arise from either the nature of the narrative 
reporting and FLFD in the UK context, or/and from the gaps in the literature. This will 
be discussed in details in the following section. 
The first motivation for the current study arises from the nature of narrative reporting in 
the UK context. The UK provides a unique context within which we can examine the 
informativness of narrative reporting. It has a unique narrative reporting section entitled 
“OFR”. The OFR is a key narrative reporting statement required by the ASB in the UK. 
These narrative statements are introduced to encourage companies to provide narrative 
explanation within which directors could discuss the main factors underlying the 
company’s performance and its financial position. In addition, it is considered as a tool 
for managers to provide their perspectives of the firm to the current and potential 
investors. This is in turn would help to reduce the information asymmetry problem and 
allow investors to know more about the company from the eyes of the board of 
directors. 
However, recently the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) has worried 
about how informative narrative reporting is, and has advised firms to avoid providing 
boilerplate disclosures. It is argued that “management should avoid generic disclosures 
that do not relate to the practices and circumstances of the entity and immaterial 
disclosures that make the more important information difficult to find” (IFRS, 2010, P. 
12). This raises a concern about how informative is narrative reporting in the UK. 
Furthermore, narrative reporting provides a room of flexibility for managers in how and 
what information to disclose. This room of flexibility may allow managers to use their 
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disclosure discretion to mislead investors (Marquardt & Wiedman, 2005). Li (2008) 
concludes that managers can use their discretion in preparing narrative reporting to 
strategically obfuscate the financial results of their firms. Likewise, Athanasakou and 
Hussainey (2014) argue that managers use future oriented information when they have 
incentives to mislead and provide untruthful disclosures. Therefore, this motivates the 
researcher to examine whether narrative reporting in the UK context is informative or 
simply boilerplate disclosures.  
The second motivation comes from the nature of forward-looking information in the UK 
narratives. Forward-looking information in UK narratives is a very different in nature 
from that in the US. The forward-looking information in the US mainly takes the form 
of quantitative forecasts which are easily to be verifiable (Wang & Hussainey, 2013). 
However, forward-looking statements in the UK narratives are qualitative in nature. In 
addition, these statements are not immediately verifiable or auditable (Athanasakou & 
Hussainey, 2014; Wang & Hussainey, 2013). Furthermore, prior research (e.g., 
Hussainey et al., 2003) find a significant variation between the UK firms in terms of 
forward-looking reporting practices. This nature of forward-looking disclosure in the 
UK narratives may encourage managers of firms to use the previous year’s forward-
looking narratives as a template from year to year without making significant changes in 
order to save the preparation costs of narrative reporting document. This may raise a 
concern that these statements include substantial boilerplate disclosures and immaterial 
details about firm current performance. 
The third motivation for the current study stems from the lack of the timeliness of the 
publication date of the annual report and, consequently, its narrative reporting. It is 
concluded that forward-looking information is useful to investors in anticipating future 
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earnings information and evaluating the ability of management to successfully run the 
business in the future (Hussainey et al., 2003). However, this type of information may 
not be useful for real time decision-making because of the relative lack of timeliness of 
the annual report. This may be because this type of information is likely to be 
forestalled by other disclosure media such as analysts’ reports or conference calls. 
Consequently, the usefulness of financial-forward-looking disclosure in the UK 
narratives is still an open empirical issue and, therefore, needs more investigation. 
The fourth motivation for the current study arises from the measurement methodology 
of narrative disclosure employed in prior research. As previously stated, forward-
looking information in UK narratives is qualitative nature and is not verifiable or 
auditable. This nature might encourage managers to use last year’s narratives as 
templets for future years, which raises a concern that these statements include 
substantial boilerplate disclosures. This suggests that using measure that better captures 
new information that is free of boilerplate statements is preferable. Therefore, unlike 
prior research on forward-looking disclosure in the UK narratives (e.g., Schleicher & 
Walker, 1999; Hussainey et al., 2003; Schleicher, Hussainey & Walker, 2007; Wang & 
Hussainey, 2013; Althanasakou & Hussainey 2014), the current study uses the change 
in the level of FLFD from the most recent year rather than their respective levels. 
Adopting the change measure can better capture new information that is free of 
boilerplate statements and reflects change in the business environment (Muslu, 
Radhakrishnan, Subramanyam and Lim, 2011). In addition, this method mitigates the 
problem of endogeneity (Li, 2010b) and provides more robust results (Feldman et al., 
2010); it also alleviates the measurement noise due to repetitive statements (Muslu et 
al., 2011). To the best of our knowledge, there are no prior research measures the 
change in the level of forward-looking information in the UK narratives. 
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The fifth motivation of the current study comes from lack of prior research that 
examines 1) the influence of performance on narrative reporting, and 2) the extent to 
which firms change their disclosure in response to changes in performance. Significant 
amount of prior research typically emphasises on how performance influences the 
disclosure of quantitative financial information (e.g. Lev & Penman, 1990; Skinner, 
1994; Kasznik & Lev, 1995; Harris, 1998; Healy & Palepu, 2001; Botosan & Stanford 
2005; Berger & Hann, 2007). However, research that examines the association between 
narrative reporting and firm performance is relatively limited (Merkley, 2014). This 
may be because this type of disclosure is difficult to measure and quantify. 
In addition, Merkley (2014) suggests that for narrative reporting to perform its function, 
managers must be willing to change it in response to change in firm financial 
performance. Prior research examines the influence of performance on narrative 
disclosure (Wang & Hussainey, 2013; Merkley, 2014). However, to what extent change 
in firm performance influences managers of a firm to change FLFD is largely 
unexamined. Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, there is no prior research that 
examines the extent to which FLFD in the UK narratives is changed after the change in 
firm performance. 
The sixth motivation for the current study comes from the lack of research that 
examines the effect of FLFD on the value of a firm. Prior empirical research assesses 
the investors’ response to the publication of FLFD, by their impact on future 
performance (e.g., Clarkson, Kao, & Richardson, 1994; Li, 2010a), accuracy of analyst 
forecasts (e.g., Lang & Lundholm, 1996; Barron, Kile, & O’Keefe, 1999; Bozzolan, 
Trombetta, & Beretta, 2009; Vanstraelen, Zarzeski, & Robb, 2003; Walker & Tsalta, 
2001), and future earnings (e.g., Schleicher & Walker, 1999; Hussainey et al., 2003; 
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Schleicher et al., 2007; Wang & Hussainey, 2013; Muslu, et al., 2011). To the best of 
our knowledge, there is no prior empirical research that directly investigates the 
relationship between the publication of FLFD in UK narratives and firm value. 
Furthermore, research that investigates investors’ response to firm’s OFR statements is 
limited (Wang & Hussainey, 2013). 
The final motivation for the current study comes from the estimation method in the 
empirical tests. Bernard (1987) explains that market-based accounting research 
generally adopted Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression ignoring the problem of 
cross-sectional dependency, which may bias the standard error of the empirical model. 
This is in turn leads to incorrect inferences. 
Petersen (2009) states that when the same units (e.g., firms) are followed over a given 
period of time, the time series dependence or auto-correlation and the cross-sectional 
dependence or heteroscedasticity are more likely to exist. Specifically, he states that 
failure to deal with auto-correlation and heteroscedasticity leads to bias in the estimation 
of the standard errors and consequently incorrect inferences.  
Gow, Ormazabal and Taylor (2010) review and evaluate the estimation methods that are 
frequently used in accounting literature to correct the time series dependence and cross-
sectional dependence. They review and evaluate 121 accounting studies that use panel 
data in their estimation analyses. Their evaluations reveal that 25% of the accounting 
studies do not address such dependence (both time series and cross-sectional) while 
75% attempt to address the dependence using variety of approaches. The major problem 
with these approaches is that they may correct dependence in one direction and ignore it 
in the other direction. They, finally, explain that accounting research ignores either one 
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or both types of dependence or relies on methods that have not been formally evaluated 
(e.g., Z2 statistics and New-West).  
Peterson (2009) and Gow et al. (2010) find that in the presence of auto-correlation and 
heteroscedasticity in the data sets, the standard errors that are clustered by firms are 
unbiased and produce correctly sized confidence intervals. In addition, Petersen (2009) 
finds that the presence of time effect in the data set can be addressed using fixed effect 
(e.g. including time dummies). Overall, he suggests that the efficiency of the estimation 
method can be improved by adding fixed effects to the estimation method. 
Essentially, the current study estimates the empirical models using OLS regression with 
robust standard error clustered by firms to account for any residual dependence created 
by firm effects (auto-correlation). In addition, the year-fixed effect is added in the 
empirical models to mitigate the time effects (heteroscedasticity). This estimation 
method accounts for the residual dependency problems frequently neglected in market-
based accounting research (Gow et al., 2010). 
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1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES, RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND RESEARCH 
HYPOTHESES 
1.3.1 Research objectives  
This study uses a year-over-year change score in forward-looking financial disclosure 
(FLFD) to empirically examine the informativeness of this type of information in the 
UK OFR statements. If FLFD level is changed (updated) in response to change in firm 
performance, it will include some informational content about firm performance and, 
thus, offers valuable and relevant information for investors. In addition, investors’ 
response to the new information released as a result of the change in FLFD helps in 
assessing the usefulness of FLFD in the UK narratives to investors. 
Particularly, the current study addresses the following research objectives: 
First, it examines the extent to which change in firms’ performance influences managers 
of firms to change FLFD. This objective is achieved theoretically and empirically in 
chapter 4.  
Second, it identifies the firm characteristics that may drive (influence) managers of 
firms to change their FLFD from year to year. This objective is achieved theoretically 
and empirically in chapter 4.  
Third, it investigates the investors’ response to change in FLFD. Particularly, it 
examines the association between the change in FLFD and the future value of a firm. 
This aim is achieved theoretically and empirically in in chapter 5. 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
 
 
 
A
p
p
en
d
ice
s 
11 
1.3.2 Research questions  
The following summarises the research questions addressed by the current study. 
First, whether and to what extent do firms’ managers change FLFD of their firms in 
response to changes in firms’ current performance? 
 
This question can be divided into the following sub-questions: 
 
Q1a. Do firms’ managers change FLFD of their firms in response to changes in 
firms’ current performance? If they do at all, 
 
Q1b. Do firms with larger change in their current performance change their FLFD 
more than firms with smaller performance change? 
 
Q1c. Do poorly performing firms change their FLFD more than well-performing 
firms? 
 
Second, what are the firm characteristics that may influence managers to change FLFD 
of their firms from the previous year?  
 
This question can be divided into the following sub-questions  
 
Q2a. Does firm size influence firms’ managers to change FLFD from the previous 
year? 
 
Q2b. Does competitive environment influence firms’ managers to change FLFD 
from the previous year? 
 
Q2c. Does litigious environment influence firms’ managers to change FLFD from 
the previous year? 
 
Q2d. Does the percentage of managerial ownership influence firms’ managers to 
change FLFD from the previous year? 
 
Q2e. Does auditor type influence firms’ managers to change FLFD from the 
previous year? 
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Third, do investors response to information revealed by the change in FLFD?   
The current study uses the future value of a firm to measure the investors’ responses to 
changes in FLFD. Therefore, this research question could be re-stated as follows: 
Q3a: Does association exist between the change in FLFD and a firm value? 
 
Q3b. Does change in FLFD affect the value of well-performing firms and poorly 
performing firms differently? 
 
1.3.3 Research Hypotheses  
The research hypotheses are classified into three main groups based on research 
questions and objectives. The first group of hypotheses is related to the association 
between the change in firm current performance and the change in FLFD. The second 
group is related to the firm characteristics that may influence firms’ managers to change 
FLFD of their firms from the previous year. The final one is related to the association 
between the change in FLFD and the value of the firm. Details of these groups are given 
below:  
First: The association between change in firm current performance and change in 
FLFD.  
 
H1a: A positive association exists between the change in firm performance and 
the change in FLFD in UK narratives. 
 
H1b: Firms with larger changes in their performance are more likely to change 
their FLFD than those with smaller performance changes in UK narratives.  
 
Second: Firm characteristics that may encourage managers to change FLFD.  
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H2a: A positive association exists between firm size and the change in FLFD in 
UK narratives. 
 
H2b: A negative association exists between competitive environment and the 
change in FLFD in UK narratives. 
 
H2c: An association exists between litigious environment and the change in FLFD 
in UK narratives. 
 
H2d: A positive association exists between the percentage of managerial 
ownership and the change in FLFD in UK narratives 
 
H2e: A positive association exists between auditor type and the change in FLFD 
in UK narratives 
 
Third:  The association between the change in FLFD and the value of the firm.  
 
H3: An association exists between the change in FLFD and firm value. 
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1.4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY   
Verifying a suitable methodology should be consistent with both the research objectives 
and questions. In order to achieve the objectives and to answer the research questions, 
this section states the study’s research philosophy, strategy, approach and design (as 
presented in Figure 1.1). 
Figure 1.1: Summary of research philosophy, strategy, approach, and design 
 
 
                    Source: The author 
1.4.1 Research philosophy 
The research philosophy can go from the “interpretivism” on one extreme to the 
“positivism” on the other extreme (Collis & Hussey 2003). The interpretivism 
philosophy emphasises the differences between conducting research among people and 
objects of the natural sciences and, therefore, requires a social scientist to grasp the 
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• Inductive 
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•Qualitative  
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subjective meaning of social action (Bryman, 2004; Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 
2009).  
A part from the interpretivism, the research philosophy employed in the current study is 
the positivism. The positivism philosophy seeks to adopt a scientific detachment, free 
from the distorting potential of opinion and bias and consequently pursuit objectivity 
(Parsa, 2001). Therefore, under the positivism philosophy, the researcher is likely to use 
existing theory to develop hypotheses which would be tested and confirmed or rejected 
(Saunders et al., 2009). 
1.4.2 Research strategies  
Two main distinctive research strategies are widely employed in social science: 
“quantitative” and “qualitative” strategies. The quantitative strategy emphasises on the 
quantification in the data collection, and using mathematical models that link between 
cause and effect relationship, and test the hypotheses of the chosen theories. On the 
other hand, the qualitative strategy emphasises on words and interpretation to discover 
the required knowledge rather than quantification in the collection and analysis of data.  
The quantitative strategy is most suited with the positivism philosophy (Crotty, 1998). 
Furthermore, the nature of the research objectives and research questions suggests the 
use of quantitative strategy. This strategy allows the quantification in the collection and 
analysis of data to test and interpret the association between variables. It is more likely 
to answer the research questions and, therefore, generalizing the results. 
1.4.3 Research approach  
There are two main research approaches: “deductive” and “inductive” approaches. The 
deductive approach is starting from a theory (theories), after that, the hypotheses are 
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developed based on this theory (these theories), and then a research strategy is designed 
to test the hypotheses depending on the collected data (Saunders et al., 2009). Unlike 
the deductive approach, under the inductive approach the data related to the 
phenomenon is collected and analysed, then a theory is built up as a result of the 
conclusion from data analysis (Bryman & Bell, 2003). 
The deductive approach is more appropriate for the current study. Under this approach, 
research questions are established, then various hypotheses are developed based on the 
existing theory (theories) and finally statistical techniques are used to test the developed 
hypotheses which lead to either accepting or rejecting the relationship between variables 
according to the chosen theory (theories). 
1.4.4 Research design 
The study uses a sample of the UK FTSE all-shares non-financial firms over the period 
from 2005 to 2011. Datastream is used to obtain a list of FTSE all-shares firms listed in 
the London Stock Exchange. All financial firms are excluded; in addition, firms that do 
not have complete series of annual reports over the sample period are excluded. More 
details about these issues are provided in chapter 3 (section 3.3), chapter 4 (section 
4.6.4), and chapter 5 (section 5.7.4). The annual reports are collected from companies’ 
official websites, the Thomson one banker database, and the Northcote website 
(www.northcote.co.uk). All financial data is collected form Datastream. The auditor 
type data is manually collected from the companies’ annual reports.  
Based on prior disclosure research, the level of FLFD is captured using the automated 
content analysis technique (e.g., Hussainey et al., 2003; Li, 2010a; Muslu et al., 2011). 
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The current study measures the change in firm’s FLFD by calculating the change in the 
level of FLFD from the previous year to current year. 
Change in firm current performance is measured by the difference between firm return 
on equity ratio in year t and year t-1. In terms of firm characteristics, firm size is 
measured as the natural logarithm of the market value of equity at the end of the current 
year. The Herfindahl index or simply Herf is used as a proxy for competitive 
environment. The industry classification is used to identify firms that are exposed to 
high litigious risk. The managerial ownership is the percentage of total shares in issue of 
5% or more held by employees, or by those with a substantial position in a company 
that provides significant voting power at an annual general meeting. The size of the 
audit firm is used as a measure of the auditor type.  
To investigate investors’ response to changes in FLFD, firm value three months after 
the annual report date is used as a proxy for investors’ response. The value of the firm is 
measured using the natural logarithm of the firm Tobin’s Q ratio three months after the 
date of annual report. 
To test the hypotheses and examine the association between the main variables, the 
current study estimates using OLS regression with robust standard error clustered by 
firm to mitigate the residual dependence problems caused by time effect 
(heteroscedasticity) and firm effect (auto-correlation).  
More details about the research design are discussed throughout chapters (3, 4 & 5).  
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1.5 RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS 
This study offers three distinct contributions to the narrative reporting literature in 
general and forward-looking disclosure in particular.  
First, it contributes to the body of knowledge on methodological developments in both 
the measurement of FLFD and the estimation method in empirical tests. Unlike prior 
research on forward-looking disclosure in the UK narratives (e.g., Schleicher & Walker, 
1999; Hussainey et al., 2003; Schleicher et al., 2007; Wang & Hussainey, 2013; 
Althanasakou & Hussainey 2014), the study uses the change in FLFD rather than their 
respective levels. Adopting change measure in narrative reporting can better capture 
new information that is free of boilerplate statements and reflects changes in the 
business environment (Muslu et al., 2011). In addition, this method mitigates the 
problem of endogeneity (Li, 2010b) and provides more robust results (Feldman et al., 
2010); it also alleviates the measurement noise due to repetitive statements (Muslu et 
al., 2011).  
Furthermore, the study uses the OLS regression with robust standard error clustered by 
firms in order to mitigate the residual dependence problems caused by time effect 
(heteroscedasticity) and firm effect (auto-correlation). This estimation method accounts 
for the residual dependency problem frequently neglected in market-based accounting 
research (Gow et al., 2010).  
Second, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first UK evidence on the extent to 
which firms change their FLFD in response to change in performance. The study finds 
an association between the change in firms’ earnings performance and the change in 
FLFD. However, it offers evidence that firms with larger changes in earnings 
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performance are more likely to change their FLFD than those with smaller performance 
changes. Furthermore, the change in FLFD is more positively associated with poorly 
performing firms compared to well-performing firms. Given that IASB concerns about 
the informativeness of narrative reporting, this study provides fresh evidence that FLFD 
in the UK narrative statements includes some content about firm performance. 
The study, also, provides the first UK evidence on identifying the firm characteristics 
that might influence managers of firms to change FLFD of their firms over years. It 
finds that change in FLFD is influenced positively (negatively) by firm size, 
(competitive environment), (litigious environment), and (percentage of managerial 
ownership). In addition, the role of the auditor in overseeing narrative reporting is not 
appearing for the all sample firms or for well-performing firms, however, it is 
observable only when firms are poorly performing. This result helps in understanding 
the incentives of managers to provide informative narrative reporting. 
Third, the prior empirical research assesses the usefulness of forward-looking 
statements in the UK narratives by examining their impact on future earnings 
(Schleicher & Walker, 1999; Hussainey et al., 2003; Schleicher et al., 2007; Wang & 
Hussainey, 2013). This study extends the literature on the infomativeness of FLFD by 
examining the effect of the change in these statements on the firm value. The results 
suggest that the value of a firm decreases as long as it changes its FLFD from the 
previous year. However, when we distinguish between well and poorly performing 
firms, it finds that the change in FLFD has no effect on the value of well-performing 
firms, while, it negatively affects poorly performing firms. These results add to our 
understanding on the usefulness of forward-looking information in the UK narrative 
reporting. 
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1.6 STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY  
This section outlines the structure of the thesis, which contains six chapters, as shown in 
Figure 1.2. This structure indicates that there are three main chapters (chapters 3, 4 & 
5). Each one of these chapters contains, where relevant, a review of the relevant 
theories, literature, and the development of hypothesis/hypotheses, in addition, it 
presents the research design, and results. The current study is organised as follows: 
Chapter Two discusses different disclosure aspects in the corporate reporting and 
explains the importance of annual report as a way of communicating information. After 
that, it explains the nature, and arguments for and against narrative reporting in the 
annual report. Then, it focuses on narrative reporting in the annual reports of the UK 
firms, particularly the OFR statements. Finally, it takes sharper focus (more 
concentration) on forward-looking information in the UK narratives. 
Chapter Three explains the methodology of measuring change in FLFD from the 
previous year. It starts by discussing the arguments for adopting change methodology in 
measuring narrative reporting. Then, it explains the sample selection process and the 
collection of the annual reports. After that, it provides the detailed explanation of the 
steps used in measuring change in FLFD, and discusses the reliability and validity tests. 
Finally, it reports the descriptive analysis that explains the change in FLFD over years 
and across industries. 
Chapter Four investigates the factors that might influence managers of firms to change 
FLFD over years. Hence, it provides answers to the research questions: Q1a, Q1b, Q1c, 
Q2a, Q2b, Q2c, Q2d and Q2e. The chapter starts by providing the theoretical 
framework; it discusses relevant theories, the literature, and the development of 
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hypotheses. Then, it details the research design; it draws on the variables’ definitions 
and measurements, and sample selection and data collection. Finally, it reports the 
results of the current study; it presents the descriptive statistics, the correlation analysis, 
the multivariate results, and introduces further analysis. 
Chapter Five examines the association between change in FLFD and firm value. Hence, 
it provides an answer to the research question: Q3. The chapter starts by providing the 
theoretical framework; it discusses relevant theories, the literature, and the development 
of hypothesis. Then, it details the research design; it draws on the variables’ definitions 
and measurements, and sample selection and data collection. Finally, it reports the 
results of the current study; it presents the descriptive statistics, the correlation analysis, 
the multivariate results and introduces further analysis and robustness test. 
Chapter Six provides the concluding remarks of the current study. It starts by providing 
summary of the research objectives and key findings. Then, it discusses the implications 
of the results. Finally, the limitations of the current study and suggestions for future 
research are highlighted.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
 
 
 
A
p
p
en
d
ice
s 
22 
Figure 1.2: The structure of the study 
  
Chapter 1:  
Introduction   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Provides an overview of the current study 
motivation, objectives, methodology, and 
contributions.  
  
Chapter 2:  
Narrative reporting  
Explains the importance of annual reports, 
narrative reporting, OFR, and forward-looking 
information. 
  
Chapter 3:  
Measuring change in 
FLFD  
Explains the methodology of measuring 
changes in FLFD from the previous, discusses 
the reliability and validity tests, and reports the 
descriptive analysis. 
  
Chapter 4:  
Managers’ incentives to 
change FLFD of their 
firms 
Examines the factors that might encourage 
managers to change their FLFD over years. 
Hence, it provides an answer to the research 
question: Q1a, Q1b, Q1c, Q2a, Q2b, Q2c, Q2d 
and Q2e. 
  
Chapter 5:  
Association between 
change in FLFD and firm 
value  
Examines the association between change in 
FLFD and firm value. Hence, it provides an 
answer to the research question: Q3. 
  
Chapter 6:  
Conclusion   
Summarises the main findings, provides the 
research implications and discusses limitations 
and suggests potential avenues for future 
research. 
Source: The author 
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CHAPTER 2 : NARRATIVE REPORTING   
2.1 OVERVIEW  
Lev (1989) states that financial statements lost their value relevance, therefore, beside 
the traditional financial information, annual report contains large amounts of narrative 
information. This chapter generally seeks to provide a description (and where 
appropriate, an evaluation) of narrative reporting. It presents discussion about the nature 
of narrative reporting then focuses on the narrative reporting within the context of the 
UK. Finally, it takes a sharper focus on forward-looking information in the UK 
narratives. 
Particularly, the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses different 
communication tools and different disclosure aspects in the corporate reporting. Then, it 
explains the importance of annual reports as a way of communicating information. 
Section 2.3 discusses the nature of narrative reporting and explains the arguments for 
and against narrative reporting. Section 2.4 focuses mainly on narrative reporting in the 
UK; it discusses the nature, development and content of the OFR as a main narrative 
disclosure medium required by the ASB in the UK. Section 2.5 takes a sharper focus on 
forward-looking information included in the UK OFR statements. It discusses the nature 
and argument for and against forward-looking information. Then, it explains the 
usefulness of forward-looking information. Finally, the chapter discusses different 
measures of forward-looking disclosure. The concluding remarks of this chapter are 
provided in section 2.6. 
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2.2 CORPORATE REPORTING 
The separation between ownership and control creates an agency problem
4
, particularly 
an information asymmetry problem, where market participants believe that managers 
tend to behave to their own benefits (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Accordingly, any 
mechanism intended to overcome this information asymmetry problem is profound to 
the success of the financial market (Ronen & Yaari, 2002). One of the most effective 
mechanisms in mitigating such problem is keeping investors informed through 
disclosure. Disclosure, in general, is critical for the functioning of capital market (Healy 
& Palepu, 2001). It is defined as “any deliberate release of information, whether 
quantitative or qualitative, mandatory or voluntary, or via formal or informal channels” 
(Gibbins, Richardson, & Waterhouse, 1990, p. 122).  
The disclosure of financial information is crucial; however, it provides only one part of 
the overall firm performance. Since, it focuses only on the short-term results of 
businesses, giving little emphasis to their long-term value potential (Beattie et al., 
2004). The International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) argues that “if financial 
statements are not sufficient to meet the objectives of financial reporting, then the IASB 
should consider requiring the disclosure of other information to help the financial 
reports meet their objective (…) this will be achieved only if companies provide clear 
and meaningful information” (IASB, 2005, p. 11).  
Therefore, there is a need for other types of information beyond the traditional financial 
statements that emphasis on back-looking and quantified financial disclosure (Lev & 
                                                 
4
 The agency problems arise when investors do not intend to play an active role in the management of 
their firms and delegate the responsibility to the agents of the firm. The self-interested managers have an 
incentive to make decisions that expropriate investors’ interests by over-consuming perquisites, paying 
directors excessive compensation or making investment decisions that are harmful to the interests of 
outside investor (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
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Zarowin, 1999; FASB, 2001b; Lev, 2001; ICAEW, 2003; Beattie et al., 2004). These 
types of information may provide more transparency regarding the companies’ business 
life (Espinosa, Tapia, & Trombetta, 2008).  
The disclosure requirements and practices are growing. The types of information that 
firms provide to the public are being changed. Instead of simply providing the 
breakdown of line items, companies begin to provide more detailed disclosures to 
accommodate users’ needs. Therefore, the firm’s corporate reporting has been changed. 
Besides financial reporting, there are many different disclosure areas of reporting such 
as corporate governance, corporate social responsibility, directors’ remuneration 
reporting, and narrative reporting. Below is an overview on each of these different 
disclosure areas of reporting: 
Financial reporting: This type of reporting is the core of corporate reporting. It consists 
mainly of the financial statements
5
 and the accompanying notes to these financial 
statements. The preparation of financial statements has to be done in accordance with 
the accounting standards (e.g., IFRS; US-GAAP). 
Corporate governance reporting: The term corporate governance refers to the process 
through which firms are controlled. The corporate governance reporting covers 
information such as the structure of board of directors, the internal control system, 
reporting on firm’s going concern, and the external auditors. 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) reporting: This represents the communication on 
how firms understand and manage their impact on people, customers, suppliers, 
environment, and society in order to deliver enhanced value to all stakeholders. 
                                                 
5 According to the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), financial statements include the 
following: statement of financial position, statement of comprehensive income, statement of change in 
equity, and cash flow statement.  
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Directors remuneration reporting: This reports the firm’s directors’ rewards and 
compensation packages, both in the short term and the long term, for delivering their 
company’s strategic objectives. It includes information about the actual amounts of 
payments made by the company to its directors and how these amounts of payments are 
calculated. 
Narrative reporting: This is stenography for the critical textual and non-financial 
discussion that is reported alongside financial information. It aims to present a review of 
the company’s operating and financial performance, position and prospects for the 
future. This narrative discussion would help investors to have a broader, more 
meaningful understanding of a company's business, its market position, strategy, 
performance, and future prospects. Typical mediums of narrative reporting are 
chairman’s statement in the UK or president letter to shareholders in the US, Chief 
Executive Officer’s statement, Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) and 
Operating and Financial Review (OFR).  
Obviously, all corporate reporting areas of disclosure include narrative statements. For 
instance, the notes accompanying to financial statements are narrative statements. The 
other corporate reporting areas, namely: corporate governance, corporate social 
responsibility, directors’ remuneration reporting and narrative reporting include 
narrative statements. However, Beattie, Dhanani, and Jones (2008) argue that narrative 
statements could be divided into two categories; descriptive and storytelling narratives. 
The descriptive narratives aim to present specific data. This type of descriptive 
narratives includes the following: notes accompanying to financial statements, corporate 
governance, corporate social responsibility, directors’ remuneration reporting. While, 
the storytelling narratives provide discussion and analysis concerning firm’s 
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performance and financial position. This type of information refers to the narrative 
reporting such as OFR and MD&A. 
However, the corporate reports of a firm can take many forms such as annual reports, 
interim reports, press releases, conference calls, and internet reporting, the firm’s annual 
report is regarded as the only source of corporate reporting that is independently 
verified (ACCA, 2013). This is because it contains the audited financial statements of a 
firm.  
The main purpose of the annual reports is to provide useful information to different 
users. Users of the annual reports can be divided into two groups; primary and 
secondary groups. The primary group of users includes shareholders or investors, 
creditors and analysts. The secondary group includes standard setters, government, 
employees, customers, suppliers, labour unions, and academic researchers. 
The importance of the annual report can be seen from two different perspectives; 
management and user perspectives. Table 2.1 summarises the importance of the annual 
reports from management and user perspectives. 
Table 2.1 
Importance of annual reports from management and user perspectives  
Management 
perspective  
Annual report intends to: 
 
Provide information for making an informed investment 
decision. 
Report on financial position, operating results and cash flows. 
Report on managers’ stewardship. 
Maintain public relations. 
Meet legal and regulatory requirements. 
Provide information for an informed shareholder voting 
decision. 
User (e.g., investor) 
perspective 
Annual report intends to: 
 
Asses risk and return. 
Provide general reference. 
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Provide information for meetings with management. 
Verify information from other sources. 
Make performances forecast. 
Reach current/potential customers. 
Analyse and track industry sector. 
This Table reports the importance of the annual reports from management and user perspectives 
  
The need for information is affected by the users’ objectives and their relation with the 
business involved. This may have a significant impact on the type of information 
required by each group, and the extent of information that can be made available to 
users. Therefore, in order to meet the different objectives, users need different types of 
information for their decision making process. Thus, management should make a 
balance between qualitative and quantitative information provided in the annual report 
in order to meet the needs of different users. 
The annual report provides variety of types of information to its users. It is regarded as a 
medium for communicating both quantitative and qualitative information to 
shareholders, investors and other users (Al-Shammari, 2008). It may contain mandatory 
and voluntary information, financial and non-financial, qualitative and quantitative 
information, back-looking and forward-looking information.  
Some prior research emphasise the usefulness of information disclosed in the annual 
reports. For instance, it is argued that information disclosed in the annual reports could 
enhance the ability of the firm to raise capital at a lower cost of capital (Healy & Palepu, 
2001). In addition, qualitative information published in the annual reports helps in 
improving share price anticipation of future earnings (Hussainey et al., 2003; Wang & 
Hussainey, 2013). 
This study focuses on narrative reporting in the annual report. However, the annual 
report has criticised because of its lack of timeliness of information, the decision to 
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focus on narrative reporting in the annual report is justified based on the following 
reasons:  
First, the annual report of a firm is an official document required to be published on an 
annual basis (Hussainey, 2004; Marston, 2008). Second, the annual reports are 
considered a primary and an influential source of information for investors and there is 
an increasing usage of these reports (Marston & Shrives, 1991; Lang & Lundholm, 
1993; Beattie et al., 2008; Elshandidy, Fraser & Hussainey, 2013). Third, the annual 
report is considered the basis for other reports such as analyst report. There is 
significant positive correlation between annual report disclosure and the disclosure of 
other media of communication such as analysts’ reports (Lang & Lundholm, 1993; 
Botosan, 1997; Botosan & Plumlee, 2002; Hussainey, 2004). This suggests that analysts 
prepare their reports based on annual reports of firms. 
Fourth, narrative reporting is extensive in annual reports. Typical mediums of narrative 
reporting in the annual reports are chairman’s statement in the UK firms or president 
letter to shareholders in the US firms, Chief Executive Officer’s statement (CEO 
statement), Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A), Operating and Financial 
Review (OFR) and Business Review. More details will be provides about narrative 
reporting in section 2.3. 
Finally, following Hussainey et al. (2003), the use of the annual reports is due to 
technical reason in coding the reports. The annual reports are available on an electronic 
format for large number of the UK firms on their websites. Thus, the study can code 
these reports automatically using QSR N6 software. In addition, the current study uses 
annual reports rather interim reports to avoid seasonality and updates of originally 
reported interim data. 
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2.3 NARRATIVE REPORTING 
Narrative reporting has become an integral part of corporate reporting, and is considered 
to be a crucial element to achieve a desired level of quality of a firm corporate reporting 
(Beattie et al., 2004). This section discusses the nature of narrative reporting and 
explains the arguments for and against this type of disclosure. 
2.3.1 Nature of narrative reporting  
Financial statements are historical in nature and contain very little non-financial 
information. However, they provide information about firm performance and its 
financial position; it is argued that more qualitative information should be provided to 
improve the users understanding (Beattie et al., 2004). As a result, firms provide 
narrative reporting statements in their annual reports. 
Narrative reporting is stenography for the critical textual and non-financial discussion 
that is reported alongside financial statements information. It aims to present a review of 
the company’s operating and financial performance, position and prospects for the 
future. It allows management to present a description of corporate financial performance 
and related accounting output and through which managers can provide discussion and 
analysis surrounding firm economic environment (Clatworthy & Jones, 2003).  
It complements financial statements and provides a channel for managers to convey 
textual information about their firms to market participants (Merkley, 2014). 
Furthermore, it offers the possibility to account for corporate qualitative information not 
recognized in financial statements, such as forward-looking information (Beattie et al., 
2004). Nonetheless, market participants analyse narrative reporting statements when 
making their decisions. The narrative statements help participants to bridge the gap 
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between financial statements amounts and the economic reality of firms’ performance 
(Feldma et al., 2010; Merkley, 2014). 
Typical mediums of narrative reporting are the UK firms’ chairman’s statement or the 
US firms president letter to shareholders, Chief Executive Officer’s statement (CEO 
statement), Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) and Operating and 
Financial Review (OFR).   
A chairman’s statement or president letter provides an overview of the firm 
performance over the past year and covers strategy, and future prospects. CEO 
statement is naturally complement to chairman’s statement. The MD&A is a key 
narrative reporting section required by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
for annual and quarterly financial reporting. The MD&A provides an overview of the 
previous year operations explains how the firm performed the past year and provides 
projections for the coming year. The OFR is a narrative explanation required by 
Accounting Standard Board (ASB) for annual reporting. It provides the main trends and 
factors underlying the development, performance and position (the OFR will be 
discussed in details in section 2.4). The current study focuses mainly on the OFR 
statements as a main narrative reporting statements required by the ASB in the UK.  
Narrative reporting can vary in both content and style. The content of narrative 
reporting refers to what information to disclose. In other wording, it concerns with 
breadth and depth of disclosed information. Disclosure breadth means the extent of the 
disclosure of different topics and how firms spread that disclosure across these topics, 
while, the disclosure depth concerns the question of what information is to be disclosed 
in each topic (Anis et al., 2012). For instance, if the company makes a discussion about 
its financial position, it could disclose information about its assets, liabilities and equity. 
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This reflects the disclosure breadth. The disclosure depth concerns with what 
information to be disclosed in each topic. For instance, in the discussion about firm’s 
assets, whether the company will provide historical discussion about its assets or some 
future oriented information concerning the assets will be provided.  
Contents, typically, have a shared meaning and are necessary to convey an idea to 
someone else (Pennebaker, 2011). If there is no focus on the content, narrative reporting 
becomes meaningless (Asay, Libby & Pennekamp, 2013). Research on the content of 
narrative reporting focuses on some characteristics such as tone of narrative disclosure  
(e.g., Kothari, Li, & Short 2009; Feldman et al., 2010; Li, 2010b; Demers & Vega 2011; 
Davis, Piger, & Sedor 2012; Huang, Teoh, & Zhang, 2014) and narrative disclosure 
quantity (e.g., Hussainey et al., 2003; Wang & Hussainey, 2013; Merkley, 2014; 
Athanasakou & Hussainey, 2014; Elshandidy, Fraser, & Hussainey, 2014).  
On the other hand, the style of narrative reporting concerns with how information is 
disclosed. In other words, style concerns with the readability of narrative reporting (e.g., 
Li, 2008; Bonsall IV & Miller, 2014). However, it is argued that narrative reporting can 
still be largely understood regardless of the style of reporting (Asay et al., 2013). Prior 
research suggests that style of reporting can affect user decision. For instance, users 
might interpret certain style choices as signals of trustworthiness or credibility (Elliott, 
Hodge, & Sedor, 2012), optimism about the future (Bowen, Davis & Matsumoto 2005; 
Davis et al., 2012), or the relative importance of information (Elliott, 2006). 
Empirically, prior research finds that bad news disclosures are likely to be longer and 
less readable than good news disclosures (e.g., Li, 2008; Asay et al., 2013; Rennekamp, 
2012). Furthermore, the longer and less readable disclosures are associated with lower 
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trading and weaker market reactions (You & Zhang 2009; Miller, 2010; Rennekamp, 
2012; Tan, Wang, & Zhou, 2013).  
Another feature of narrative reporting is that it provides a room of discretion for 
managers. Although, the topics of narrative reporting are broadly prescribed; managers 
have considerable discretion regarding the amount and content of narrative disclosure. 
Brown and Tucker (2011) argue that MD&A must cover certain topics but managers 
have flexibility in choosing breadth and depth of what is disclosed in MD&A. 
Therefore, it could be argued that narrative reporting has a mandatory/discretionary 
nature. 
2.3.2 Arguments for and against narrative reporting 
There are various arguments concerning the merits and demerits of the publication of 
narrative reporting. This section attempts to explain the arguments for and against the 
narrative reporting. 
As previously indicated that the financial statements are unlikely to provide all 
information required by investors, the insufficiency of financial statements information 
may be an underlying reason why investors need narrative reporting. Narrative reporting 
may be used as a tool to communicate what cannot be delivered by financial statements 
numbers. Li (2010b) argues that narrative reporting can provide a very useful context 
for understanding financial amounts in the financial statements. Furthermore, Merkely 
(2014) argues that narrative reporting bridge the gap between financial reporting and 
economic reality of the firm. Abrahamson and Amir (1996) argue that financial 
statements are aimed at aiding investors in timing and valuing future cash flows and 
dividends, the information therein is purely historical. However, management possess 
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the information that can be helpful in explaining current performance and forecasting; 
such data cannot be expressed within the financial statements. Therefore, narrative 
reporting is required to alleviate the discrepancy between the objective of financial 
statements and the ability of the actual content of the statements to fulfil this function. 
Therefore, narratives provide the platform for discussion and analysis around numbers 
in the financial statements.  
Another argument for the publication of narrative reporting is that these reports reduce 
the information asymmetry problem between managers and outsiders (Dhaliwal, Li, & 
Tsang, 2011). Narrative reporting provides a considerably important mean for managers 
to convey their perspectives of the firm to outside investors. Therefore, it is considered a 
crucial in reducing information asymmetry among the market participants, as well as, 
between managers and investors (Dhaliwal et al., 2011).  Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1998) explain two cases related to under and over reaction to earnings figure. In the 
case of under reaction, investors assume that the earnings figures may be permanent. 
Barberis et al. (1998) argue that the reason may be because investors depend on the 
earlier earnings that may be too low to justify the current earnings. In the case of 
overvaluation, investors erroneously assume that past good performance is reflective of 
future good performance. They, also, suggest that more explanation is required to justify 
the current earnings. Consequently, narrative reporting may be used to serve this 
purpose.  
Furthermore, proponents of the publication of narrative reporting argue that it is 
regarded as an important source of information for different users. Clatworthy and Jones 
(2003) state that narrative reporting is an important source of information for different 
sophisticated users such as analysts and institutional investors. In addition, it is helpful 
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in making investment decisions (Lee & Tweedie, 1981). Arnold and Moizer (1984) find 
that narrative reporting statements in the annual reports are influential source of 
information to both financial analysts and institutional investors. The ASB (2005, para 
14 & 2006, para 14) conceptualised that narrative reporting is intended to help investors 
in evaluating past results and future performance of the business in order to enable them 
to make rational investment decisions. Likewise, the IASB (2005, para 41) argue that 
narrative reporting are more likely to help users interpret financial statements and 
improve their ability to make economic decisions. 
On the other hand, there are other arguments against the publication of narrative 
reporting. Opponents of narrative reporting argue that managers may successfully use 
narrative reporting to mislead investors (Kanto & Schadewitz, 2009). If you consider 
that narrative reporting provides a room for discretion for managers, managers may use 
their discretion in disclosure to mislead investors (Marquardt & Wiedman, 2005). Li 
(2008) concludes that managers can use their discretion in preparing narrative reporting 
to strategically obfuscate the financial results. He finds that the narrative statements of 
poorly performing firms are difficult to read and understand compared to those of well-
performing firms.  
Furthermore, some studies (e.g., Healy, Hutton & Palepu, 1999; Lev & Penman, 1990) 
suggest that narrative disclosures reflects agency but explained as either a case of 
impression management or management’s willingness to subdue information 
asymmetry.  Impression management is regarded as attempts “to control and manipulate 
the impression conveyed to users in accounting information” (Clatworthy & Jones, 
2001, p. 311). As a result, managers are presumed to use narrative reporting as 
impression management vehicles to “strategically manipulate the perceptions and 
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decisions of stakeholders” (Yuthas, Rogers & Dillard, 2002, p. 142). Therefore, 
narrative reporting may provide a disclosure medium for managers to engage in 
impression management practices.  
Table 2.2 summarises the arguments for and against narrative reporting. 
 
Table 2.2 
Arguments for and against narrative reporting 
Arguments for narrative reporting Arguments against narrative reporting  
Used to deliver what cannot be delivered 
by financial statements numbers. 
May be used by management to mislead 
investors  
Reduces the information asymmetry 
problem  
Helps managers to engage in impression 
management practices. 
Source of information for different users 
(e.g., analysts and institutional investors) 
 
This Table summarises the arguments for and against narrative reporting. 
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2.4 OPERATING AND FINANCIAL REVIEW (OFR)  
The current study focuses on narrative reporting in the United Kingdom (UK). The 
Operating and Financial Review, or simply OFR, is introduced by the Accounting 
Standard Board (ASB) as a narrative reporting medium for firms in the UK. This 
section discusses the nature, the developments, and the contents of the OFR. 
2.4.1 Nature of the OFR statements  
Para 3 of the ASB (2006) defines the OFR as “A narrative explanation, provided in or 
accompanying the annual report, of the main trends and factors underlying the 
development, performance and position of an entity during the financial year covered by 
the financial statements, and those which are likely to affect the entity’s future 
development, performance, and position” (ASB, 2006, p. 8)  
The OFR is introduced to encourage companies to provide textual disclosure within 
which directors could discuss the main factors underlying the company’s performance 
and financial position (ASB, 2005; ASB, 2006). It should provide analysis of the 
business through the eyes of the board of directors. It is stated that “The OFR shall set 
out an analysis of the business through the eyes of the board of directors” (ASB, 2006, 
Principle 4, p. 9). Thus, the OFR should reflect the directors’ view of the business. It is 
argued that “Directors should consider the potential future significance of issues in 
deciding whether or not to include an analysis of them in the OFR” (ASB, 2006, p. 18).  
The OFR shall focus on matters that are relevant to the interest of different users (ASB, 
2005; ASB, 2006). It is stated in the exposure draft of the Reporting Standard 1 (RS1) 
of the OFR that it requires directors to prepare an OFR addressed to investors. However, 
it is explicitly stated that the users of the OFR statements include investors, potential 
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investors, creditors, customers, suppliers, employees and society (ASB, 2005; ASB, 
2006). Accordingly, the OFR statements should be relevant to all users who may need 
relevant information for their decision making.  
2.4.2 The developments of the OFR statements  
The preparation of the OFR has been guided in number of ways since the concept was 
first developed in 1993. It has gone from voluntary, to mandatory, back to voluntary, 
and then firms are required to prepare a “Business Review”. As stated in the OFR 
Reporting Statement (2006, Introduction, para.1, 2, 3, 4, &5), the development of the 
OFR statements was as follows: 
The ASB originally issued the “Statement OFR” in July 1993.The Statement build on 
the foundation of existing best practice by providing a framework within which 
directors could discuss the main factors underlying the company performance and its 
financial position
6
. Then, this statement was updated and a revised version issued in 
January 2003 to reflect later improvements in narrative reporting. At this stage there 
were no mandatory requirements on firms to prepare an OFR.  
Following a recommendation from the Company Law Review (CLR) Steering Group 
(2001) and the government response on the “Modernising Company Law” (2002), the 
government decided to require quoted companies to prepare and publish OFR 
statements. In May 2004, the government issued proposal on the detailed 
implementation of this new requirement in a consultation document “Draft Regulation 
on the Operating and Financial Review and Directors’ report” The consultation 
document contained draft secondary legislation to implement new statutory OFR. 
                                                 
6 I have searched for the original “Statement OFR”. However, it is not available. Any information about 
this statement is based on what is written in the OFR standard and statement in 2005 and 2006, 
respectively. 
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Following consultation, the final OFR regulations were passed into law in March 2005, 
the ASB started developing a reporting standard for OFR. The government gave the 
ASB a statutory power to make reporting standards for OFR.  
In November 2004, the ASB issued the Reporting Exposure Draft (RED) 1 “The 
Operating and Financial Review”. After approval for issue by eight of the nine members 
of the ASB, the ASB issued the Reporting Standard 1 (RS1) “The Operating and 
Financial Review”. The RS1 is mandatory for all Great Britain (GB) quoted companies7  
and any other entities that wish to prepare an OFR for financial years beginning on or 
after 1
st
 April 2005.  The mandatory legal requirement for the content of the OFR is set 
out in the companies act 1985 (operating and financial review and directors’ report etc.) 
regulations 2005.  
On 28 November 2005, and after less than one year of the issuing of the mandating 
RS1, the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced the intention of government to remove 
the mandatory requirement for quoted companies to publish an OFR, on the basis that 
government has a general policy not to impose regulatory requirements on UK 
businesses over and above the relevant directive requirements. In December 2005 the 
mandatory requirement for OFR was cancelled and came into force on 12
th
 of January, 
2006.  
RS1 has been withdrawn as a result of the removal of the statutory requirement for the 
OFR. The ASB has converted RS1 into a Reporting Statement of best practice on the 
OFR which is considered voluntary rather than mandatory. The Reporting Statement of 
best practice on the OFR has been taken effect on January 2006 as voluntary best 
                                                 
7  A quoted company is defined as a GB company whose equity share capital: 
 is included in the official list (under part 6 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000); or 
 is officially listed in an European Economic Area state 
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practice. It is argued that “The wording of the objectives of the 2005 OFR reporting 
standard and the 2006 OFR reporting statement were almost identical apart from that 
the latter being more persuasive relative to the former that had a clear mandatory 
requirement” (Wang & Hussainey, 2013, p. 27). 
In 2006, the companies’ act 2006 was introduced later that year, which introduced 
requirements for companies reporting, in the shape of “Business Review” requirements. 
Business Review requirements were enhanced for quoted companies and restated in the 
Companies Act 2006; these requirements came into effect for reporting years beginning 
on or after 1
st
 of October, 2007. The ASB believes that the Reporting Statement on 
Operating and Financial Review continues to provide best practice guidance for all UK 
companies that are required to prepare a business review (ASB, 2008). The Business 
Review requires companies to provide broadly the same information on narrative 
matters as the earlier OFR. All companies, other than small, are required to prepare a 
business review as part of the directors’ annual report8.  
The ASB published a report in 2009 titled “A Review of Narrative Reporting by UK 
Listed Companies in 2008/2009”. This report surveyed the UK narratives on a review 
statement. The review concludes that “The companies that are reviewed are titling their 
narrative reporting statements using variety of titles, such as the “Business Review”, the 
“OFR”, the “Performance Review”, the “Chairman’s Review or Statement” and the 
“Chief Executive’s Review or Statement” (ASB, 2009, Summary of conclusion, para. 
1.10).  
Furthermore, Anis et al. (2012) review 580 narrative reporting statements of UK firms 
over the period from 2006 to 2009. They find that firms produce the same contents of 
                                                 
8 Business Review is part of the directors’ report. Firms provide the OFR contents under the title business 
review. However, the OFR statements are mandatory not voluntary as earlier OFR reporting statement. 
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the OFR under the title of “Business Review” or under the title “Chief Executive 
Review”. In addition, firms may report two separate sections “Operating Review” and 
“Financial Review” or produce either only an “Operating Review” or a “Financial 
Review”.  
Hereafter, when we use the term OFR, we mean by it the OFR statements reported 
under any of the aforementioned titles.  
2.4.3 Contents of the OFR statements  
Both principle 14 in the ASB (2005) and principle 13 of ASB (2006) suggest that the 
OFR should complement and supplement the financial statements of firms in order to 
enhance the overall corporate reporting. Further, they explain that in complementing the 
financial statements, the OFR should provide relevant financial and non-financial 
information about the firm and its performance that is not reported in the financial 
statements. In supplements the financial statements the OFR should explain the 
conditions and events that shaped the information contained in the financial statements.  
However, the OFR should cover certain topics; the contents of OFR statements are 
discretionary. In other words, when preparing the OFR statements managers have 
flexibility in choosing breadth and depth of what is discussed. However, they have to 
follow certain principles that are outlined in the ASB (2005 & 2006) reporting 
statement. Therefore, it may be argued that the OFR statements have 
mandatory/discretionary nature. 
According to ASB (2005 & 2006) principles, the OFR should cover, but not limited to, 
the following topics: 
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The nature, objectives and strategies of the business: This should cover a description of 
the business and its external environment. It, also, discusses objectives of the business 
to generate value over the long term. In addition, it sets out the directors’ strategies for 
achieving the objectives of the business. 
Current and future development and performance: This should describe and provide the 
directors’ analysis of the significant features of the development and performance of the 
business during the financial year covered by the financial statements. In addition, it 
analyses the main trends and factors underlying the development, performance and 
position of the business during the financial year and those that are likely to affect them 
in the future. 
Financial position: This should cover analysis of the financial position of the entity. It 
should provide analysis of the factors that have impacted the financial position of the 
entity during the financial year. In addition, it analyses the future factors that that may 
affect the future financial position. Furthermore, it discusses the accounting policies that 
are critical to an understanding of firm’s performance and financial position. 
Capital structure, cash flow, and liquidity: This should include discussion on firm 
capital structure and its short and long term funding plans. It, also, discusses the cash 
inflows and cash outflows and provides analysis of the factors that have affected the 
cash flows during the financial year. In addition, it discusses the entity’s current and 
prospective liquidity and the level of borrowings. 
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Key Performance Indicators (KPIs)
9
: This should cover the definitions and calculation 
methods of the KPIs and their purposes. In addition it should include any changes that 
may alter to the KPIs. It should also include other performance indicators. 
Resources, principal risks and uncertainties: This should include a description of the 
resources available to the entity. It includes, also, description and analysis of the 
principal risks and uncertainties facing the entity. 
Relationships: This should cover information about significant relationships with 
stakeholders that are likely to directly or indirectly influence the performance of the 
business and its value. 
The contents of the OFR are narratives but, where appropriate, with supporting figures. 
In addition, the discussions and analyses in the OFR should be sufficiently detailed, 
comprehensive and written in clear and readily understandable style. Furthermore, it 
should be balanced and neutral and deal with both good and bad aspects. Moreover, the 
OFR statements should be comparable overtime. Finally, the discussion and analysis in 
the OFR should have forward-looking orientation.
10
. 
The current study focuses mainly on the forward-looking information in the UK OFR 
statements. Section 2.5 provides detailed discussion on forward-looking information  
                                                 
9
 According to Elzahar, Hussainey, Mazzi, and Tsalavoutas (2015), the Key Performance Indicators 
(KPIs) are considered to be crucial measures of firm’s performance, and are disclosed by a firm’s 
directors in order to help the investors and other stakeholders to analyze the firm’s performance. These 
KPIs could be financial (e.g., operating profit, cash flow, and earnings per share), or non-financial (e.g., 
new product launches; emissions; total energy). 
 
10
 All this information is based on the principles outlined in the ASB (2005 & 2006) 
CHAPTER 2: NARRATIVE REPORTING   
 
 
 
A
p
p
en
d
ice
s 
44 
2.5 FORWARD-LOOKING INFORMATION 
All the requirements of the narrative reporting recommend that the analysis and 
discussion in narrative reporting should have a forward-looking orientation and, 
therefore, firms should provide this type of information.  
For instance, the OFR reporting statement suggests that “The OFR should have a 
forward-looking orientation, identifying those trends and factors relevant to the 
members’ assessment of the current and future performance of the business and the 
progress towards the achievement of long-term business objectives” (ASB, 2006, p. 9).  
Furthermore, the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) suggests that 
“Management should include forward-looking information. Such information should 
focus on the extent to which the entity’s financial position, liquidity and performance 
may change in the future and why, and include management’s assessment of the entity’s 
prospects in the light of current period results. Management should provide forward-
looking information through narrative explanations or through quantified data” (IASB, 
2010, p.  10). 
This section discusses the nature, the arguments for and against, as well as, the 
usefulness of forward-looking information. Then, it explains different measures of this 
type of disclosure.  
2.5.1 Nature of forward-looking information  
Hussainey (2004) states that the information disclosed in the annual reports could be 
classified into two types of information; “backward-looking information” and “forward-
looking information“. The backward-looking information refers to the past financial 
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results and their related disclosures. Unlike the back-looking information, the forward-
looking information focuses on the future. 
Hussainey (2004, p. 38) defines forward-looking disclosure as “information on current 
plans and future forecasts that enable shareholders and other investors to assess a 
company’s future financial performance. Furthermore, it can be defined as “Information 
about the future. It includes information about the future, (e.g., information about 
prospects and plans), that may later be presented as historical information (e.g., results)” 
(IASB, 2010, p. 17).  
Forward-looking disclosure involves, but not limited to, the managements’ projections 
on the anticipated operating results and financial forecasts such as the next year’s 
earnings, the expected revenues, and the anticipated cash flows. It also involves non-
financial information such as risks and uncertainties that could significantly affect 
actual results and cause them to differ from projected results.  
Obviously, this type of information is subjective and consequently its preparation 
requires the exercise of professional judgement. Some prior research (e.g., Hussainey et 
al., 2003; Li, 2010a; Muslu et al., 2011) identifies forward-looking statements in the 
annual report narratives using some keywords such as “forecast,” “expect,” “anticipate,” 
“estimate,” “predict” or other comparable terminology.  
Consistently, the following extract from Vodafone group PLC (2007) can be used to 
define forward-looking statements. 
“Forward-looking statements are sometimes, but not always, identified by their use of a 
date in the future or such words as “anticipates”, “aims”, “could”, “may”, “should”, 
“expects”, “believes”, “intends”, “plans” or “targets”. By their nature, forward-
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looking statements are inherently predictive, speculative and involve risk and 
uncertainty because they relate to events and depend on circumstances that will occur 
in the future” Vodafone group PLC, OFR statements, 2007. 
Prior studies look at the presentation of the forward-looking information. For instance, 
Hussainey and Walker (2008) classify forward-looking information into four types: 1) 
financial and non- financial, 2) qualitative and quantitative, 3) good news and bad news 
information, and 4) one year and multiple years’ forecasts information. They identify 
the forward-looking financial information as forward-looking information that is related 
to firm’s financial statements items (e.g., earnings, costs & cash flows) and the financial 
ratios (e.g., return on assets (ROA) & earnings per share (EPS)). On the other hand, the 
forward-looking non-financial information is the forward-looking information that is 
related to firm specific information items such as firm’s strategy and objectives, 
products, suppliers, and competitors. Furthermore, they identify the forward-looking 
quantitative information as forward-looking information that includes numbers (e.g., 0 
to 9), symbols (e.g., £, $, %) or units such as hundred(s) and million(s). on the other 
hand, any forward-looking information other than forward-looking quantitative 
information is referred to as forward-looking qualitative information. Moreover, they 
identify the good news forward-looking information as forward-looking information 
that includes positive message (e.g., high quality, superior and excellent). While, 
forward-looking information with negative message (e.g., disaster, loss and worse) is 
classified as bad news forward-looking disclosure. Finally, they define forward-looking 
disclosure as one year forecast if the sentence contains forward-looking information for 
one year following the current year (forecasts for 2005 made in the current year 2004). 
However, the sentence is multiple years’ forecast, if it includes multiple years’ forecasts 
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following the current year (e.g., forecasts for 2005and 2006 made in the current year 
2004). 
However, the types of forward-looking information seem to be independent, they are 
mutually interrelated. In other words, the forward-looking qualitative information could 
be financial or non-financial forward-looking information. The good and bad news 
information may be qualitative, non-qualitative, financial, and non-financial or may be 
for one year or multiple years.  
Prior research finds the following in terms of the types of forward-looking information. 
Bujaki and McConomy (2002) describe the nature of forward-looking information 
published in the chairmen statements and the MD&A for 46 Canadian companies. They 
find that 19.2% of information included in the chairmen statements and the MD&A is 
forward-looking. In addition, they observe that most of the forward-looking information 
is qualitative and non-financial. The also find that good news dominates bad news. 
Good news disclosures represent 97.5%, while, only 2.5% of forward-looking 
information is bad news.  
This result is consistent with other prior research in the UK. For instance, Hussainey 
and Walker (2007) report that 58% of the forward-looking information in the analyst 
report are non-financial and qualitative. In addition, only 31% provides multiple years 
forecasts in their forward-looking information. Finally, the good news information 
represents 83% of the total forward-looking information which suggests that good news 
dominates the bad news. Consistently, Clatworthy and Jones (2003) suggest that UK 
companies prefer to report positive aspects of their performance (the good news 
information). Recently, Wang and Hussainey (2013) argue that forward-looking 
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information in the UK narrative reporting are not immediately verifiable or auditable 
and are dominated by good news. 
The current study focuses only on one type of forward-looking disclosure, namely, 
forward-looking financial disclosure (FLFD). This type of forward-looking information 
is directly related to the financial statements amounts and firm financial ratios. 
Therefore, if managers follow the spirit of OFR statements, we may expect them to 
provide discussions and analyses with forward-looking orientation when there are 
significant changes in the financial performance of their firms compared to previous 
year. Consequently, this type of disclosure is suitable in investigating the association 
between forward-looking information and firm performance. Therefore, when we use 
the term forward-looking disclosure/information, we do it in this restrictive sense 
throughout this thesis. 
2.5.2 Argument for and against forward-looking information  
There is some prior research that attempts to explain what motivates firms to disclose 
forward-looking information. For instance, Kieso and Weygandt (1995) argue that the 
disclosure of forward-looking information is required due to the following. First, the 
economic environment in which the company operates is too dynamic and changes 
rapidly overtime and consequently the users’ needs for information are changing. 
Therefore, other types of information (e.g., forward-looking information) beside the 
historical information are required to satisfy users’ need for information. Second, the 
publication of forward-looking information may be helpful to investors in their 
investment decision-making process. Third, the absence of forward-looking information 
may force investors to be more likely to base their forecasts on inaccurate information 
from other sources.  
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Furthermore, Bujaki, Zeghal, and Bozec (1999) argue that the publication of forward-
looking information in the annual report is useful for reducing the degree of information 
asymmetry between managers and investors, and this, consequently, helps in reducing 
the firm cost of external financing. This argument is consistent with the capital markets 
transactions hypothesis as a motivation for narrative reporting (Healy & Palepu, 2001). 
On the other hand, there are some other arguments against the publication of forward-
looking disclosure. First, future is not well known with certainty, there is some 
uncertainty associated with the future. Because of this uncertainty, it might be difficult 
to predict the future with accuracy. Therefore, forward-looking disclosure may not be 
accurate. It is argued that firms might leverage their performance towards the level of 
their forecasts (Kasznik, 1999). Second, the publication of inaccurate forecasts increases 
the probability for lawsuits against the firm; this is consistent with the litigation cost 
hypothesis (Field, Lowery, & Shu, 2005). Accordingly, the litigation costs might reduce 
a manager’s incentives to disclose forward-looking information in narrative reporting. 
Particularly, this is true when managers believe that the legal system cannot distinguish 
between forecast errors due to uncertainty and inaccurate forecast due to management 
bias. Third, consistent with the proprietary cost hypothesis (Healy & Palepu, 2001); the 
disclosure of forward-looking information might provide useful information to 
competitors of a firm and, hence, might affect its competitive position in the market. 
Consequently, managers may be more likely to avoid disclosing this type of 
information. 
However of these arguments against the publication of forward-looking disclosure, 
there are some benefits the company could gain from the disclosure of this type of 
information. 
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2.5.3 Usefulness of forward-looking information  
From the point of view of regulatory bodies, the ASB stated that the disclosure of 
forward-looking information helps users to assess future prospects of firms (ASB, 2005; 
ASB, 2006). Furthermore, other professional accounting bodies (e.g., ICAEW, 2003, 
2004 & 2005) coincide with this benefit of the forward-looking information.  
In addition, the Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) interprets the relevance 
of forward-looking information from the point of view that financial statements lack the 
ability to provide the relevant information to users, and, consequently, other types of 
information such as forward-looking information may serve this purpose. It explains 
that the accounting function in an organisation is charged with the responsibility of 
providing useful information to investors for their economic decision-making. Since the 
function of accounting is to aid decision-making, it is necessary for the information to 
possess a future oriented outlook. Regulated financial statements can only accommodate 
historical information, but, a narrative reporting has the ability to include this type of 
disclosures (FASB, 2001a & 2001b). 
Theoretically, signalling theory may provide another perspective that might explain the 
usefulness of forward-looking disclosure. According to signalling theory, firms with 
poor performance (e.g. losses) may provide more forward-looking disclosure in order to 
signal their strengths to eliminate losses in the future. Prior studies (e.g., Schadewitz, 
Kanto, Kahra, & Blevins, 2002; Schleicher et al., 2007) argue that the managers of loss-
making firms are more likely to provide forward-looking disclosure in order to attract 
investors. In this case of bad news (e.g., losses), managers realise that the share prices 
are bound to be impacted negatively. Consequently, in order to reduce this negative 
impact or even reverse the effect of bad news to share price returns, managers tend to 
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disclose more forward-looking information that assure investors on the future viability 
of the investment. 
Empirically, prior research examines the usefulness of the disclosure of forward-looking 
information. It finds that the publication of forward-looking information is associated 
with 1) the prediction of future performance, 2) the accuracy of analyst forecasts, and 3) 
the share price anticipation of future earnings. 
For instnace, Clarkson et al. (1994) find that the publication of forward-looking 
information in the annual reports is informative with respect to future performance. In 
addition, they provide evidence that the change in forward-looking disclosure level in 
MD&A is positively associated with future firm performance. This evidence suggests 
that forward-looking disclosure in MD&A provides value relevant information. 
Furthermore, Li (2010a) examines whether forward-looking statements in MD&A are 
informative about future performance. He finds that forward-looking statements in 
MD&A are informative with respect to future firm performance. 
Large body of prior research focuses on the association between forward-looking 
disclosure and financial analyst forecasts. Generally, Lang and Lundholm (1996) report 
that analysts rely on value relevant information in deriving their forecasts. Such findings 
support Lev and Zarowin’s (1999) argument that the value relevance of historical 
information is decreasing. In terms of forward-looking disclosure, Barron et al. (1999) 
find that that higher level of forward-looking disclosure about capital expenditure and 
operations is associated with more accuracy of the analysts’ forecasts.  
Furthermore, Walker and Tsalta (2001) find a positive association between analysts’ 
forecasts and the quality of forward-looking disclosure published in the UK annual 
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reports. Moreover, Vanstraelen et al. (2003) find that disclosure of forward-looking 
information increases analysts’ accuracy of forecasts, whereas historical information 
does not affect the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts. In addition, Bozzolan et al. (2009) 
argue that forward-looking information reflects the expected impact on firm 
performance and, hence, is considered to be effective in improving the accuracy of 
analyst forecasts. 
A further group of research examines the effect of the disclosure of forward-looking 
information in annual reports on stock market. This research assesses the usefulness of 
forward-looking statements in narrative reporting by their impact on future earnings. 
For example, Muslu et al. (2011) examine whether disclosure of forward-looking 
information in MD&A helps investors to anticipate future earnings. They find that 
additional disclosure of forward-looking information in MD&A helps investors to 
anticipate future earnings, especially, when there is earnings guidance.  
On the other hand, some prior research focuses on the association between disclosure of 
forward-looking information and future return in the UK narrative reporting. For 
instance, Schleicher and Walker (1999) and Hussainey et al. (2003) provide evidence 
that high levels of forward-looking disclosure in the narrative statements of the annual 
reports improve the ability of stock market to anticipate future earnings changes. 
Moreover, Schleicher et al. (2007) find that the ability of stock returns of loss firms to 
anticipate next period earnings change is significantly greater when the firm provides 
large number of profit predictions in the annual report narratives. Furthermore, Wang 
and Hussainey (2013) find that forward-looking information in the OFR statements of 
well-governed firms improves the stock market ability to anticipate future earnings. 
Recently, Athanasakou and Hussainey (2014) examine the credibility of forward 
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looking information in narrative sections of the annual reports. They find that investors 
rely on future oriented information to anticipate future earnings 
2.5.4 Measures of forward-looking disclosure  
This section discusses different measures and proxies of voluntary disclosure in general 
and forward-looking information in particular. The classification of these measures is 
based on prior research (Hussainey, 2004; Hassan & Marston, 2010). The following 
measures will be discussed: 1) subjective rating, 2) self-constructed disclosure indices, 
3) management forecasts, and 4) content analysis technique.  
According to Hassan and Marston (2010), these measures of disclosure could be divided 
into two categories. First category includes measures that are not directly based on 
examining the original disclosure medium such as annual report (e.g., subjective rating). 
The second category measures disclosure by inspecting directly the original disclosure 
medium (e.g., self-constructed disclosure indices, management forecasts, and content 
analysis technique) 
2.5.4.1 Subjective rating11 
Under this method, a disclosure score is assigned for a particular company by 
investigating the perception of financial analyst, investor or other group of users about 
the firm disclosure practise (Beattie et al., 2004). The most well-known examples of 
subjective ratings are the Association for Investment Management Research – Financial 
Analysts Federation (AIMR-FAF) and the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System 
(I/B/E/S). 
                                                 
11 However, to the best of knowledge, subjective rating is not used in prior research to measure forward-
looking information; it is used to measure voluntary disclosure in general which may contain forward 
looking information. 
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In terms of AIMR-FAF, it uses key analysts to develop ranking lists for the US 
companies in each industry. Particularly, it conducts annual survey and assigns 
subjective ranks for firm mandatory and voluntary disclosure relative to their industry 
peers (Hassan & Marston, 2010). Under this rating, the final disclosure score of a 
particular firm is the average aggregation of disclosure within three categories, namely 
annual reports, quarterly disclosure reports, and investor and analyst relations (Hassan 
& Marston, 2010).  
Prior research use AIMR-FAF ratings as a measure of disclosure level (e.g., Botosan & 
Plumlee, 2002; Bushee & Noe, 2000; Byard & Shaw, 2003; Gelb & Zarowin, 2002; 
Healy et al., 1999; Lang & Lundholm, 1996; Lundholm & Myers, 2002). The AIMR-
FAF stopped its disclosure ratings in 1997 after rating the reports of the fiscal year 
1995. Countries such as the UK do not have similar ratings (Beattie et al., 2004). 
With regard to I/B/E/S, it represents the analysts’ forecasts of companies’ future 
earnings (Frankel et al., 2006). This rating is heavily criticised because it entails a great 
deal of subjective rating (Frankel, McVay, & Soliman, 2006).  
Apart from AIMR-FAF and I/B/E/S, there are other types of subjective ratings 
employed in prior research. As stated by Hussainey (2004), these types include the 
following: Financial Post ratings (Sutley, 1994), Australian Stock Exchange ratings 
(Brown, Taylor, & Walter, 1999), SEC ratings (Barron et al., 1999), Society of 
Management Accountants of Canada (SMAC) ratings (Richardson & Welker, 2001), 
Actualidad Economica Ratings (Blasco & Trombetta, 2003) and Centre for International 
Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR) ratings (Hope, 2003). Hussainey (2004) 
resists that prior research that use these ratings do not state whether these ratings are 
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based on investigating firms’ publications, or they just reflect analysts’ and accountants’ 
general opinions regarding the firm’s disclosure policy. 
Subjective ratings have been criticised in prior research for number of reasons. First, it 
is based on subjective judgement of the financial analysts (Healy & Palepu, 2001; 
Cheung, Jiang, & Tan, 2010) which might lead to bias in the firms’ disclosure scores 
toward the firms followed by those financial analysts (Botosan, 1997). Second, 
subjective (vs. objective) ratings limit the reliability of disclosure score because it may 
lead to different scores among different analysts (Cheung et al., 2010). Third, Healy and 
Palepu (2001) argue that: 1) it is not clear how financial analysts select the firms to be 
included in the rating, and 2) these ratings are biased towards the largest firms in each 
industry.  
It is argued that a solution to mitigate the problems of subjective rating is the use of 
self-constructed disclosure indices that are based on a list of disclosure items 
(Hussainey, 2004; Anis et al., 2012). 
2.5.4.2 Self-constructed disclosure indices  
One of the heavily used methods to assess, compare and explain differences in the 
amount of disclosure is the disclosure index. It is defined as “a research instrument to 
measure the extent of information reported in a particular disclosure vehicle(s) by a 
particular entity(s) according to a list of selected items of information” (Hassan & 
Marston, 2010, p. 18). The disclosure index is considered to be an objective (vs. 
subjective measure) of disclosure (Anis et al., 2012). It based on predetermined list of 
items that may be disclosed in firm reports (Marston & Shrives, 1991). However, the 
selection of items to be included in the index may suffer from subjectivity. 
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Disclosure index might include mandatory information items or voluntary information 
items or both mandatory and voluntary information items. In addition, it may cover 
information reported in one or more of disclosure medium produced by the company 
itself such as annual reports, and interim reports, or others such as analyst reports. 
Furthermore, it may focus on the overall disclosure medium (e.g., annual report), or 
only one section of this medium (e.g., narrative reporting statements of the annual 
report). Moreover, it may focus on only one type of information such as forward-
looking information, risk disclosure or corporate social responsibility disclosure.  
Disclosure index has been used firstly by Cerf (1961). Since this date it has been used 
extensively in academic research. Prior research that uses disclosure index include, but 
not limited to, Hassan, Romilly, and Giorgioni (2009), Jiang, Habib, and Hu (2010), 
Ernstberger and Gruning (2010), Cheung et al. (2010). Review of prior research 
indicates variation in disclosure indices in many terms. First, they (disclosure indices) 
vary in terms of the degree of involvement by the researcher in constructing the index
12
. 
Second, they vary in the type of information used to construct the index. For example, 
disclosure indices might cover mandatory disclosure (e.g.,Tai, Au-Yeung & Kwok, 
1990; Wallace, Naser, & Mora, 1994; McChlery, Kouhy, Paisey, & Hussainey, 2011) or 
voluntary disclosure (e.g., Li, Pike, & Haniffa, 2008; Striukova, Unerman, & Guthrie, 
2008; Ernstberger & Gruning, 2010; Cheung et al., 2010) or both mandatory and 
                                                 
12 According to Hassan and Marston (2010), the degree of researcher involvement in constructing the 
index varies from full involvement to non-involvement. Full involvement means that the researcher 
controls the entire process of constructing a disclosure index from selecting the items of information to be 
included in the index, to scoring these items. However, the constructed index should be based on list of 
criteria against which the disclosure is evaluated to reach to a disclosure score. For instance, Celik, Ecer 
and Karabacak (2006) construct their own disclosure score based on Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB) requirements; Abraham and Cox (2007) use principles of risks in the UK. To construct 
their disclosure index; McChlery et al. (2011) use Statement of Recommended Practice (SORP) and the 
Operating and financial review to evaluate the quality of voluntary information disclosed on oil and gas 
reserves. While non-involvement means that the researcher depends on available disclosure indices from 
prior studies or professional organizations. For instance, Evans (2004) relies on Botosan’s (1997) 
disclosure score; Leventis and Weetman (2004) use Meek, Roberts, and Gray’s (1995) index; Lim, 
Matolcsy and Chow(2007) use Meek et al.’s (1995) disclosure score. 
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voluntary disclosures (e.g., Barako, Hancock, & Izan, 2006; Wang, Sewon, & 
Claiborne, 2008; Hassan et al., 2009; Jiang et al., 2010). Third, they vary from few 
items (Tai et al., 1990) to a hundred of items (Spero, 1979). Finally there is variation in 
terms of types of industries investigated and countries covered by the index. Some prior 
research developed a disclosure index to measure the level of forward-looking 
disclosure (e.g., Brown, 1997; Mathuva, 2012; Alkhatib, 2014).  
However disclosure indices are widely used in the literature, they have some limitations. 
Opponents of disclosure index argue that literature that uses disclosure indices generally 
employs smaller sample size due to the labour intensive data collection process (Hassan 
and & Marston, 2010). In addition, the selection of type of information and number of 
items to be included in the index is subject to researcher judgement which in turn 
reduces the validity of such index (Artiach & Clarkson, 2011; Hassan et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, the construction of disclosure index does not take into account the 
incremental information content or frequency of each item included into the index 
(Hassan & Marston, 2010). 
2.5.4.3 Management forecasts  
Management forecast is typically a type of forward-looking information (Hassan & 
Marston, 2010; Hussainey, 2004). It can be provided voluntarily by management as 
point or range of estimates for earnings or revenue (Hussainey, 2004). It may also take 
the form of quantitative forecasts (e.g., point of estimate) or qualitative forecasts (e.g., 
statements for confirming future earnings) (Hutton & Stocken, 2009). These forecasts 
could be verified through comparing them with actual results. For instance, if 
management issued an earnings forecast, this earnings forecast could be verified by 
comparing it with actual earnings at the end of the year. Thus, they enable academics to 
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construct variables such as accuracy of management forecasts. Furthermore, because of 
the precise timing of these forecasts, it is used for testing the motivation and 
consequences of such disclosure (Healy & Palepu, 2001).  
Some prior research (e.g., Rogers & Stocken, 2005) uses management forecast as proxy 
for disclosure quality. These management forecasts are widely used in disclosure 
literature as a measure of disclosure quality, particularly in US studies. This may be due 
to the availability of these forecasts in different database such as the First Call database 
and the Dow Jones News Retrieval Service (Hassan & Marston, 2010). According to 
Hussainey (2004), there is no database for management forecasts in United Kingdom 
(UK)
13
 .  
Prior research examines the truthfulness of management forecasts. For instance, Rogers 
and Stocken (2005) assess whether management bias their management forecasts. They 
find that management has a willingness to misrepresent their forecasts. In addition, their 
willingness of misrepresentation varies with the market ability to detect such 
misrepresentation. Consequently, Xu (2010) finds that managers of firms bias their 
forecasts for future in range forecasts but not for point forecasts. His results suggest that 
managements’ bias of their forecasts is affected by managerial opportunism and fear of 
litigation. Moreover, Hassan and Marston (2010) argue that forecasts issued by 
management are subject to earnings management. This is in turn might affect the quality 
of management forecasts as a measure of disclosure. 
                                                 
13  Further, check for databases at Stirling University and Plymouth University to find out if management 
forecasts are available at their databases. The check reveals that there are no databases for these forecasts 
in the United Kingdom (UK). 
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2.5.4.4 Content analysis 
Content analysis can be defined as “a research technique for the objective, systematic 
and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication” (Berelson 
(1952, p. 18). It can be seen as a mean of categorising items of text, and can be used 
where such a qualitative data needs analysing (Holsti, 1969). It is used to make 
replicable and valid inferences from data to their context (Krippendorff, 1980). It is 
argued that the implementation of content analysis to study disclosure has the potential 
to allow the researcher to capture more dimensions of the disclosure phenomenon 
(Bozzolan et al., 2009). Consequently, it is helpful technique in analysing narrative 
documents and examining the trends and patterns in the documents over time 
(Hussainey, 2004).   
Content analysis can be classified as partial or comprehensive content analysis (Hassan 
& Marston, 2010). Partial content analysis refers to content analysis that covers part of 
the document such as the operating and financial review statements of the annual report 
(e.g., Wang & Hussainey, 2013). On the other hand, the comprehensive content analysis 
covers the whole document such as all statements in the annual report (e.g., 
Athanasakou & Hussainey, 2014; Hussainey et al., 2003). Furthermore, by using the 
content analysis technique, the level of disclosure can be measured per category, 
number of words, and number of sentences (See, Hackston & Milne, 1996; Hussainey et 
al., 2003; Wang & Hussainey, 2013; Li, 2010a, Muslue et al., 2011).  
The content analysis can be conducted either manually or automatically. Under manual 
content analysis, the analysis of the text is done via manual reading of the document. A 
number of prior research has employed the manual content analysis (e.g., Hackston & 
Milne, 1996; Francis, Hanna, & Philbrick, 1997; Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Linsley & 
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Shrives, 2006; Schleicher & Walker, 2010; and Bozzolan et al., 2009). However, 
manual content analysis is precise, it has some limitations. It is a labour-intensive data 
collection process (Hassan & Marston, 2010). This is in turn restricts the sample size 
and makes results difficult to be generalized (Beattie & Thomson, 2007). 
Hussainey et al. (2003) suggest that one of the ways to overcome the limitation of 
manual content analysis is the use of automated content analysis. The following are 
synonyms to automated content analysis: computerized content analysis, computer-
based content, computer-intensive content analysis, machine readable content analysis 
and software based content analysis. The current study uses the term automated content 
analysis to refer to any of the aforementioned terms.  
The automated content analysis can be defined as the use of computer software to code 
the text and create the content categories and analyse the occurrences of the categories 
in the text (Li, 2010a; Hussainey et al., 2003). Significant number of prior research has 
employed the automated content analysis technique (e.g., Smith & Taffler, 2000; Breton 
& Taffler, 2001; Hussainey et al., 2003; Schleicher et al., 2007; Hussainey & Walker, 
2008; Kothari et al., 2009; Li, 2010a, Wang & Hussainey, 2013; Athanasakou & 
Hussainey, 2014: Elshandidy et al., 2013). 
The automated content analysis has number of advantages. First, it is easy to use, save 
time and effort, and enables researchers to use a large sample of firms which makes 
result to be generalized and so inferences are more reliable (Abrahamson & Amir, 1996; 
Hassan & Marston 2010). It is argued that by using automated content analysis, 
comparability among firms is easy because the keywords and topics are unified across 
different firm years (Hussainey et al., 2003). Second, the use of large sample size as a 
result of employing such technique may significantly increase the power of the 
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empirical test which is vital for testing hypotheses such as those related to the stock 
market efficiency with respect to disclosure (Li, 2010b).  
On the other hand, automated content analysis is not absolute advantage technique, it 
has some disadvantages. For example, if words or keywords are used in isolation of the 
meaning of the whole sentence this may lead to misleading results (Beattie & Thomson, 
2007; Hassan & Marston, 2010). This problem could be solved by using sentence as 
unit of the analysis. Sentence is considered a more reliable unit of the analysis than the 
printed page or paragraph, because it provide complete, reliable and meaningful data for 
further analysis and it is considered more focused on specific aspect than whole page or 
paragraph (Hackston & Milne 1996; Milne & Adler 1999). 
Forward-looking disclosure is extensively measured, in prior research, using automated 
content analysis either manually or computerized (e.g., Hussainey et al., 2003; Li, 
2010a; Aljifri & Hussainey, 2007). Studies that adopt manual content analysis to 
measure forward-looking disclosure develop a list of forward-looking keywords and 
search for this list of keywords in the disclosure medium manually. Conversely, 
research that employed the automated content analysis develops a list of forward-
looking keywords and writes a command file to be used by specific computer software 
(e.g., QSR programme) to search for the forward-looking disclosure.  
The current study aims to measure the change in narrative reporting statements for 
sample from UK over time. Consequently, there is a need for relatively large panel of 
data. Therefore, this study, among all measures of disclosure, will employ the 
automated content analysis technique. 
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2.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter discusses the underlying basis of narrative reporting. It explains different 
types of information included in the annual report. In addition, the importance of the 
annual report as a medium for communicating narrative reporting is justified from 
different ways. The chapter explains the concept of narrative reporting and discusses the 
arguments for and against narrative reporting. Then, it focuses on the narrative reporting 
practice with the UK, namely, the operating and Financial Review (OFR). Finally, this 
chapter takes sharper focus on forward-looking information. It discusses the nature, 
argument for and against this type of information. In addition, it explains the usefulness 
of this type of disclosure and discusses different measures for forward-looking 
disclosure. 
Narrative reporting presents a review of the company’s operations, performance, and its 
financial position. This narrative discussion would help investors to have a broader and 
more meaningful understanding of a company's business. Large amount of this 
narratives are included in the annual report. 
The Operating and Financial Review, or simply OFR, is introduced by the Accounting 
Standard Board (ASB) as a narrative reporting medium for firms in the UK. It provides 
analysis of the business through the eyes of the board of directors and its contents have 
mandatory/discretionary nature.  
The discussion and analysis in the OFR should have forward-looking orientation. The 
disclosure of forward-looking information would help investors in the prediction of 
future performance, the accuracy of analyst forecasts and the anticipation of the stock 
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price. There are different measures employed in prior research to focus on this type of 
information. 
The current study focuses on only on one type of forward-looking disclosure, namely, 
forward-looking financial disclosure (FLFD) disclosed in the firm OFR statements. 
Particularly, the current study focuses on the changes in the level of FLFD from the 
most recent year.  
More details about the arguments for measuring change in FLFD and the steps followed 
to measure change in FLFD will be discussed in chapter 3. 
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CHAPTER 3 : MEASURING CHANGE IN FORWARD-LOOKING 
FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE (FLFD) 
3.1 OVERVIEW 
In essence, a document that is very similar to the previous year’s version does not reveal 
considerable new information. Consequently, a change in narrative reporting statements 
from the previous year reveals relatively new information. This study adopts change 
methodology in measuring narrative reporting. Particularly, it measures the year-over-
year change in the level of FLFD. Therefore, the main focus of this chapter is two folds. 
First, it provides arguments for the use of the change in narrative reporting in empirical 
accounting research. Second, it measures the year-over-year change in FLFD in the UK 
narrative reporting statements. The current study employed the automated content 
analysis technique. The study, however, manually codes a sample of the narrative 
reporting statements to ensure the reliability and validity of the automated content 
analysis. 
Particularly, this chapter is outlined as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the arguments for 
adopting change methodology in measuring the change in narrative reporting and 
reviews the literature that adopts such methodology. Section 3.3 explains the sample 
selection process, the collection of the annual reports and the preparation of data for the 
coding process. Section 3.4 details the steps used in measuring the change in FLFD. 
Section 3.5 discusses the reliability and validity tests. Section 3.6 reports the descriptive 
analysis that explains the change in FLFD over time and across industries. Section 3.7 
provides the concluding remarks. 
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3.2 CHANGE METHODOLOGY IN MEASURING NARRATIVE REPORTING 
The study focuses on forward-looking financial disclosure (FLFD) in the UK narrative 
reporting statements, namely, the OFR statements of the annual report. The focus on the 
OFR statements is decided because these statements provide a narrative framework 
within which directors could discuss the main factors underlying the firm performance. 
The mandatory/discretionary nature of these statements may help to better understand 
managers’ narrative disclosure behaviour. 
Generally, narrative reporting is soft discussion and analysis about firm performance 
and its financial position and is known to be sticky in style and content
14
 (Brown & 
Tucker, 2011). Feldman et al. (2010, p. 922) state that “Since managers usually use 
prior MD&A as a blueprint for producing a new and incremental MD&A, there could 
be considerable similarities in MD&As that are close in years”.  
In the OFR statements, managers should provide reasons for changing in firm 
performance, the liquidity needs that the firms may face, and the different capital 
resources that have been or planned to be used. This information would help investors 
to assess past and current financial performance of a firm, as well as, to predict its future 
performance (Wang & Hussainey, 2013). The value relevance of these statements arises 
from their ability to provide analysis of the business from the eyes of the board of 
directors. This discussion and analysis should be changed as long as the factors 
underlying such analysis are changing. Consequently, it may be argued that the OFR 
statements are unlikely to serve their purposes if they do not change from previous year 
especially after significant change in firm performance. This suggests that the change 
measure may be the better measure of FLFD in the UK OFR statements. 
                                                 
14  Sticky means that a firm may use the same style and topics of its narrative reporting documents for 
longer period of time. 
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Consistent with this argument, prior research (Brown & Tucker, 2011; Roulstone, 2011) 
argues that that the MD&A disclosure will not be potentially informative as intended if 
it does not change from the previous year especially after changes in the firm economic 
environment. Brown and Tucker (2011) measure the degree to which the narratives in 
the MD&A differ from the previous year. They find the stock price responses 
significantly to change in the MD&A. In other words, they find that the stock price is 
affected as long as the firm changes its narratives in the MD&A relative to previous 
year.  
Furthermore, Merkley (2014) argues that for narrative reporting to perform its function, 
managers of firms must be willing to change the narrative disclosures of their firms 
based on their firms’ changing financial performance. He suggests that managers will be 
more likely to change their research and developments (R&D) disclosure in response to 
changes in performance. He regresses the year-to-year changes in R&D disclosure on 
year-to-year changes in performance and control variables. He finds that managers of 
firms change R&D disclosure in response to changes in performance of their firms. 
Forward-looking statements in the UK narrative reporting are different from those in the 
US. In the US, forward-looking information typically takes the form of management 
forecasts (Wang & Hussainey, 2013). These forecasts are quantitative in nature and are 
easily verifiable through comparing them with the actual results. On the other hand, the 
forward-looking information in the UK narratives is qualitative in nature and is not 
immediately verifiable or auditable (Athanasakou & Hussainey, 2014; Wang & 
Hussainey, 2013).  
This nature of the UK forward-looking disclosure may provide an incentive for 
managers to use the previous year’s forward-looking narratives as templates from year 
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to year without making changes in these narratives. Consistently, Brown and Tucker 
(2013) argue that the soft talk nature of some narrative discussion may induce managers 
to use them as templates over years. Consequently, narratives may include substantial 
boilerplate disclosures
15
. Therefore, the current study uses the change in the level of 
FLFD in the UK narrative reporting from year to year.  
If a firm’s FLFD is changed from the previous year according to changes in its 
economic environment, considerable new information will be revealed to reflect 
changes in its business environment. For instance, Muslu et al. (2011, p. 10) argue that 
“a firm that is planning to expand operations overseas or introduce new product lines 
will add narratives on how initial setup will proceed”. In addition, they argue that “A 
firm that acquired another company will add narratives on how the acquisition will 
proceed” (Muslu et al., 2011, p. 10). As such, this additional statement has firm specific 
contents and free from boilerplate disclosures, and are more likely to indicate changes in 
the business economic environment. Furthermore, they argue that the use of changes in 
the disclosure level from the previous year mitigates the measurement noise due to 
repetitive boilerplate statements. 
Empirically, Muslu et al. (2011) use the change in the level of forward-looking 
statements from the most recent year to examine the economic consequences of changes 
in the level of forward-looking information in MD&A narrative statements. They find 
that the additional forward-looking statements include relatively more future earnings 
information that is incorporated into the current stock price. In addition, they suggest 
that as long as the firm changes its forward-looking information, this is helpful for 
investors to anticipate future earnings.  
                                                 
15
 Boilerplate disclosure is standard disclosures with little firm-specific content 
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Another reason to consider the change in FLFD is to mitigate the problem of 
endogeneity. One of the causes of the endogeneity problem arises from the simultaneity 
of variables. Simultaneity occurs when the causal relation between dependent and 
independent variables runs in both ways (Lopes & Alencar, 2010; Chenhall & Moers, 
2007). This endogeneity problem causes the relationship between variables as an 
association not causality (Li, 2010b). As such, Li (2010b) argues that research in textual 
disclosure raises concern about endogeneity problem. Consequently, he calls for future 
research to devote more effort to mitigate this problem. Li (2010b), and Kravet and 
Muslu (2013) suggest that adopting change methodology in measuring narrative 
disclosure could mitigate this problem.  
Additionally, adopting the change in measuring narrative reporting may be used to 
provide more robust results. Feldman et al. (2010) argue that the relevant variable to 
measure the change in a firm environment is not the level of disclosure but its change 
from the most recent year. They investigate the effect of optimistic and pessimistic news 
conveyed in MD&A on immediate and delayed stock returns. They find that the results 
obtained are likely to be more robust with level’s change rather than the year’s level. 
Recently, Elshandidy and Shrives (2015) examine the extent to which environmental 
factors influence German firms in revealing aggregate risk disclosure. Their empirical 
analyses suggest that the power of environmental factors to explain variations in 
aggregate risk disclosure is higher when applying a change model. 
To conclude, adopting the change methodology in measuring narrative reporting can 
better capture new information that is free of boilerplate statements and reflects changes 
in the business economic environment, as well as, this methodology alleviates the 
measurement noise due to the repetitive statements (Muslu et al., 2011; Brown & 
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Tucker, 2011). In addition, this method mitigates the problem of endogeneity (e.g., Li, 
2010b) and provides more robust results (e.g., Feldman et al., 2010). 
In terms of measuring the changes in narrative reporting, the literature proposes two 
measures using the automated content analysis technique: word and sentence based 
change measure. The word-based change measure depends on specific word(s) in the 
sentence as unit of the analysis. It calculates the level of disclosure based on this unit of 
analysis, and, then, the change in the level of disclosure from the previous year could be 
measured. For instance, Li (2006) counts the level of risk related-words in the annual 
report of a firm each year. He, then, uses the annual difference of the logarithm of this 
count as his measure of change in the level of risk disclosure.  
Consistently, Nelson and Pritchard (2007) and Brown and Tucker (2011) examine the 
rate of change from the previous year in the frequency of specific words in the MD&A 
as a measure of the change in narrative reporting from the previous year. The higher the 
rate of change in two successive narrative documents, the higher the dissimilarities 
between the two documents.  
On the other hand, other prior research (Kravet & Muslu, 2013; Muslu et al., 2011) uses 
sentence rather than word as the unit of the analysis. For instance, Kravet and Muslu, 
(2013) calculate change in risk disclosure as the difference between total numbers of 
risk-related sentences in period t and period t-1 in 10-K fillings. Consistently, Muslu et 
al. (2011) follow the same approach to measure changes in the level of forward-looking 
disclosure in the 10-K fillings.   
The current study uses sentence as the unit of the analysis. Accordingly, we parse OFR 
sections into statements. 
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3.3 SAMPLE SELECTION, DATA COLLECTION AND PREPARATAION OF 
DATA  
The study examines year-over-year change in FLFD in the OFR statements of the FTSE 
all-shares non-financial firms listed in the main market of the London Stock Exchange. 
The sample period covers annual reports for fiscal years from 2005 to 2011. It starts 
with 2005 because the reporting standard RS1 on the OFR was issued in 2005 and ends 
the analysis with 2011; the most recent annual reports available at the time of the 
analyses. 
Datastream is used to obtain list of FTSE all-shares listed firms. Following prior 
research (e.g., Hussainey et al., 2003; Li, 2010a; Wang & Hussainey, 2013; Elshandidy 
et al., 2013; Athanasakou & Hussainey, 2014; Elzahar et al., 2015) financial firms are 
excluded
16
. This may be either because of their distinctive regulations and accounting 
practices (Linsley & Shrives, 2006; Abraham & Cox, 2007), or because the structure of 
their financial statements are different from those of non-financial firms (Schleicher & 
Walker, 2010). 
Furthermore, we exclude firms: 1) whose annual reports for the current or the previous 
years are missing, 2) whose annual reports cannot be converted to text file to be 
readable by QSR Nudist 6 (QSR N6)
17
 software, and 3) that changed the month of the 
year-end during the sample period (2005 – 2011).  
                                                 
16 Financial firms include the following: banks, equity investment instruments, insurance, real estate, real 
estate investment and services, real estate investment trust, and non-equity investment instruments 
companies. The definitions of financial firms are based on the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB). 
 
17
 QSR Nudist version 6 (QSR N6) is an earlier version of NVIVO software which better suits the data we 
needed to analyse in the sense that it gives the option of using the sentence as coding unit rather the word 
resulting in avoiding the problem of double-counting, it also advances the context of textual analyses. 
QSR N6, also, eases importing and extracting the results in specific order by which merging disclosure 
scores with market data becomes more accurate. 
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This screening leaves us with 346 firms (2422 firm-year observations) with complete 
time series of annual reports. Table 3.1 elaborates the sample selection process.  
Table 3.1  
Sample selection process 
 N 
FTSE- all shares 622 
Less: Financial firms  126 
Less: Firms with missing annual reports 75 
Less: Firms with non-text convertible annual reports 59 
Less: Firms that changed the reporting date  16 
Final Sample  346 
This Table reports the process of sample selection. N denotes the number of firms. The 
final sample consists of 346 firms over the 7 years period from 2005 to 2011. Thus, it 
comprises 2422 firm-year observations. 
Table 3.2 shows the distribution of the final sample amongst industries. The definitions 
of the industries are based on the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB). The Table 
shows the number and the percentage of firms. The firm-year observations are presented 
in parentheses. The industrial firms represent the highest number of firms and 
percentage. The telecommunication firms, on the other hand, represent only 4 firms 
(24). This classification of the sample is consistent with other studies conducted in the 
UK (e.g., Wang & Husaainey, 2013; Elshandiday et al., 2013). 
Table 3.2 
Distribution of the sample amongst industries  
Industry  N Percentage 
Industrial  120 (840) 34.68 
Basic materials  28  (196) 8.09 
Technology  35  (245) 10.12 
Consumer goods  36  (252) 10.40 
Consumer services  77  (539)  22.25 
Health care  22  (154) 6.36 
Oil and gas  17  (119) 4.91 
Utilities  7  (49)  2.02 
Telecommunication  4  (28) 1.16 
Total  346 (2422) 100% 
This Table provides the distribution of the sample among industries. The sample consists of 346 firms over 7-
years period (2422 firm-year observation) distributed among 9 industries. The definition of the industry is 
based on Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB). 
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The annual reports are collected from the companies’ official websites, the Thomson 
one banker database and the Northcote website (www.northcote.co.uk). The annual 
reports are downloaded in PDF format. However, the QSR N6 software used in this 
study codes text files only. Therefore, each annual report is converted to a text format.  
The annual reports are read carefully to identify the OFR statements. Then, the OFR 
statements are saved in a separate text file.  
When identifying the OFR statements, we find that there is a rarely definitive section 
entitled OFR. Most firms in the sample produce the OFR statements under the title 
“OFR” (448); or report two separate sections “Operating Review” and “Financial 
Review” (908); or produce the same OFR contents under the title “Business Review” 
(749); or under the title “Chief Executive Review” (198). This adds up to 2,303 firm-
year observations, representing 95% of the sample. The remaining 5% produce either 
only an “Operating Review” (73) or a “Financial Review” (46). Table 3.3 shows a 
summary of different titles that report the OFR contents.  
 
Table 3.3 
Different titles that report OFR contents  
 N Percentage 
OFR 448  18.50% 
Operating Review/ Financial Review  908 37.49% 
Business Review  749 30.92% 
Chief Executive Review 198 8.18% 
Operating Review  73 3.01% 
Financial Review  46 1.90% 
Total  2,422 100% 
This Table reports different titles for OFR contents. Firms produce OFR statements under the title OFR; 
or report two separate sections Operating Review and Financial Review; or produce the same OFR 
contents under the title Business Review; or under the title Chief Executive Review; or produce either 
only an Operating Review or a Financial Review. 
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This result is consistent with the ASB survey conducted in 2009. In addition, it is 
consistent with the survey conducted by Anis et al. (2012) on the UK firms over the 
period from 2006 to 2009. 
The following extract identifies the boundaries of the OFR statements reported under 
the title “Business Review”: “This business review is addressed to the members of the 
company. Its purpose is to help them assess how the directors have performed in their 
duty to promote the success of the company. It is framed by the principles and 
guidelines for Operating and financial reviews published by the UK Accounting 
Standards Board in 2006. It outlines the main operational and financial factors 
underpinning the development, performance and position of the Group as well as those 
likely to affect performance over the coming year, illustrating this with key performance 
indicators” Daily Mail and General Trust PLC, 2009. 
Following the approach adopted by the ASB (2009), all titles of narrative reporting 
(e.g., OFR, Business Review & Chief Executive review) are included in the analysis to 
avoid any selection bias. 
To check the reliability of the data, the researcher identifies the OFR statements in a 
separate text file, and then the director of studies (first supervisor), who possesses a 
comprehensive knowledge in the field of narrative reporting, randomly checks a sample 
of these files before coding. No disagreement was identified in this regard. 
The following section (3.3) explains in details the steps followed to measure the year-
over-year change in firm’s FLFD in its OFR statements. 
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3.4 MEASURING CHANGE IN FLFD BETWEEN OFR STATEMENTS  
The current study constructs the following steps, as shown in Figure 3.1, to measure the 
year-over-year change in the level of forward-looking financial disclosure (FLFD) 
between firm’s OFR statements. Step (1) extracts the forward-looking sentences from 
OFR statements. Step (2) extracts financial-related sentences from OFR statements. 
Step (3) extracts forward-looking financial statements (FLFD). Step (4) measures the 
year-over-year change in FLFD between firm’s OFR statements. 
3.4.1 Step 1: Extracting the forward-looking sentences from the OFR statements 
In order to extract the forward-looking sentences from the OFR statements, a final list 
of forward-looking keywords
18
 is constructed to capture the future oriented statements 
from the OFR statements. The following steps are followed to construct the final list of 
forward-looking keywords and extract the forward-looking sentences: (1) developing 
preliminary list of forward-looking keywords, (2) refining the preliminary list of the 
forward-looking keyword, and approving the final keywords list, and (3) writing the 
command file, running the command, and saving the output. 
3.4.1.1 Developing preliminary list of forward-looking keywords 
In this step, a preliminary list of forward-looking keywords is created. This list is 
created based on: 1) Prior empirical research on forward-looking disclosure (Hussainey 
et al., 2003; Morgan, 2008; Li, 2010a; Muslu et al., 2011), 2) a randomly selected 
sample of 20 OFR statements from each year (140 OFR statements); all the 140 OFR 
statements are read and any new keywords related to the future are added to the 
preliminary list. The reading of the sample reveals 4 new keywords, “Investment, 
                                                 
18
 The keyword list is a customised dictionary, which the computer software (QSR N6) uses to code the 
OFR statements. 
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Development, Research, and Successive”, which are used in forward-looking context in 
the OFR statements.  
Table 3.4 details the preliminary list of the forward-looking keywords which consists of 
70 keywords. 
Table 3.4  
Preliminary list of forward-looking keyword 
Accelerate 
Aim  
Anticipate 
Approximately 
Assume  
Await 
believe 
Can  
Coming  
Commit  
Confidence  
Confident 
Contemplate  
Continue  
Convince 
Could  
Current  
Development 
Effort  
Envisage 
Estimate 
Eventual 
Expect 
Following 
Forecast 
Foresee 
Forthcoming 
Goal  
Guidance 
Hope 
Incoming  
Intend  
Intention 
Investment 
Likely  
Look-ahead  
Look-forward 
May  
Might  
Next 
Novel 
Objective  
Optimistic 
Outlook 
Plan  
Planned  
Planning 
Potential  
 
Predict 
Project  
Projection  
Prospect 
Remain 
Renew 
Research 
Scope for  
Scope to 
Seek  
Shall 
Shortly 
Should 
Soon 
Subsequent 
Successive 
Target 
Unlikely 
Upcoming 
Well-placed  
Well- positioned 
Year-ahead 
 
The order of the keywords is alphabetical  
The common keywords among all literature are: Will, Intend, Forecast, Expect, 
and Anticipate. 
This Table details the keywords in the preliminary list of forward-looking keywords list. The 
preliminary list consists of 70 keywords.  
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Figure 3.1: Steps to measure year-over-year change in FLFD using the automated 
content analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 1: 
Extracting forward-looking 
sentences from OFR 
statements 
Developing preliminary list of forward-
looking keywords  
Output:  
 
Forward-
Looking 
Statements  
Step 2: 
Extracting financial-related 
sentences from OFR 
statements   
Output: 
  
Financial-
related 
Statements 
Step 3: 
Extracting forward-looking 
financial statements from 
OFR statements 
This is done by finding the intersection 
between the “Forward-Looking Statements” 
output of step 1 and the “Financial-related 
Statements” output of step 2. 
Output: 
 
Forward-
Looking 
Financial 
Statements 
Step 4: 
Measuring change in 
forward-looking financial 
statements between firm’s 
OFR statements  
Firm’s FLFD in period t minus the same firm 
FLFD in period t-1 
Change in 
FLFD 
between 
OFR 
statements   
Refining the preliminary list and approving 
the final list of forward-looking keywords 
Writing the command file, running the 
command, and the saving output 
Developing preliminary list of financial-
related keywords  
Refining the preliminary list approving the 
final list of financial-related keywords  
Writing the command file, running the 
command, and the saving output 
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3.4.1.2 Refining the preliminary list and approving the final list of forward-looking 
keywords 
In this step, the preliminary list of forward-looking keywords is refined to determine the 
final forward-looking keywords list. The refinement of the preliminary list is done 
through the following two steps:  
1) Some keywords, such as shall, should, may, might, can, and could, are excluded from 
the preliminary list. This is because these keywords are regarded as not real forward-
looking keywords and are associated with legal language and boilerplate disclosures (Li, 
2010a; Muslu et al. 2011). Before excluding these keywords, a sample of 20 sentences 
per keyword of these keywords are randomly selected and read to check whether they 
represent real forward-looking keywords. After reading, it is concluded that in almost 
all of the sentences, these keywords are frequently associated with legal language and 
boilerplate disclosure and are not considered real future oriented keywords. Therefore, 
the keywords shall, should, may, might, can, and could are deleted from the preliminary 
list of forward-looking keywords. To clarify, consider the following extracts from the 
OFR statements of different companies:  
“He comes with substantial experience in the field of mineral law which should benefit 
us in meeting the challenges of the new legislative environment.” AQUARIUS 
PLATINUM LTD GROUP, OFR STATEMENTS, 2004. 
 “Signiﬁcant breaches could result in large ﬁnancial penalties, which could materially 
adversely impact the Group’s ﬁnancial performance and prospects.” BTG PLC, OFR 
STATEMENTS, 2010. 
“Moreover, failure by BTG or a BTG partner company to comply with regulations may 
result in a product being withdrawn from the market with a subsequent loss of 
revenues.” BTG PLC, OFR STATEMENTS, 2010. 
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“The process is designed to manage rather than to eliminate the risks inherent in 
achieving the Group’s business objectives and can therefore provide only reasonable 
and not absolute assurance against material misstatement or loss.” HUNTSWORTH 
PLC, OFR STATEMENTS, 2011. 
“The availability of materials and sub-contracted labour for each site can affect both 
the construction programme and the cost of construction.” TELFORD HOMES PLC, 
OFR STATEMENTS, 2009. 
“A change in political administration – or a change in the policy priorities of the 
current administration – might result in a reduction in education spending or reduced 
commitment to ICT within education spending.” RM PLC, OFR STATEMENTS, 
2008. 
“Global economic conditions might result in a reduction in budgets available for public 
spending generally and education spending specifically.” RM PLC, OFR 
STATEMENTS, 2008. 
“In making such policy determinations, the Board shall take into account relevant facts 
and circumstances including, without limitation, the financial performance and capital 
requirements of Verizon Wireless.” VODAFONE GROUP PLC, OFR 
STATEMENTS, 2004.  
However, the above extracts includes keywords that may imply the future, they are not 
real future-oriented statements. 
2) We check the forward-lookingness of the keywords. To this end, a random sample of 
20 sentences per forward-looking keyword are selected and read carefully. The number 
of cases in which the sentence represents a future oriented statement is counted. 
Hussainey et al. (2003) suggest that the keyword is considered a forward-looking 
keyword if it refers to the future in at least 67% of the sentences. However, this 
benchmark allows computer software to correctly identify only 55.2% of forward-
looking sentences actually included in the annual report narrative statements. In order to 
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improve the ability of the software to correctly capture the forward-looking statements, 
this benchmark is increased to 90%. Accordingly, a keyword is included in the final list 
of forward-looking keywords, if at least 90% of the sentences (18 sentences) including 
such keyword represent future oriented message. In other words, the keyword is 
included in the final list of forward-looking keywords, if this keyword represents the 
future in at least 90% of the cases. According to Krippendorff (1980), this approach is 
known as a meaning-oriented approach.  
After refining the preliminary list based on the above highlighted two steps, the final list 
of forward-looking keywords is approved. 
Table 3.5 details the final list of forward-looking keyword which consists of 33 
forward-looking keywords.  
Table 3.5  
Final list of forward-looking keywords 
Aim  
Anticipate  
Believe  
Coming   
Estimate 
Eventual  
Expect  
Following   
Forecast  
Forthcoming  
Future   
Hope  
Incoming   
Intend  
Intention  
Likely  
Look-ahead  
Look-forward  
Next  
Plan  
Predict  
Project  
Prospect  
Seek  
Shortly  
Soon  
Subsequent   
Unlikely  
Upcoming  
Well-placed  
Well-positioned  
Will  
Year-ahead 
The order of the keywords is alphabetical 
In addition to this list of keywords, time indicators, conjugations, and reference to 
future year are added in the coding process. Details are given in section 3.4.1.3. 
This Table lists the final list of forward-looking keywords. This final list consists of 33 keywords 
and is approved after refining the preliminary list of keywords. 
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3.4.1.3 Writing command file, running the command, and saving the output. 
After approving the final list of forward-looking keywords, a special command file for 
each year is written based on the final list of keywords. The command file is a batch of 
orders to tell the software (QSR N6) how to code the text based on the final list of 
forward-looking keywords. Appendix (1) reports a command file to extract forward-
looking sentences. 
The command file is used to restrict the search for the keywords as follows:  
1) The following adjectives: next, coming, incoming, upcoming, forthcoming, following, 
and subsequent, have to be connected with the following time indicators: fiscal, 
month(s), quarter(s), year(s), period(s), and/or six months/twelve months
19
. In another 
meaning, for example, the QSR N6 software will not search for the keyword “next”; 
instead the search will be for: next fiscal, next month, next months, next twelve months, 
next six months, next quarter, next quarters, next year, next years, next period, next 
periods. These time indicators help in correctly capturing forward-looking statements 
associated with these adjectives. For instance, consider the following two extracts: 
“So far, we have been very successful in executing this strategy, and Aggreko’s 
International Power Projects business is now many times bigger than its next largest 
competitor.” AGGREKO PLC, OFR STATEMENTS, 2009. 
 
 “With stocks anticipated to grow during 2008, we would expect to see some weakening 
of price over the course of the next year.” KBC ADVANCED PLC, OFR 
STATEMENTS, 2007.  
 
The first extract does not represent a future oriented statement, while, the second one 
                                                 
19
 The time indicators are added based on prior research (e.g., Hussainey et al., 2003: Muslu et al., 2011), 
and after reading sample of 100 OFR statements. 
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represents a forward-looking statement. Therefore, time indicators are required to be 
connected with the adjectives (e.g., next year) 
2) All sentences that contain: expected; anticipated; forecasted; projected; and 
believed, are excluded from the search when such words follow: was; were; has; have; 
had; and had been. These sentences are not forward-looking in nature (Hussainey et al., 
2003, Li, 2010a; Muslu et al., 2011).  For instance, consider the following extract: 
“The operational improvements increased the overall results for the period; however 
these were expected to be better but were impacted by the snow in early December.” 
MOSS BROS GROUP, OFR STATEMENTS, 2011. 
 
To solve this problem, keywords are used with more specific tense structure. For 
instance, instead of searching for “expect” as a keyword, different forms of this 
keyword are used. In other words, instead of searching for the word “expect”, the search 
is done for the following: “expect”, “expects”, “is expecting”, “are expecting”, “is 
expected”, and “are expected”. This method helps in reducing the likelihood of 
capturing statements that are not forward-looking in nature. For clarity, consider the 
following extract: 
“We  continue  to  anticipate  a  cash  inflow from  operations  during   the  course  of  
the new  financial  year  which  is  expected  to  lead  to  a  reduction  in  net  debt  by  
30  June  2010.” REDROW PLC, OFR STATEMENTS, 2009. 
 
3) The simple form of some verbs – plan, project, hope, estimate, expect, aim, forecast, 
prospect, believe – may lead to noun meaning of the verb which frequently has no 
future oriented meaning. For instance, consider the following extracts: 
“A detailed action plan has established to resolve areas of operating under 
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performance and this has resulted in number of management changes in this division.” 
INTERNATIONAL GREETINGS PLC, OFR STATEMENTS, 2002. 
“A new pension scheme was introduced on 1 January 2003, the Andrews Sykes 
stakeholders pension plan, for which the majority of UK employees are eligible”. 
ANDREWS SYKES PLC, OFR SECTION, 2008. 
In order to avoid the likelihood of incorrectly capturing noun forms of some verbs, 
some conjugations are used, which reduce the likelihood of capturing noun forms of 
these verbs. For example, the following conjugations
20
  are used (the verb “plan” is used 
as template for brevity): “we plan”, “management plans”, “managers plan”, “manager 
plans”, “company plans”, “firm plans”, “is planning”, “are planning”, “is planned”, 
“are planned”, “normally plan”, “normally plans”, “currently plan”, “currently 
plans”, “also plan”, “also plans”, and  “to plan”. For instance, consider the following 
extracts: 
“The water market remains competitive but we plan to continue to develop Strathmore 
as a premium brand in the sector.” ANDREWS SYKES PLC, OFR STATEMENTS, 
2008.  
“In 2011 we plan to increase capital expenditure to around Â£60 million.” GREENE 
KING PLC OFR STATEMENTS, 2010 
“We hope this is alongside continued support, via appropriate capital expenditure and 
other allowances, for businesses such as ours to be   encouraged to maintain investment 
levels.” GREENE KING PLC OFR STATEMENTS, 2010 
“We estimate that South-eastern will be at around 90% of bid revenue for the year 
ended 31 March 2011.” GREENE KING PLC OFR STATEMENTS, 2010 
 
                                                 
20 The conjugations are added based on prior research (e.g., Muslu et al., 2011) and after reading sample 
of 100 OFR statements.  
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4) References to future years are added in the search for forward-looking statements. 
For example, reference to years 2008/2009 is made when searching in the OFR 
statements of the annual report of 2007, and reference to years 2009/2010 is added 
when searching in the OFR statements of the annual report of 2008 and so on. For 
instance, consider the following extracts:  
“We expect 2010 to provide much better trading conditions for air conditioning 
products.” ANDREWS SYKES GROUP, OFR STATEMENTS, 2009 
“I am certain that we have set the right foundations for future growth and with a strong 
management team in place I expect to see stronger Data and Managed Services revenue 
growth in 2011.”  COLT, OFR STATEMENTS, 2010 
“For 2009 and beyond, the overall reported tax rate is likely to continue to be volatile, 
being influenced by the possible further recognition of currently unrecognised deferred 
tax assets and the settlement of prior year tax disputes.” GKN, OFR STATEMENTS, 
2007 
The above extracts provide a future orientation for the coming year/years. 
 
To conclude, the QSR N6 software tags an OFR statement as a forward-looking 
statement, if the statement includes any of the following: 
Likely, future, will, eventual, well-positioned, well-placed, shortly, and soon. 
Look-forward, looks-forward, looking-forward, look-ahead, looks-ahead, looking-
ahead, year-ahead, years-ahead. 
The following adjectives: next, coming, incoming, upcoming, forthcoming, 
following, and subsequent, followed by any of the following time indicators: 
fiscal, month(s), quarter(s), year(s), period(s), and/or six months/twelve months. 
The following conjugations: we, management, managers, manager, company, 
firm, is, are, normally, to, also, currently, connected with the following verbs: 
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plan, project, hope, estimate, expect, aim, forecast, prospect, and believe. 
References to future years, references to years 2009/2010 are made when 
searching in the OFR statements of the annual report of 2008. 
After writing the command, it is then run for each year in the sample. The output is 
saved in separate file titled “Forward-Looking Statements”. The Forward-looking 
Statements output represents list of all sentences containing at least one of the forward-
looking keywords for each firm in the sample. 
3.4.2 Step 2: Extracting the financial-related sentences from the OFR statements 
Financial-related sentences in the OFR statements provide explanations about the 
amount recorded in the firm financial statements. If managers follow the spirit of OFR 
statements, an explanation will be required if there is significant changes in the amounts 
recorded in the financial statements.  
In order to capture the financial-related sentences from the OFR statements, a list of 
financial-related keywords is developed. The same steps followed for extracting the 
forward-looking sentences are used to extract the financial-related sentences. However, 
extracting financial-related sentences depends on a list of financial-related keywords. 
These steps include the following: (1) developing preliminary list of financial-related 
keywords, (2) refining the preliminary list of the financial-related keywords, and 
approving the final keywords list, and (3) writing the command file, running the 
command, and saving the output. 
3.4.2.1 Developing preliminary list of financial-related keywords 
In this step, a preliminary list of financial-related keywords is created. This preliminary 
list is based on the following. 1) The items of the financial statements as explained by 
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the International Accounting Standard 1 (IAS1), 2) prior empirical research on 
disclosure (Hussainy et al. 2003; Hussainey & walker 2008, and Beattie et al., 2004)
21
, 
and 3) randomly selected sample of 20 OFR statements from each year (140 OFR 
statements); all the 140 OFR statements are read carefully and any new financial-related 
keywords are added to the preliminary list.  
Table 3.6 details the preliminary list of the keyword which consists of 62 financial-
related keywords.  
Table 3.6  
Preliminary list of financial-related keywords 
Acid test ratio  
Amortisation  
Assets  
Capital  
Cash  
Cash flow  
Cash flow per share  
Cash inflow  
Cash outflow 
Costs  
Credit given  
Credit obtained  
Current ratio  
Debt  
Depletion  
Depreciation  
Discontinued operations  
Dividend 
Dividend cover  
Dividends yield 
Earnings  
Earnings per share  
EBI*  
EBIT*  
EBITDA*  
EPS*  
Equity  
Expenses  
Extraordinary items 
Gain  
Gearing  
Gross margin ratio  
Impairment 
Income  
Interest cover  
Inventories  
Investment property 
Liabilities  
Liquidity ratio  
Loss  
Margin  
Market to book value ratio  
 
Payable  
Price earnings ratio  
Profit  
Profit margin  
Profitability 
Property , plant and 
equipment  
Provisions  
Quick ratio  
Receivable  
Return on assets  
Return on capital employed  
Return on equity  
Return on investment 
Revenue  
ROA*  
ROCE*  
ROE*  
Sales  
Stock turnover  
Tax 
* EBI: earnings before interest. EBIT: earnings before interest and tax. EBITDA: earnings 
before interest and tax and depreciation and amortization. EPS: earnings per share. ROA: 
return on assets. ROCE: return on capital employed. ROE: return on equity. 
The order of the keywords is alphabetical. 
This Table details the preliminary list of financial-related keywords list. It consists of 62 keywords. 
                                                 
21 We did not depend only on the IAS1, because this standard provides only the minimum items that 
should be included in the firm’s financial statements. Accordingly, we depend also on prior research and 
sample from the OFR statements in order to be able to identify comprehensive set of the financial-related 
keywords. 
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3.4.2.2 Refining the preliminary list, and approving the final list of the financial-
related keywords 
In this step, the preliminary list of financial-related keywords is refined to identify the 
final financial-related keywords. To refine the preliminary list of financial-related 
keywords, a random sample of 20 sentences per financial-related keyword are selected 
and read carefully. The number of cases in which the sentence represents a financial-
related statement is counted. Following the same benchmark of the forward-looking 
keywords, a keyword is included in the final list of financial-related keywords if at least 
90% of the sentences including such keyword represent financial-related statement. 
There was no concern about any of the keywords in the preliminary list. Therefore, all 
keywords in the preliminary list are approved as final financial-related keywords.  
Table 3.7 details the final financial-related keywords list categorised into four different 
groups. These groups represent the firm’s financial statements items and its financial 
ratios. In other words, the groups include the following: (1) income statements items, 
(2) statement of financial position items, (3) cash flow statement items, and (4) financial 
ratios. 
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Table 3.7  
Final financial-related keywords list classified into four different categories 
Income statement 
items 
Statement of 
financial position 
items 
Cash flow 
items 
Financial ratios  
Amortisation 
Costs  
Depletion 
Depreciation 
Discontinued operations 
Dividends  
Earnings  
EBI*  
EBIT*  
EBITDA*  
Expenses  
Extraordinary items 
Gain  
Impairment 
Income  
Loss  
Margin  
Profit  
Revenue  
Sales  
Tax 
Assets  
Capital  
Debt  
Equity  
Inventories 
Investment property 
Liabilities  
Payable  
Property plant and 
equipment  
Provisions 
Receivable 
Cash  
Cash flow  
Cash inflow  
Cash outflow 
Acid test ratio 
Cash flow per share  
Credit given  
Credit obtained 
Current ratio  
Dividend cover  
Dividends yield 
Earnings per share  
EPS*  
Gearing  
Gross margin ratio  
Interest cover 
Liquidity ratio 
Market to book value 
ratio  
Price earnings ratio  
Profit margin  
Profitability  
Quick ratio  
Return on assets  
Return on capital 
employed  
Return on equity  
Return on investment 
ROA*  
ROCE*  
ROE* 
Stock turnover 
* EBI: earnings before interest. EBIT: earnings before interest and tax. EBITDA: earnings 
before interest and tax and depreciation and amortization. EPS: earnings per share. ROA: return 
on assets. ROCE: return on capital employed. ROE: return on equity. 
This Table details the final list of financial-related words and their classification according to whether the keyword 
represents an income statement item, statement of financial position item, cash flow item, or a financial ratio. 
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3.4.2.3 Writing the command file, running the command, and saving the output 
After approving the final list of the financial-related keywords, a special command file 
for each year is written based on the final list of keywords. Appendix (2) reports a 
command file to extract financial-related sentences. 
The special command tags an OFR statement as a financial-related statement, if the 
OFR statement includes any of the financial-related keywords listed in Table 3.7. 
After writing the command, it is then run for each year in the sample. The output is 
saved in separate file titled “Financial-Related Statements”. The Financial-Related 
Statements output represent list of all sentences containing at least one of the financial-
related keywords for each firm in the sample. 
The following extracts represent sample of the “Financial-Related Statements” from the 
OFR statements:  
“Revenue, operating profit and margin, earnings per share (EPS) and operating cash 
flow indicate the volume of work we have done, its profitability and the efficiency with 
which we have turned operating profits into cash; work in hand measures our secured 
workload as a percentage of the budgeted revenue for the next year; staff numbers and 
staff turnover are measures of capacity and show us how effective we have been in 
recruiting and retaining our key resource.” ATKINS (WS) PLC, OFR 
STATEMENTS, 2008 
“Gearing reduced from 43% to 32% and interest cover improved. Interest cover, based 
on net interest payable excluding the net interest cost on pension liabilities improved to 
6.3 times (2009: 6.1 times). Total external and inter division revenue was 17% down on 
2007.” 4IMPRINT GROUP PLC, OFR STATEMENTS, 2008  
“In North America; total revenue in US dollars at $170.57m was 17% ahead of prior 
year, the result of continued expansion of catalogue mailings, internet presence and 
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existing customer marketing programmes.” 4IMPRINT GROUP PLC, OFR 
STATEMENTS, 2008 
 “The tax charge was £0.40m, an effective rate of 15% (2008: 30%). The reduction in 
the rate is due to tax losses generated and utilised in the year in the Group’s principal 
trading territories - UK and USA.” 4IMPRINT GROUP PLC, OFR STATEMENTS, 
2009 
“When a trade receivable is uncollectable it is written off against the provision for 
impairment of trade receivables account.” AGGREKO PLC, OFR STATEMENTS, 
2009 
“A weaker dollar,  higher commodity prices than at 31 December  2008 as  well as a 
stronger trading performance  in the later stages of 2009  compared with the  prior year 
have contributed to a $929 million increase to inventories and current receivables.” 
ANGLO AMERICAN PLC, OFR STATEMENTS, 2009                              
“AMEC is subject to litigation from time to time in the ordinary course of   business and 
makes provision for the expected costs based on appropriate   professional advice.” 
AMEC PLC, OFR STATEMENTS, 2010 
“The closure provision was increased following an updated pound in 2009 to 106.8 
cents, reflecting higher energy prices, increased labour assessment during 2010 by 
external consultants, with the provision increasing and maintenance and fuel costs as 
well as the impact of the stronger Chilean   due to factors including increases in the 
scale of scale of the operation, updated cost peso.” ANTOFAGASTA PLC, OFR 
STATEMENTS, 2010  
“The Group gearing ratio (net debt as a percentage of total Net working capital) was 
tightly controlled and only increased marginally although revenue rose by 7% in the 
year.” PORVAIR PLC, OFR STATEMENTS, 2011 
“Dividends paid to shareholders totalled £8.2 million.” THE VITEC GROUP PLC, 
OFR STATEMENTS, 2011 
The main unit of discussion in each of the above extracts is one or more of the financial 
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statements items or the related financial ratios.                                                               
3.4.3 Step 3: Extracting the forward-looking financial statements (FLFD) from the 
OFR statements 
In step 1, the QSR N6 software extracts the forward-looking statements from the OFR 
statements and the output of this step is saved in a separate file entitled “Forward-
Looking Statements”. Whilst, in step 2, the software extracts the financial-related 
statements from the OFR statements and the output of this step is saved in a separate file 
entitled “Financial-Related Statements”.  
Step 3 aims to extract the forward-looking financial disclosure (FLFD) from the OFR 
statements. FLFD provides explanations for the amounts of financial statements with 
forward-looking orientation. It represents all statements that include at least one of the 
forward-looking keywords and at least one of the financial-related keywords  
Using the QSR N6 software, we search the OFR statements for sentences that include at 
least one of the forward-looking keywords and at least one of the financial-related 
keyword for each year separately. This is done by finding the intersection between the 
“Forward-looking Statements” output of step 1 and the “Financial-related Statements” 
output of step 2. The output of this step is saved in separate file entitled “Forward-
Looking financial Statements (FLFD)”. This output represents the level of FLFD in a 
firm’s OFR statements each year. 
Table 3.8 shows the output from the three steps for a random sample of 21 firms in 2010, 
the definition of each column in the Table is as follows. Column (1) represents the firm 
name. Column (2) presents the output of step 1; the level of the forward-looking 
statements in firm’s OFR statements. Column (3) shows the output of step 2; the level 
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of financial-related sentences in firm’s OFR statements. Finally, column (4) represents 
the level of FLFD firm’s OFR statements.  
For instance, IMI Company has 45 and 113 forward-looking and financial-related 
statements, respectively. However, only 12 statements are considered FLFD. Each 
statement of the 12 statements of FLFD includes at least one of the forward-looking 
keywords and at least one of the financial-related keywords.  
Table 3.8 
Example of forward-looking level, financial-related level and FLFD 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Company name   
Forward-
looking 
statements  
Financial-
Related 
statements 
Forward-
looking financial 
statements  
IMI PLC 45 113 12 
IMPERIAL TOBACCO PLC 63 159 18 
JOHNSTON PRESS PLC 35 126 13 
MORGAN SINDALL PLC 111 385 42 
NATIONAL EXPRESS PLC 102 202 41 
NORTHGATE PLC 23 122 9 
NEXT PLC 56 105 24 
PENNON GROUP PLC 80 202 20 
PERSIMMON PLC 56 123 34 
PREMIER FARNELL 70 185 23 
RANK GROUP PLC 54 196 17 
REA HOLDINGS PLC 143 169 39 
RIO TINTO PLC 176 316 34 
SABMILLER PLC 67 316 20 
SIG PLC 84 268 36 
SPEEDY HIRE PLC 141 111 29 
TESCO PLC 57 157 16 
UBM PLC 68 225 23 
VODAFONE GROUP PLC 59 328 39 
WPP PLC 236 329 28 
YELL GROUP PLC 63 173 33 
This Table reports the forward-looking, the financial-related, and FLFD statements for a sample of firms 
in the reporting year 2010. 
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The following extracts represent sample of the forward-looking financial disclosure 
(FLFD) in the firms’ OFR statements:  
“An all-inclusive processing and transportation tariff has been agreed with the Banff 
Group which will substantially reduce operating costs and allow the extension of field 
life up to the end of 2015”. PREMIER OIL PLC, OFR STATEMENTS, 2005 
“In future periods, it is expected that the effective tax rate, adjusted for associates’ tax, 
will remain at or above the current levels.” ANGLO AMERICAN PLC, OFR 
STATEMENTS, 2005 
“The Board intends to enhance future dividends by expected to amount to £10m in 
2007/08”.HMV GROUP PLC, OFR STATEMENTS, 2006 
“The Board believes that this strategy will enable Porvair to grow its revenues and 
operating profits”. PORVAIR PLC, OFR STATEMENTS, 2007 
“The Board will review the trading performance and level of debt at the conclusion of 
future periods and evaluate whether a dividend is appropriate at that time”. AVON 
RUBBER PLC, OFR STATEMENTS, 2008 
“North America Overall, unit sales grew by 25% during the year and we believe this 
momentum will be, at least, maintained during the coming year”. 600 GROUP, OFR 
STATEMENTS, 2008 
“The final dividend will be paid on 28 May 2009 to shareholders on the register at 1 
May 2009.” AEGIS GROUP, OFR STATEMENTS, 2008 
“Looking forward, we expect to be able to continue to balance cash inflows and 
outflows even if conditions are equally challenging.” BP PLC, OFR STATEMENTS, 
2009 
“All  our  new  stores  take  time  to  mature  and  we  expect  to  see  stronger  sales  
from  them  in  future  years.” CARPETRIGHT PLC, OFR STATEMENTS, 2009 
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“For 2010 and beyond, the overall reported tax rate is likely to continue to be volatile, 
primarily due to movements in provisions for uncertain tax positions and the 
recognition/ derecognition of deferred tax assets.” GKN PLC, OFR STATEMENTS, 
2009 
“This capital expenditure will be funded from our strong cash flow and will begin 
delivering benefits from 2011, ultimately delivering efficiency benefits to the bottom line 
of at least £10 million per annum by 2014.” GREENE KING PLC, OFR 
STATEMENTS, 2009 
“It is with this in mind that we have  announced our intention to effect a  return of value  
of approximately Â£150 million in 2011 (to be effected   by way of a B share scheme), 
and a further amount,  depending on  circumstances in the next 2 to 3 years,  that will 
move Net Debt to  EBITDA to around 1 times.  AGGREKO PLC, OFR 
STATEMENTS, 2010 
“Net debt/EBITDA was down to 5.1 x, in line with our targeted level, and this will 
continue to move slightly as proceeds are further invested ahead of the earnings stream 
they generate.” GREENE KING PLC, OFR STATEMENTS, 2010 
“A contribution to this reduction was a net tax repayment of £1.8 million during 2010 
with a further receipt of £5.8 million which will benefit 2011, although this amount 
remains subject to final agreement with HMRC.” JOHNSON MATTHEY PLC, OFR 
STATEMENTS, 2010 
“In 2012 we expect to deliver continued dividend growth.” GLAXOSMITHKLINE 
PLC, OFR STATEMENTS, 2011  
“We expect Pearson to achieve growth in sales and operating profits in 2012.” 
PEARSON PLC, OFR STATEMENTS, 2011 
Each extract, from the above, provides a discussion about an item or more of a firm 
financial statements or/and one or more of its financial ratio(s) with a forward-looking 
orientation. 
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3.4.4 Step 4: measuring year-over-year change in FLFD  
Until now the level of firm’s FLFD in its OFR statements is identified or measured. The 
final step is measuring the firm’s year-over-year changes in its FLFD. Simply, the 
change in the firm’s FLFD, Δ FLFD, from period t-1 to period t is equal to firm’s FLFD 
in period t minus FLFD in period t-1.  
In the empirical analysis, the study is not concerned with the direction of the change in 
FLFD. However, it is concerned with the existence and magnitude of such change in 
FLFD. The absolute values preserve the magnitude of change. Therefore, the year-over-
year absolute change in FLFD, |Δ FLFD|, is used. For simplicity, we refer to the 
variable, |Δ FLFD|, as absolute change score or change score.  
The change score, |Δ FLFD |, measures the extent to which FLFD in two successive 
OFR documents are different. A higher score indicates more changes from the previous 
year and vice versa. Following prior research (e.g., Kravet & Muslu, 2013) we do not 
scale this variable; instead, we control for the overall length of the narrative reporting 
document in the empirical model.  
Table 3.9 shows an example of the level of FLFD, change in FLFD (∆FLFD) and 
absolute change in FLFD (|∆FLFD|) for two firms over the period from 2005 to 2011. 
Firm name and the years of disclosure are given in columns (1) and (2), respectively. 
Firm FLFD, ∆FLFD, and |∆FLFD| are reported in columns (3), (4) and (5), respectively.  
For illustration, the change in the level of FLFD of Aggreko company in column (4) 
reveals that the FLFD is increased from 8 in 2005 to 24 in 2006, then FLFD decreases 
to 22 in 2007 and remains at this level in 2008 then increases by 1 statements in 2009 
and continue to increase by 4 statements in 2010 and finally drops by 10 statements in 
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2011. Column (5) shows the magnitude of these changes. The largest change in FLFD is 
happened from 2005 to 2006 (16 statements), also there is large change in the level of 
FLFD from 2010 to 2011 (10 statements). 
Table 3.9  
Example of level change and absolute change in the level of FLFD 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Company name   Years FLFD ∆FLFD |∆FLFD| 
AGGREKO PLC 2005 8   
AGGREKO PLC 2006 24 16 16 
AGGREKO PLC 2007 22 -2 2 
AGGREKO PLC 2008 22 0 0 
AGGREKO PLC 2009 23 1 1 
AGGREKO PLC 2010 27 4 4 
AGGREKO PLC 2011 17 -10 10 
ASHTEAD PLC 2005 20   
ASHTEAD PLC 2006 18 -2 2 
ASHTEAD PLC 2007 34 16 16 
ASHTEAD PLC 2008 24 -10 10 
ASHTEAD PLC 2009 22 -2 2 
ASHTEAD PLC 2010 28 -6 6 
ASHTEAD PLC 2011 13 -15 15 
This Table provides example from two firms over the period from 2005 to 2011. It shows the level of forward-
looking financial statements in firm’s OFR statements in column 3. Column 4 presents the change in the level of 
FLFD which is equal to the level of firm’s FLFD in period t minus the level of firm’s FLFD in period t-1. 
Column 5 shows the absolute change of column 4.   
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3.5 ENSURING RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY OF CHANGE SCORE  
The measure of disclosure should be reliable and valid in order to obtain valid inference 
from employing it in the research (Hassan & Marston, 2010; Weber, 1990). Reliability 
refers to the ability of different coders to code the same text in the same way (Weber, 
1990). Whilst, validity concerns the extent to which the measuring instrument measures 
what is intended to measure (Carmines & Zeller, 1991). This section discusses the 
reliability and validity tests of the change measure. 
3.5.1 Reliability tests  
Reliability could be defined as the ability of different coders to code the same text in the 
same way (Weber, 1990). Prior research suggests that content analysis might not be 
reliable as intended if it is conducted only once or only by one person (Neuendorf, 
2002; Hussainey et al., 2003). In addition, it is argued that the reliability of 
computerized content analysis is based on the reliability of the coding schemes, the lists 
of keywords, designed by the researcher (Sydserff & Weetman, 2002). The reliability of 
the change score is checked on three stages as follows: 
The first stage checks the accuracy of the lists of keywords
22
. In this stage, we examine 
the extent to which the final lists of forward-looking (financial-related) keywords 
captures the forward-looking (financial-related) sentences from the OFR statements. In 
other words, the reliability in this stage is used to test: 1) the extent to which final-
forward-looking keywords list captures the forward-looking sentences from the OFR 
statements, and 2) the extent to which final financial-related keywords list captures the 
financial-related sentences from the OFR statements. In this stage we assume that the 
                                                 
22
 However, reliability tests are performed to check the accuracy of the final lists of keywords in each 
stage; this is considered a double check test for the output from each step. 
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accuracy of the output is based mainly on the accuracy of the keywords. If, for example, 
the forward-looking statements actually reflect real future oriented statements, then the 
keywords are accurate. 
To this end, with respect to forward-looking statements, a sample of 20 statements from 
each year is randomly selected from the output of step 1 (140 statements). The 140 
statements are read carefully to identify the extent to which these statements reflect 
future. There were no concerns about any of the statements which indicate that the 
forward-looking keywords are successful in capturing the future oriented statements 
from the OFR statements. 
In terms of financial-related keywords, a sample of 20 statements from each year is 
randomly selected from the output of step 2 (140 statements). The 140 statements are 
read carefully to identify the extent to which these statements reflect discussion about 
amount recorded in the firm financial statements and its financial ratios. The researcher 
finds that the final financial-related keywords are successful in capturing the financial-
related sentences in the OFR statements. 
The second stage of the reliability tests is conducted to examine how well the change 
score from the automated content analysis is correlated with the change score from the 
manual coding.  
To this end, a randomly selected sample from the OFR statements is manually coded. 
Each firm OFR statements for the current year (t) and the previous year (t-1) are 
compared and manually coded. Within each section, we read through the paragraphs 
and sentences. Total statements – units of analysis in our study – are identified and we 
then identify forward-looking sentences. Forward-looking sentences are all statements 
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that concern the future. Each forward-looking statement is, then, read carefully to 
identify the basic unit of discussion of the statement, referred to as aspect. If the aspect 
is about firm financial statements items or/and its financial ratios, then, the statement is 
classified as FLFD. After that, we calculate the change in FLFD for the same firm OFR 
statements between period (t) and period (t-1). Following Hussianey et al. (2003), we 
use the Pearson correlation to compare between the change score from the automated 
coding and the change score from the manual coding. The Pearson correlation test 
shows that the change score based on the manual coding is significantly and highly 
correlated with the change score from the automated coding. This finding suggests that 
the change score calculated depending on the computer software is reliable
23
.  
The third stage of reliability tests is conducted to examine the extent to which our 
coding methodology is stable over time. Stability concerns the degree to which a 
process is unchanging overtime (Krippendroff, 1980). In content analysis, stability can 
be determined when the same content is coded more than once by the same coding 
methodology and the results are the same (Hassan & Marston, 2010)
24
.  
To check the stability of the coding methodology, all the coding steps employed in 
measuring the change in FLFD are re-run again after a period of time. First, forward-
looking sentences are re-extracted from the OFR statements (Step 1). Second, financial-
related sentences are re-extracted from the OFR statements (step 2). Third, FLFD are re-
                                                 
23
 This test of reliability is called “Reproducibility” (Krippendoff, 1980) or “Inter-coder reliability” 
(Hassan & Marston, 2010). It can be defined as “the extent to which content classification produces the 
same results when the same text is coded by more than one coder” (Weber, 1990, p. 17). Hassan and 
Martson (2010) argue that if correlation is used to compare between different coders, the higher the 
correlation coefficient obtained, the higher the reliability of the measurement instrument. 
 
24
 An example of research who conducts the stability test is Hussainey et al. (2003). They code all annual 
reports at one time using Nudist software. After a short period of time, samples of these reports are 
recoded using the same software. The resulting scores yielded from the second round matched exactly 
with those from the first round, which proves the stability of the results obtained from the measurement 
instrument over time  
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extracted from the OFR statements (step 3). Finally, the change in FLFD is re-
calculated (step 4). The output from each step in the second coding trial is compared 
with those from the first coding round. The outputs of both trials are exactly the same. 
This provides assurance of the stability of the automated coding methodology over time.  
3.5.2 Validity tests  
Validity concerns the extent to which the measuring instrument measures what is 
intended to measure (Carmines & Zeller, 1991). Shevlin (2004) suggests that the 
measuring instrument can be validated by analytical analysis that involves empirical 
evidence to support the measuring instrument. In other words, this type of validity test 
focuses on the extent to which the measurement of disclosure is associated with the 
theoretical expectations (Carmines & Zeller, 1991). Specifically, prior research on 
disclosure (e.g., Botosan, 1997; Brown & Tucker, 2011) adopts analytical analysis 
methodology for validating disclosure measures. They suggest that their measure of 
disclosure is valid, if it is associated with firm-specific characteristics
25
.  
For instance, Botosan (1997) develops a disclosure index to measure the level of 
voluntary disclosure provided by firms in their annual reports. He argues that his 
disclosure index measures the level of voluntary disclosure, if it is related to some 
specific firm-related characteristics identified by prior research (e.g., size and auditor 
type). He validated his disclosure index by examining the association between his index 
and some firm specific characteristics that are firm size, exchange listing status of a firm, 
audit firm size and firm’s leverage. 
Furthermore, Brown and Tucker (2011) measure change in narrative reporting by 
                                                 
25  This type of validity test is referred to as construct validity (Hassan & Marston, 2010) or analytical 
validity (Shevlin, 2004). This validity test involves using empirical evidence to support the measurement 
of disclosure. 
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examining the rate of change in the frequency of specific words within the MD&A 
narrative statements of the annual report. They argue that their change measure capture 
considerable new information, if it is associated with factors identified in prior research 
as determinants of voluntary disclosure. They validate their change measure by 
empirically analyse the association between their change measure and factors that have 
been identified in prior research as determinants of voluntary disclosure. These factors 
are firm size, firm competition environment, firm litigation environment, institutional 
ownership and auditor type. They find that their change measure is associated with firm 
size, firm competition environment, litigation environment and institutional ownership. 
They conclude that, these results add validity that their change measure captures 
considerable new information in narrative reporting. 
Following Botosan (1997), and Brown and Tucker (2011), the current study adopts 
analytical analysis methodology to validate the change score. The study, therefore, 
empirically examine the association between the change score and some factors that 
have been identified in prior research as determinates of voluntary disclosure. These 
factors are firm size, competition environment, litigation environment, managerial 
ownership and auditor type. Chapter (4) elaborates this empirical test. 
The current study, as reported in the empirical analysis in section 4.7.3, finds that 
associations exist between the change score and some determinates of voluntary 
disclosure. These factors include the following: firm size, competitive environment, 
litigious environment and percentage of managerial ownership. This result adds validity 
to the change score. According, it validates the idea that as long as the company 
changes its level of disclosure, it will disclose relatively new information  
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3.6 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
Table 3.10 shows the descriptive statistics of the change score |ΔFLFD|. Panel A shows 
the descriptive statistics for all sample firms and by years, while, panel B presents the 
descriptive statistics of the change score for all sample firms and by industries.  
In Panel A, the mean (medium) values of the change score in all sample firms are 4.27 
(3.00). The maximum value of |ΔFLFD| of the sample firms is 58 while the minimum is 
0. This range indicates that a variation exists between the UK firms in terms of their 
decision to change FLFD from year-to-year. Where some firms have higher changes in 
their level of FLFD, others have smaller changes.  
The mean values of change score over the sample period depict monotonic increase, as 
shown in Figure 3.2, in the change score over the period from 2006 to 2011. It ranges 
from 3.78 in 2006 to 5.58 in 2011. This small range may be due to the soft talk nature of 
FLFD which reduces the variation of change from period to period. 
Figure 3.2: The mean value of |ΔFLFD| over years 
 
 
 
This Figure shows the mean value of year-over-year change in the level of FLFD. The sample 
includes 2076 observation over the period of 2006-2011.  It depicts monotonic increase in the 
change score over the sample period 
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Panel B of Table 3.10 shows the descriptive statistics of the change score for all sample 
firms and by industries. There is a variation in the mean value of change score across 
different industries. Utilities firms have the highest mean value of the change score 
(5.54), whilst, the technology firms have the lowest mean value (3.14). It is argued that 
the disclosure behaviour is similar between firms in the same industry, where similar 
business environments and operating conditions exist, and this behaviour tends to be 
different between firms in different industries. This is may be consistent with the 
prediction that litigation is high in technology industry, and so firms tend to provide less 
informative disclosure and thus fewer changes. 
As mentioned above, it seems that there is a variation in in terms of |ΔFLFD| during the 
sample period. However, the study compares the mean values of the change score 
across the sample period to test whether or not differences between the values of change 
score are significant over the period of study. The Table below indicates that the F value 
of the ANOVA test is 6.97 and is significant at 1% level of significance. This result 
suggests that differences exist in terms of the mean values of the change score across 
firms over the sample period. Therefore, more investigation is required for such 
variations in the change score.  
ANOVA  
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 868.326 5 173.665 6.975 .000 
Within Groups 51538.697 2070 24.898   
Total 52407.023 2075    
 
Chapter 4 investigates the factors that that may influence managers of firms to change 
their firms’ FLFD level over years. 
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Table 3.10  
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of change score, |ΔFLFD|,  for all the sample and by years  
 All 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Mean  4.27 3.78 3.60 4.03 4.03 4.26 5.58 
Minimum  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
25% 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Medium  3.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 
75% 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 6.00 8.00 8.00 
Maximum 58.00 24.00 27.00 58.00 58.00 29.00 35.00 
N 2076 346 346 346 346 346 346 
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics of the change score, |ΔFLFD|, for all the sample and by industries  
 All Industrial 
Basic 
material 
Technology 
Consumer 
goods 
Consumer 
service 
Health 
care 
Oil and 
gas 
Utilities Tel. 
Mean  4.27 4.24 4.66 3.14 3.50 4.40 4.56 4.94 5.54 4.91 
Minimum  0.00 00.00 00.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 00.00 00.00 00.00 1.00 
25% 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 
Medium  3.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.50 4.50 
75% 5.00 5.75 5.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 10.00 6.00 
Maximum 58.00 58.00 51.00 27.00 22.00 31.00 34.00 25.00 18.00 18.00 
N 2076 720 168 210 216 462 132 102 42 24 
This Table shows the descriptive statistics of the change score |ΔFLFD | for all sample firms, by years, and by industries. Panel A shows the descriptive statistics for all 
sample firms and by years. Whilst, Panel B shows the descriptive statistics for all sample firms and by industry. N indicates the number of observations. The definitions 
of industries are based on the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB). 
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3.7 CONCLUDING REMARKS  
The main objective of this chapter is measuring the year-over-year change in firm FLFD. 
The chapter starts by discussing the arguments for adopting change methodology in 
measuring narrative statements, and explains the sample selection process. Then, it 
explains the steps of measuring year-over-year change in FLFD. Finally, it provides 
descriptive analysis that explains the change in FLFD over time and across industries. 
Adopting change methodology in measuring narrative reporting can better capture new 
information that is free of boilerplate statements and reflects changes in the business 
economic environment, as well as, this methodology alleviates the measurement noise 
due to the repetitive statements (Muslu et al., 2011; Brown & Tucker, 2011). In addition, 
this method mitigates the problem of endogeneity (e.g., Li, 2010b) and provides more 
robust results (e.g., Feldman et al., 2010). 
To measure year-over-year change in FLFD, the following four steps are followed.  
First step, forward-looking sentences are extracted from OFR statements based on a list 
of 33 forward-looking keywords such as expect, anticipate, and look-forward. Second 
step, financial-related sentences are extracted from OFR statements based on a list of 62 
financial-related keywords such as earnings per share (EPS), cash, and margin.  
Third step, using the QSR N6 software package, we search OFR statements for 
sentences that include both a forward-looking keyword and a financial-related keyword. 
This helps in counting the frequency of FLFD in firm OFR statements each year. Fourth 
step, the change in FLFD, ΔFLFD, between period t-1 and period t is equal to FLFD in 
period t minus FLFD in period t-1. This measures the extent to which FLFD in two 
successive OFR documents are different. A higher score indicates more changes from 
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the previous year and vice versa. 
The reliability and validity tests have been considered. Reliability test suggests that our 
change score based on the automated content analysis is reliable. Whilst, the validity 
test adds credibility to the idea that: as long as the company changes its level of 
disclosure, it will disclose relatively new information. Hence, it ensures that the change 
score captures new information  
The descriptive statistics indicate that a variation exists between the UK firms in terms 
of their decision to change their FLFD from year-to-year. 
This study contributes to the body of knowledge on methodological developments in the 
measurement of FLFD. Unlike prior research on forward-looking disclosure in UK 
narratives (e.g., Hussainey et al., 2003; Schleicher et al., 2007; Wang & Hussainey, 
2013), the study uses change in FLFD rather than their respective levels. Adopting 
change measure can better capture new information that is free of boilerplate statements 
and reflects change in the business environment (Muslu et al., 2011). In addition, this 
method mitigates the problem of endogeneity (Li, 2010b) and provides more robust 
results (Feldman et al., 2010); it also alleviates the measurement noise due to repetitive 
statements (Muslu et al., 2011). 
However, it has some limitations which have to be considered as potential avenues for 
future research. The change measure employed in the current study is based on the idea 
in prior research that change in the level disclosure is associated with change in firm 
performance (e.g., Miller, 2000). In other words, as long as the company changes its 
level of disclosure, it will disclose relatively new information. However, the change in 
the level of disclosure may not be the suitable measure to capture the in-depth changes 
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in firm’s information content. The company may keep its FLFD level the same from 
year to year, but disclose relatively new information each year. Perhaps for this reason, 
it would be an interesting area for future research to look for other sophisticated 
measures of change in information such as Turnitin software used to check for 
plagiarism. However, our change measure is not perfect; it is one step forward in 
understanding managers’ narrative disclosure behaviour. 
Chapter 4 will provide more investigation in terms of the factors that might drive 
managers of firms to change the FLFD of their firms over years. 
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Chapter 4 : MANAGERS’ INCENTIVES TO CHANGE FLFD OF 
THEIR FIRMS  
4.1 OVERVIEW  
Exploring the factors that may encourage firms’ managers to change the FLFD of their 
firms over years is the main objective of this chapter. The chapter, therefore, discusses 
the theoretical expectations, the research design and the empirical results concerning the 
factors that may drive managers of firms to change FLFD of their firms over years. 
Hence, it would provide answers to research questions: Q1a, Q1b, Q1c, Q2a, Q2b, Q2c, 
Q2d, & Q2e 
As previously mentioned each chapter discusses, where relevant, the relevant theories, 
literature, and hypotheses development. In addition, it explains the research design and 
reports the results. Particularly, this chapter is outlined as follows: 
Section 4.2 discusses the relevant theories that explain managers’ incentives to change 
their FLFD. The review of the literature is discussed in section 4.3. Section 4.4 develops 
the hypotheses of the current study. Section 4.5 presents the literature on variables that 
may influence managers to change FLFD (control variables). Section 4.6 details the 
research design. It draws on the variables’ definitions and measurements in section 
4.6.1, empirical model in section 4.6.2, statistical issues in section 4.6.3, and sample 
selection and data collection in section 4.6.4. The results of the current study are 
presented in section 4.7. This section reports the descriptive statistics in section 4.7.1, 
the correlation analysis in section 4.7.2, the empirical results in section 4.7.3, and the 
further analysis and endogeneity tests in sections 4.7.4 and 4.7.5, respectively. Section 
4.8 provides the concluding remarks. 
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4.2 THEORIES  
Literature presents various theories that explain managers’ incentives for disclosure26. 
Obviously, there is no general or comprehensive theory that could be applied 
(Verrecchia, 2001). However, each theory focuses on or explains different aspect of 
disclosure. Therefore, several theories could be applied to explain managers’ behaviour 
in terms of narrative disclosure. The objective of this section is to present the main 
theories that could explain managers’ incentives to change FLFD over years. 
Managers’ decision to change FLFD from the previous year depends on 1) the 
likelihood that managers have new information to disclose relative to prior year, and 2) 
the cost of including more or less information in the narrative document. Accordingly, 
our theoretical prediction is based on the following theories: managers’ incentive 
theories and cost of disclosure theories.  
4.2.1 Managers’ incentive theories 
Managers’ incentives to change their narrative reporting over years could be explained 
from the point of views of the agency and signalling theories (Core, 2001; Beyer, Cohen, 
Lys, & Walther, 2010).  
4.2.1.1 Agency theory 
Agency theory was borne by Jensen and Meckling, (1976) and is used to explain 
voluntary disclosure by firms to investors. It is the dominant of all disclosure theories 
and is the widely used in disclosure studies (e.g., Wang & Hussainey, 2013; Elshandidy 
et al., 2013; Elzahar et al., 2015). Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 308) define the agency 
                                                 
26
 Examples include: Jensen and Meckling (1976), Spence (1973), Watts and Zimmerman (1990) and 
Healy and Palepu (2001). 
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relationship as “a contract under which one or more (principals) engage another person 
(the agent) to perform some service on their behalf, which involves delegating some 
decision-making authority to the agent”. This relationship assumes that the agent is 
driven by self-interest and undertakes self-serving activities that could be detrimental to 
the economic welfare of the principals (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The principals’ 
monitoring of the agents’ behaviour and bonding agents’ interests with principals’ 
interests, constitute agency costs.  
Agency theory suggests that voluntary disclosures enable principals to monitor 
managers’ behaviour and to reduce agency costs that managers would otherwise bear. 
The reduction in agency costs is a product of narrowing the information gap and 
reducing uncertainty (Chalmers & Godfrey, 2004). Thus, managers that have new 
information relative to prior year may provide it voluntarily to reduce agency costs, 
resulting in reduced uncertainty and reduced information asymmetry.  
Information asymmetry arises when management has a competitive advantage of 
information within the firm over that of the owner (Arnold & De Lange, 2004). 
Moreover, uncertainty occurs when performance declines relative to prior year. In this 
case owners demand more information to better assess the uncertainty of future cash 
flow and, in turn, firms’ managers provide more information (e.g., forward-looking 
information). Bujaki et al. (1999) argue that the publication of forward-looking 
information in the annual report is useful for reducing the degree of information 
asymmetry between managers and investors. Thus, voluntary disclosure of information 
may diminish the information asymmetry and uncertainty regarding future cash flow 
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and so reduce agency costs
27
.  
4.2.1.2 Signalling theory 
Signalling theory was proposed by Akerlof (1970), developed by Spence (1973), and 
applied in some prior voluntary disclosure research (e.g. Miller, 2002), which 
rationalizes voluntary disclosure to the capital markets. It predicts that high-quality 
firms wish to distinguish themselves from low-quality firms through providing 
disclosure voluntarily.  
Managers with good news may disclose this information voluntarily in order to signal 
their good news to the market participants and to avoid being pooled with managers of 
bad news information. Teoh and Hwang (1991) argue that if disclosure is costless, 
companies with good news will make full disclosure in order to distinguish themselves 
from firms with bad news and to avoid consequent interpretation by investors of non-
disclosing firms. Moreover, Skinner (1994) finds that companies with good 
performance disclose this good news to distinguish themselves from companies with 
poor performance information.  
Furthermore, firms’ managers with bad news (e.g., losses) may have incentives to 
disclose this information voluntarily. This is to signal their capabilities and strengths to 
eliminate losses in the future and to avoid the reputation costs which may arise from 
being late in disclosing information in proper time. Skinner (1994) examines why firms 
disclose bad news voluntarily. He suggests that poor performing firms might provide 
more information to explain the reasons for negative performance. Skinner (1994) 
                                                 
27
 Prior research focuses on the use of voluntary disclosure by management to reduce agency costs. They 
have used many variables such as firm size, earnings, leverage, liquidity, managerial ownership (e.g., 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Chow & Wong-Boren, 1987; Ruland, Tung & George, 1990; Cooke, 1991: 
Cooke, 1993; Lang & Lundholm, 1993; Hossain et al., 1994; Noe, 1999; Xiao, Yang & Chow, 2004; 
Marston & Polei, 2004; Kelton & Yang, 2008) 
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concludes that this disclosure behaviour may 1) prevent the potential litigation and 
reputational costs, 2) re-assure the market about future growth, and 3) avoid severe 
devaluation of share capital and loss of reputation in the stock market as the result of 
disclosing “bad news”.  
Therefore, companies with different types of news either good or bad relative to prior 
year should signal these types of news to their users to keep them updated with the firms’ 
events in order to increase the confidence in their companies
28
. 
4.2.2 Cost of disclosure theories 
Companies may obtain economic benefits from making more disclosure such as 
improving stock liquidity, reducing cost of capital and increasing comparability 
(Leventis, 2001). However, disclosure does not have absolute benefits, there are some 
costs associated with disclosure. Hence, companies disclose voluntarily if the benefits 
of disclosure exceeds its expected costs. Consistently, it is argued that "It is now 
generally recognised that a cost-benefit analysis is required, weighting the benefits of 
additional disclosure to investors against the costs” (Bhushan & Lessared, 1992, pp. 
150). Therefore, Cooke (1992) argues that when a firm disclose voluntarily, this means 
that the benefits of such disclosure exceeds its costs.  
There are two types of costs associated with disclosure; direct and indirect costs (Mautz 
& May, 1978; Foster, 1986). Direct costs of disclosure such as preparation costs, and 
indirect costs of disclosure refer to all the costs arising from the effect of disclosure on 
companies’ activities (Leventise, 2001). The indirect costs of disclosure include 
political costs, proprietary costs and litigation costs.  
                                                 
28
 Performance variables (e.g. earnings), firm liquidity, and reputable external auditors are discussed by 
researchers in the light of signalling theory (Clarkson et al., 1994; Jog & McConomy, 2003). Change in 
these variables reveals much new information, either good or bad news, to managers to disclose. 
CHAPTER 4: MANAGERS’ INCENTIVES TO CHANGE FLFD  
 
 
 
A
p
p
en
d
ice
s 
112 
Managers’ decision to change their disclosure relative the previous period depends on 
the cost of including more or less information. These costs include direct cost of 
disclosure, political costs, proprietary costs, and litigation costs.  
4.2.2.1 Direct costs of disclosure  
Direct costs of disclosure are all costs associated with the production, preparation, and 
dissemination of the information (Field et al., 2005; Core, 2001; Lev, 1992). These 
costs include all costs involved in collecting and gathering the information needed, 
processing and presenting it, and auditing the financial information, as well as, 
information technology equipment and the management time spent on disclosure 
activities (Cook, 1992; Gray, Radebaugh, & Roberts, 1989; Mautz & May, 1978; Foster, 
1986).  
Managers’ decision to change their firms’ narrative reporting (e.g., FLFD) over years 
may be constrained by the direct costs of disclosure. For instance, on one hand, firms 
may have enough resources to cover the preparation costs and so update their narrative 
discussions and analyses from year to year. On the other hand, companies may simply 
cut and paste from previous years’ narratives in order to save the preparation costs. 
Furthermore, firms may have enough resources to acquire reputable external auditor, 
while, other firms may not afford to acquire big external auditor. Therefore, direct costs 
of disclosure may constraints managers’ ability to change FLFD over time.  
4.2.2.2 Political cost of disclosure  
The idea beyond political costs was derived from Watts and Zimmerman (1978). The 
political cost suggests that managers are concerned with political considerations, 
including preventing explicit or implicit taxes, or other regulatory actions (Healy & 
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Palepu, 2001; Jensen & Meckling, 1978; Watts & Zimmermann, 1978). In addition, 
politicians, non-governmental interest groups and other stakeholders try increasingly to 
influence companies’ actions to favour their specific interests. They, thus, have the 
power to affect wealth transfers between the company and other stakeholders.  
To reduce the pressure that the companies encounter from politicians, firms select a 
number of devices, such as social responsibility campaigns in the media, government 
lobbying
29
 and selection of accounting procedures to minimise reported earnings (Watts 
& Zimmerman, 1978). Consistently, management can reduce the likelihood of adverse 
political actions and, thereby, reduce its expected costs (including the legal costs the 
firm would incur opposing the political actions) by adopting accounting policies and 
lobby for accounting standards (Watts & Zimmerman, 1978; Rahman & Scapens, 1988). 
Political costs have been used to explain why firms voluntarily disclose information. It 
suggests that some firms (e.g., large firms) are politically visible and regulators make 
decisions based on the information disclosed by these firms (Watts & Zimmerman, 
1986). Therefore, companies may disclose information voluntarily in order to minimize 
these political costs. Some studies reveal a positive association between political costs 
and voluntary disclosure (Firth, 1980; Cooke, 1989; Raffournier, 1995). However, 
others demonstrate that the relationship is doubtful (Belkaoui & Karpik, 1989; Owusu-
Ansah, 1997; Milne, 2002). 
Political costs can be used to explain managers’ incentives to change their narrative 
reporting relative to prior years’ disclosure. Firms that are politically visible are subject 
to high political costs and thus are more likely to disclose information voluntarily. 
Politically visible firms tend to update their disclosure from year-to-year in order to 
                                                 
29
 Lobbying is the act of attempting to influence business and government leaders to create legislation or 
conduct an activity that will help a particular organization. 
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limit their boilerplate disclosures to avoid the political costs of being perceived as being 
ambiguous.  
The size of a firm is an incentive for managers to reveal information voluntarily to 
reduce the political costs. For instance, larger companies are more appearing in the 
public eye than smaller firms. This, therefore, motivates larger companies to provide 
more informative disclosure to reduce their political costs (e.g., tax
30
) (Al-Hatybat, 
2005).  
4.2.2.3 Proprietary costs of disclosure   
Luo, Hossain and Courtenay (2006, p. 506) define proprietary costs as “the costs 
associated with strategic decision-making by a competitor using all available 
information”. Proprietary costs are, thus, incurred when the private information, 
conveyed through voluntary disclosure, is used by firm’s competitors to the harm its 
income producing activities. It is, also, argued that a firm’s decision to provide 
information to the public may damage its competitive position (Verrecchia, 1983) 
because competitors may use this information for their own advantage (Linsley & 
Shrives, 2005; Tsakumis, Doupnik & Seese, 2006). 
It is suggested that the disclosure of proprietary information may affect firm’s future 
cash flows (Dye, 1985; Scott, 1995). This may be because disclosure could improve a 
firm competitors’ ability to make inferences about its future plans and this may reduce 
its future cash flow. For instance, competitors may enter (leave) the industry, when a 
firm issues good news (bad news) regarding the earnings forecast, thus affecting firm’s 
future cash flows.   
                                                 
30
 Zimmerman (1983) argues that larger companies are subject to higher tax rates and, therefore, higher 
political costs. 
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Proprietary cost of disclosure represents competitive disadvantage because the 
extension in disclosing information by the companies may lead to additional 
information to be used by their rivals (Edwards & Smith, 1996; Radebaugh & Gray, 
1997). Verrecchia (1983) analyses the significance of the existence of a proprietary cost. 
He argues that if proprietary cost of disclosure exists, managers are less likely to 
disclose informative information that may help their competitors. Empirically, 
companies have incentive for non-disclosure of information in order to maintain their 
competitive position in the market and to prevent competitors from using their disclosed 
information, and to avoid disclosing more than their rivals (Verrechia, 1983; Feltham & 
Xie, 1992; Gigler, 1994; Verrecchia & Weber, 2006; Dedman & Lennox, 2009; 
Depoers & Jeanjean, 2012).  
Firm’s decision to provide informative disclosure is influenced by proprietary costs of 
disclosure. If disclosing certain information means publishing vital competitive 
information, firms will have an incentive for non-disclosure of this proprietary 
information (Verrecchia, 1983; Wagenhofer, 1990; Feltham & Xie, 1992; Gigler, 1994). 
Accordingly, managers are less likely to change their narrative reporting over time to 
avoid providing informative disclosure that may help firm’s competitors.  
4.2.2.4 Litigation costs of disclosure  
Litigation is costly and firms have an interest in adopting policies that may reduce 
litigation costs (Lowry, 2009). Healy and Palepu (2001) argue that the litigation costs 
have two great effects on managers’ disclosure decision. First, lawsuits against 
companies for their insufficient disclosure may be an incentive for them to increase 
their voluntary disclosure. Second, litigation costs can reduce managers’ incentives to 
provide disclosure voluntarily.  
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Regarding the first effect of litigation, companies have an incentive to increase their 
voluntary disclosure. This is because higher voluntary disclosure should make it harder 
to claim that the firm is withholding relevant information from the market, which in turn 
limits the potential litigation costs. This effect has been supported in prior research. For 
instance, Skinner (1994) finds that firms subject to litigation costs are more than twice 
as likely to disclose their bad earnings news early. In addition, Skinner (1994) provides 
evidence that timely disclosure of bad news can reduce litigation costs. Consistent with 
this evidence, Field et al. (2005) find that disclosure deters the litigation costs. If this is 
the case, we may expect that managers in high litigation environment to provide more 
voluntary disclosure and update their disclosure from year-to -year in order to avoid the 
litigations costs.  
On the other hand, the litigation costs may reduce managers’ incentive to provide 
voluntary disclosure. This is may be due to one or more of the following reasons.  
First, if legal system cannot distinguish between forecast errors due to chance and those 
due to deliberate management bias, so managers may be penalized by the legal system 
and, consequently, this may provide an incentive for managers to refrain from making 
voluntary disclosure (Healy & Palepu, 2001).  
Second, if a firm makes a disclosure and the conditions surrounding that disclosure 
change, in this case the firm has a duty to update its disclosure and may be sued if it 
does not update it (Cox, Hillman, & Langevoort, 2001). In this case, the firm may 
minimise its obligation to update disclosure and so reduces the potential litigation costs 
by limiting the amount of initial information disclosed voluntarily (Rogers & Van 
Buskirk, 2009), and accordingly, managers will have incentives to reduce the 
information they disclose voluntarily. If this is the case, we may expect managers in 
CHAPTER 4: MANAGERS’ INCENTIVES TO CHANGE FLFD  
 
 
 
A
p
p
en
d
ice
s 
117 
more litigation environment to reduce the amount of disclosure disclosed voluntarily 
and so less changes in FLFD from year to year is expected. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4: MANAGERS’ INCENTIVES TO CHANGE FLFD  
 
 
 
A
p
p
en
d
ice
s 
118 
4.3 LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section highlights the previous empirical research on forward-looking disclosure 
which has examined the managers’ incentives to disclose this type of information. It 
starts by providing an overview on the FLFD research, and then reviews the literature 
that examines managers’ incentives to provide FLFD. 
Obviously, there are two characteristics of FLFD that are of interest to researchers; level 
(how much to disclose) and tone (how to disclose)
31
. Some prior research on forward-
looking disclosure focuses on the level of disclose (e.g., Schleicher & Walker, 1999; 
Miller & Piotroski, 2000; Hussainey et al., 2003; Aljifri & Hussainey, 2007; Schleicher 
et al., 2007; Hussainey & Walker, 2008; Hussainey & Al-Najjar, 2011; Wang & 
Hussainey, 2013; Alkhatib, 2014;  Al-Najjar & Abed, 2014; Athansakou & Hussainey, 
2014; Muslu et al., 2011). However, other studies focus on the tone of forward-looking 
information (e.g., Lennox & Park, 2006; Anilowski, Feng, & Skinner, 2007; Feldman et 
al., 2010; Li, 2010a; Schleicher & Walker, 2010; Schleicher & Walker, 2012; Bonsall, 
Bozanic, & Merkley, 2013). 
In addition, FLFD has been examined in different countries. There is an extensive 
research on US (e.g., Miller & Piotroski, 2000; Hutton, Miller, & Skinner, 2003; 
Anilowski et al., 2007; Das, Kim, & Patro, 2007; Feldman et al., 2010; Li, 2010a; 
Muslu et al., 2011). Some research has been conducted in the UK (e.g., Hussainey et al., 
2003; Schleicher et al., 2007; Schleicher & Walker, 2010; Hussainey & Al-Najjar, 
2011; Wang & Hussainey, 2013; Athansakou & Hussainey, 2014). Other research 
conducts a comparative analysis between different countries in European Union (e.g., 
                                                 
31  Level of disclosure represents the amount or quantity of disclosure. This amount or quantity of 
disclosure reflects number of occurrences and the extent of disclosure to add emphasis on specific 
disclosure type (Beattie & Thomson, 2007). While disclosure tone reflects how management 
communicates its disclosure. 
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Bozzolan et al., 2009) while others focus on only one country such as Italy (e.g., 
Menicucci, 2013), Turkey (e.g., Celik et al., 2006), Australia (e.g., Kent & Ung, 2003) 
and Middle East countries such as UAE (e.g., Aljifri & Hussainey, 2007), and Jordan 
(e.g., Alkhatib, 2014). 
Some studies examine the FLFD in all sections of the annual report (e.g., Miller & 
Piotroski, 2000; Aljifri & Hussainey, 2007; Hussainey et al., 2003;  Schleicher et al.,  
2007; Athansakou & Hussainey,2014; Hussainey & Al-Najjar, 2011; Al-Najjar & Abed, 
2014), while, others focus only on narrative reporting statements of the annual reports 
such as OFR (e.g., Schleicher & Walker, 1999; Wang & Hussainey, 2013), MD&A (e.g., 
Feldman et al., 2010; Li, 2010a; Muslu et al., 2011), Management Commentary (e.g., 
Menicucci, 2013), Outlook section  (e.g., Schleicher & Walker, 2010; Schleicher, 2012), 
Chairman’s statements (e.g., Kent & Ung, 2003). In addition, other research focuses on 
other medium of disclosure such analysts’ reports (e.g., Hussainey & Walker, 2008), 
and Management Earnings Forecasts Releases (e.g., Hutton et al., 2003; Lennox, & Park, 
2006; Bozanic, Roulstone, & Van Buskirk, 2013; Davis et al., 2011). 
Furthermore, some studies use the level of FLFD as proxy for disclosure quality 
(Schleicher & Walker, 1999; Hussainey et al., 2003; Schleicher et al., 2007; Bozzolan, 
et al., 2009; Al-Najjar & Abed, 2014). They justify the use of FLFD in the following 
ways. First, firms with effective governance mechanisms provide more FLFD (Wang & 
Hussainey, 2013) and investors view this information as more credible (Athansakou & 
Hussainey, 2014). Second, it is reported that the analyst forecasts accuracy is positively 
associated with level of FLFD (Bozzolan et al., 2009)
32
.  
                                                 
32  On the other hand, some studies argue that disclosure quality is complex and multidimensional concept 
(Beattie et al., 2004) and thus FLFD cannot only capture the quality of information. However, FLFD can 
only be used as one dimension of disclosure quality. For instance, Beattie et al. (2004) measure the 
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In terms of  the managers’ incentives to provide forward-looking information, prior 
research find an association between level of forward-looking information and some 
firm- specific attributes (e.g., firm size, performance, leverage, liquidity, dividends and 
governance variables). 
For instance, Hussainey and Walker (2008) focus on the analysts’ reports as a medium 
of disclosure to examine the factors that may drive analysts to use different types of 
FLFD (e.g., financial vs. non-financial). They find that industry-specific characteristics 
drive the analysts to use different types of forward-looking information when writing 
their reports. They show that analysts use non-financial forward-looking disclosure 
when covering firms in high growth firms; in addition, they (analysts) use multiple year 
forecasts for firms in risky sectors. 
A part from analysts’ reports, other prior research focuses on the annual reports. Some 
of them examine the forward-looking information in all sections of annual report (e.g., 
Hussainey et al., 2003; Athansakou & Hussainey, 2014; Aljifri & Hussainey, 2007), 
whilst, limited research focus on narrative reporting statements of the annual report 
(Wang & Hussainey, 2013).  
For instance, Aljifri and Hussainey (2007) examine the factors that may encourage 
managers to provide FLFD in the annual report of UAE firms. They find that there is a 
significant positive relationship between the level of forward-looking information and 
the degree of financial leverage. However, they find negative association between firm 
profitability and forward-looking disclosure 
In the UK, Hussainey and Al-Najjar (2011) examine the factors that may affect 
                                                                                                                                               
quality of information as a function of four information attributes; namely: the spread (the number of 
topics disclosed), the time orientation of the information (historical or forward-looking), the financial 
orientation (financial/non-financial), and the quantitative orientation (quantitative/qualitative). 
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managers’ decisions to provide FLFD in the annual reports. They find that firm size is 
the main factor affecting the firms’ decision to disclose this type of information in the 
annual report. They, also, find that FLFD is affected by firm profitability, and 
percentage of outsider and insider directors’ ownerships. Furthermore, positive 
association exists between the FLFD in the annual report and corporate dividend policy. 
Consistently, Al-Najjar and Abed (2014) find that the publication of FLFD in the UK 
annual reports is associated positively with firm size, operating cash flow, cross-listing 
status and audit committee. While, it is associated negatively with profitability, leverage 
and block holder ownership. 
Furthermore, Athanasakou and Hussainey (2014) use more comprehensive variables to 
examine what drivers FLFD in the UK annual reports. They find that the disclosure of 
forward-looking information is negatively associated with firm size and equity offering. 
However, it is positively associated with volatility of operations, issue debt, 
performance decline, miss analysts’ earnings forecasts and underperforming the 
industry peers.  
More particularly, Wang and Hussainey (2013) focus only on narrative reporting 
statements of the UK annual reports, namely OFR statements. They find that forward-
looking disclosure is positively associated with firm size, dividends yield, leverage, 
board of director’s size and board composition. However, it is negatively affected by 
firm profitability, managerial ownership and the role duality of the chairman of the 
board of directors.  
Other research focuses on the tone of FLFD. For instance, Schleicher and Walker 
(2010) show that loss-making firms, risky firms and firms with analysts’ earnings 
forecasts provides more positive forward-looking information. However, they find that 
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firms with earnings decline relative to prior year tend to provide more negative forward-
looking information. 
Other stream of research focuses on MD&A. For instance, Li (2010a) finds that firms 
with better current performance, lower accruals, smaller size, lower market-to-book 
ratio, less return volatility, lower Fog index, and longer history tend to have more 
positive forward-looking statements in MD&A.  
On the other hand, Muslu et al. (2011) focus on the changes in the level of forward-
looking disclosure from previous year rather than their respective year levels in the 
MD&A. They hypothesise that firms with no analysts following them tend to provide 
similar levels of forward-looking disclosure in MD&A. However, they find that changes 
in the level forward-looking disclosure decreases as long as the firms have no-analysts 
following them. Their results suggest that firms provide less informative forward-
looking disclosure when it has no-analyst following them.   
Additionally, Nelson and Pritchard (2007) examine the extent to which the cautionary 
language of forward-looking statements in the MD&A is updated from year-to-year. 
They find that firms with greater litigation risk tend to update their cautionary language 
of forward-looking disclosure from year-to-year more than those subjecting to smaller 
litigation risk.   
Despite the above-mentioned research on forward-looking disclosure, the extent to 
which managers of the UK firms change FLFD from the previous year is largely 
unexamined and thus needs more investigation. The UK provides an interesting context 
within which we can examine the changes in the FLFD over years. FLFD in the UK 
narratives is a very different in nature from those in the US. In contrast to the US 
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quantitative management forecasts, the UK FLFD is qualitative in nature and is not 
immediately verifiable or auditable (Athanasakou & Hussainey, 2014; Wang & 
Hussainey, 2013). This nature may encourage firm managers to use the previous year’s 
FLFD as a template from year to year without making significant changes in order to 
save preparation costs. 
Furthermore, research on FLFD in the UK context explains managers’ incentives to 
provide FLFD from the point of view of the standard theories of disclosure such as 
agency and signalling theories (e.g., Al-Najjar & Abed, 2014; Wang & Hussainey, 
2013; Athanasakou & Hussainey, 2014). However, it is argued that disclosure is costly, 
and there are many costs associated with disclosure (e.g., direct costs, political and 
litigation costs). Therefore, this study contributes to literature in FLFD in the UK and 
examines the effect of disclosure costs on managers’ decision to change their FLFD 
over years. 
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4.4 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
In this section, the factors that might encourage managers of firms to change FLFD of 
their firms are identified to formulate the research hypotheses. Some of these factors 
(e.g., performance) are used to indicate that managers do have information to disclose if 
they are changed. Whilst, some other factors are used as proxies for costs of disclosure 
(e.g., litigious & competitive environments). Therefore, the factors are classified into 
two strands. The first strand is related to the association between change in firm 
performance and change in FLFD. The second focuses on which firm characteristics 
motivate managers to change FLFD of their firms.   
4.4.1 Change in firm performance and change in FLFD 
The impact of performance on disclosure is a major issue in disclosure research. 
Significant amount of prior empirical research typically emphasises on how 
performance influences the disclosure of quantitative financial information (e.g., Lev & 
Penman, 1990; Skinner, 1994; Kasznik & Lev, 1995; Harris, 1998; Healy & Palepu, 
2001; Botoson & Stanford, 2005; Berger & Hann, 2007). However, large amounts of 
narratives are not incorporated directly into financial statements. Prior research focuses 
less on this type of disclosure, perhaps because it is difficult to measure and quantify. 
Nonetheless, narrative reporting is important because it is analysed by market 
participants while making their investment decisions and helps them to bridge the gap 
between the amounts in the financial statements and the economic reality of firms’ 
performance (Feldman et al., 2010; Merkley, 2014). Therefore, this study addresses this 
issue and focuses on narrative reporting.  
The association between performance and narrative reporting could be hypothesised 
CHAPTER 4: MANAGERS’ INCENTIVES TO CHANGE FLFD  
 
 
 
A
p
p
en
d
ice
s 
125 
either positively or negatively. Positive association may be explained on the basis that 
managers in well-performing firms
33
 are likely to provide more discussion and analysis 
about their performance in order to signal their favourable results to their investors.  
On the other hand, a negative association may be hypothesised on the basis that 
information asymmetry increases as performance decreases (Wittenberg-Moerman 
2008; Brown, Lo, & Hillegeist, 2009; Rogers & Van Buskirk, 2009). Hayn (1995) 
argues that as earnings performance decreases the earnings signal becomes noisier and 
reported disclosure becomes less predictive of future performance. Thus, investors 
demand more information to better assess the uncertainty of future cash flows and, in 
turn, managers provide more discussion and analysis.  
Empirically, prior research finds positive association between performance and 
voluntary disclosure. For instance, Lang and Lundholm (1993) find that firms’ overall 
voluntary disclosure level is greater in periods with increasing performance. Moreover, 
Miller (2002) finds that firms experiencing an increase in their earnings tend to increase 
their disclosure, and as earnings performance returns to previous levels, their disclosure 
level decreases.  
On the other hand, empirical studies find a negative association between performance 
and voluntary disclosure. For instance, Abraham and Tonks (2006) find that firms that 
have a negative earnings’ change from the previous to the current accounting year tend 
to have a positive and significant disclosure rate. Recently, Merkley (2014) predicts that 
firms react to bad earnings performance by increasing discussion on activities with a 
potential positive effect on future performance. Empirically, he confirms his prediction 
and finds that firms increase their research and development (R&D) disclosure when 
                                                 
33 Well-performing firms are, for example, firms with earnings increase. Conversely, poor performing 
firms are those with earnings decrease. 
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earnings decrease.  
The research that examines the impact of performance on forward-looking disclosure 
provides mixed results. For instance, Lakhal (2005) and O’Sullivan, Percy and Stewart 
(2008) find no association between firm profitability and the disclosure of forward-
looking information. On the other hand, prior research (e.g., Miller & Piotroski, 2002; 
Li, 2010a; Athanasakou & Hussainey, 2014) finds that firms with good earnings 
performance are more likely to provide more forward-looking information. Conversely, 
other prior research (e.g., Aljifri & Hussainey, 2007; Hussainey & Al-Najjar, 2011; 
Wang & Hussainey, 2013; Al-Najjar & Abed, 2014) finds a negative association 
between profit-making firms and forward-looking disclosure. In addition, Schleicher et 
al. (2007) find that loss-making firms provide more relevant forward-looking 
information to their investors than profit-making firms.  
Recently, Brown and Tucker (2011) examine the association between change in firm 
economic environment and changes in narrative reporting in MD&A. They provide 
evidence on the association between a changes in firm earnings performance and 
changes in narrative reporting in MD&A. In addition, they find that firms with larger 
changes in their economic environment are more likely to change their narratives 
reporting more than those with smaller economic changes. 
To conclude, a change in a firm performance reveals considerable new information, 
either good or bad. This suggests that managers do have information to disclose to 
investors. Furthermore, companies have incentives to disclose and update their 
disclosure in response to their performance either to signal their favourable results 
(signalling theory) or to reduce information asymmetry (agency theory). Moreover, 
prior studies (e.g., Miller, 2002; Merkley, 2014) suggest that changes in disclosure are 
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associated with changes in performance. In addition, firms with larger changes in their 
economic environment change their narratives more than those with smaller economic 
changes (Brown & Tucker, 2011). Consequently, if managers follow the spirit of OFR 
statements, we expect them to provide discussion and analysis of firms’ performance 
with forward-looking orientation, and update their discussion from year to year in 
response to changes in performance. Furthermore, managers of firms with larger 
changes in their performance are expected to change their narratives more than those 
with smaller performance changes.  Therefore, the following hypotheses are set:  
H1a: A positive association exists between change in firm performance 
and the change in FLFD in UK narratives. 
H1b: Firms with larger changes in their performance tend to change 
their FLFD more than those with smaller performance changes in UK 
narratives.  
4.4.2 Firm characteristics and the change in FLFD 
In this section, we hold the changes in firm performance constant and we examine 
which firms’ characteristics may drive managers to change FLFD of their firms. These 
characteristics are identified in prior research as determinants of corporate voluntary 
disclosure and are relatively stable over years. In addition, these variables are used to 
test the validity of the change score. These factors are firm size, competitive 
environment, litigious environment, managerial ownership, and auditor type.  
4.4.2.1 Firm size and change in FLFD 
The association between firm size and narrative reporting can be explained from 
different perspectives. First, signalling theory suggests a positive association between 
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narrative reporting and firm size by proposing that larger firms are more likely to attract 
financial analysts (Schipper, 1991). This suggests that these firms are under pressure to 
provide more value relevant information to their analysts and their investors (Iatridis, 
2008). Second, larger firms are politically visible (Watts & Zimmerman, 1978) and so 
they tend to update their disclosure from year to year to limit their boilerplate disclosure 
to avoid the political costs of being perceived as being ambiguous (Brown & Tucker, 
2011). Third, larger firms are more likely to be able to afford the preparation costs of 
annual reports (Lang & Lundholm, 1993) or smaller firms might be more likely to cut 
and paste narratives from previous year in order to save the preparation costs. 
Empirically, prior research on the association between firm size and narrative reporting 
reports mixed results.  For instance, some studies find positive association between the 
two variables (e.g., Debreceny, Gray, & Rahman, 2002; Eng & Mak, 2003; Gul & 
Leung, 2004; Iatridis, 2008; Kelton & Yang, 2008). However, strangely, Hoitash, 
Hoitash and Bedard (2009) find negative association between firm size and level of 
voluntary disclosure.  
The literature on the relationship between FLFD and firm size shows mixed results. For 
instance, Karamnou and Vafeas (2005) find no relation between firm size and 
management earnings forecasts. While, other research (e.g., Hussainey & Al-Najjar, 
2011; Wang & Hussainey, 2013; Al-Najjar & Abed, 2014) find a positive association 
between firm size and the disclosure of FLFD. Conversely, Li (2010a) and 
Althanasakou and Hussainey (2014) find a negative association between the two 
variables. Based on these mixed results, the relationship between firm size and FLFD is 
an empirical issue and still requires more examination.  
This paper, empirically, examines whether firm size encourages managers to change 
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FLFD of their firms. In other words, it examines whether larger firms change their 
FLFD more than smaller firms. Firm size is expected to be positively associated with 
changes in FLFD for the following reasons. First, larger firms are under pressure to 
provide valuable and relevant information to their financial analysis. Accordingly, they 
are more likely to change their FLFD over years. Second, larger firms are politically 
visible and so they tend to update their disclosure from year-to-year to limit their 
boilerplate disclosure in order to avoid the political costs of being perceived as being 
ambiguous (Brown & Tucker, 2011). Third, larger firms have sufficient resources to 
update their disclosure from period to period. Fourth, small firms might be more likely 
to cut and paste narratives from previous year in order to save the preparation costs. 
Therefore, we hypothesise that: 
H2a: A positive association exists between firm size and change in 
FLFD in UK narratives. 
4.4.2.2 Competitive environment and change in FLFD 
Competition is considered to be the main obstacle to voluntary disclosure through the 
notion of proprietary costs (Verrecchia, 1983). Companies have concern about 
proprietary cost of disclosure. Therefore, managers prefer not to disclose information 
that may affect the competitive position of their company in the market. Healy and 
Palepu (2001) argue that managers’ incentives to disclose additional information appear 
to be sensitive to the nature of competition. It is argued that the level of disclosure 
depends mainly on the concern that such disclosure may damage an entity’s competitive 
position in the market (Wagenhofer, 1990; Feltham & Xie, 1992; Gigler, 1994; Hayes & 
Lundholm, 1996; Piotroski, 1999). 
CHAPTER 4: MANAGERS’ INCENTIVES TO CHANGE FLFD  
 
 
 
A
p
p
en
d
ice
s 
130 
Healy and Palepu (2001) argue that proprietary cost perspective of disclosure has not 
been widely used in disclosure studies. They explained that there is a little empirical 
evidence on the proprietary costs-disclosure hypothesis. Example of these studies is 
Cormier and Gordon (2001) who examine the corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
disclosure of utility companies in Canada. They find that environmental disclosure is 
very sensitive to proprietary information costs. Consistently, Jones (2007) finds that 
proprietary costs are associated with lower levels of R&D disclosure. 
Verrecchia (1983) argues that when proprietary cost exists, information is withheld. 
Empirically, prior research (e.g., Verrecchia & Weber, 2006: Dedman & Lennox, 2009: 
and Depoers & Jeanjean, 2012) find that companies have an incentive to withhold 
information in order to maintain their competitive position in the market and to prevent 
competitors from using their disclosed information.  
Furthermore, mixed evidences have been reported in the literature regarding the effect 
of competition on the level of disclosure. For instance, Wagenhofer (1990) finds that 
firms in more competitive industries tend to provide lower levels of information, and 
firms in less competitive industries provide more disclosure because of the lower 
proprietary costs. On the other hand, Birt, Bilson, Smith & Whaley (2006) find that 
firms facing more competition are more likely to provide higher levels of disclosure. 
They explain that this may be because firms are better off sharing information with their 
competitors as they can coordinate their actions to their mutual advantage and they feel 
that disclosing information is less risky to their competitive position. In terms of FLFD, 
little is known with regard to future oriented information. Clarkson et al. (1994) finds a 
negative association between competition and future oriented information. 
The OFR statements are analysed by market participants and future oriented 
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information helps in anticipating future earnings (Hussainey et al., 2003; Muslu et al., 
2011). Thus, we may expect that firms in a more competitive environment – where 
preparatory cost is high –to provide less informative FLFD in their narrative reporting. 
Consequently, these firms are less likely to change their FLFD from year to year than 
those in less competitive environment. Recently, Brown and Tucker (2011) find that 
firms facing more competition are less likely to change their narrative reporting in 
MD&A from year to year and thus provide less informative disclosure. Therefore, based 
on the above discussion, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
 H2b: A negative association exists between competitive environment 
and change in FLFD in UK narratives.  
4.4.2.3 Litigious environment and change in FLFD 
The association between narrative reporting and litigation costs can be hypothesised 
either positively or negatively. Positive association may be explained on the basis that 
lawsuits against companies for their insufficient disclosure may be an incentive for 
these companies to increase their voluntary disclosure. However, the negative 
association may be hypothesised on the basis that litigation costs can reduce managers’ 
incentives to provide voluntary disclosure.  
Prior research on the association between litigation costs and narrative reporting reports 
mixed results. Some studies find positive association between the two variables. For 
instance, Skinner (1994) finds that firms subject to litigation costs are more than twice 
likely to disclose their bad earnings news early. In addition, he provides evidence that 
timely disclosure of bad news can reduce litigation costs. Consistent with this evidence, 
Field et al. (2005) find evidence that disclosure deters litigation costs. Moreover, 
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Johnson, Kasznik & Nelson (2001) find that finds that firms increase their earnings and 
sales forecast to reduce their legal exposures.  
In addition, Miller and Piotroski (2000) find that firms operating in high litigious 
environment are more likely to provide more future oriented disclosure. Moreover, 
Nelson and Pritchard (2007) find that firms subject to litigation cost are more likely to 
update their cautionary language of future oriented information from year-to-year. 
Furthermore, Brown and Tucker (2011) find that firms in a more litigious environment 
are more likely to change their narrative reporting in MD&A to larger degree from-year 
to-year.  
On the other hand, other research reports negative association between litigation costs 
and narrative reporting. This negative association can be explained as follows. If a firm 
makes a disclosure and the conditions surrounding that disclosure change, in this case 
the firm has a duty to update its disclosure and may be sued if it does not update it (Cox, 
et al., 2001). In this case, the firm may minimise its obligation to update disclosure and 
so reduces the potential litigation costs by limiting the amount of initial information 
voluntarily disclosed (Rogers & Van Buskirk, 2009).  
This effect has been supported in prior research. Kasznik (1999) finds that companies in 
a high litigation environment narrow their estimated earnings forecasts in order to avoid 
litigation costs. Rogers and Van Buskirk (2009) find that firms reduce their litigation 
costs by reducing disclosure for which they may later be held accountable to update it. 
Additionally, managers prefer to reduce their forward-looking disclosure, especially if 
managers face the risk of being penalised against their forecasts (Healy & Palepu, 2001). 
Additionally, Aboody and Kasznik (2000) argue that managers of firms have a concern 
for disclosure of forward-looking information. This may be because of the chance of a 
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forecast error, which can cost the firm legal exposure and reputation loss for accuracy 
errors.  
Therefore, based on the above discussion, if we consider the two effects of litigation 
costs on disclosure behaviour, we may expect one of the following two scenarios. First, 
firms in a highly litigious environment tend to increase their FLFD in order to avoid 
litigation costs. In this case, these firms have the duty to update their FLFD over years 
and so a positive association is expected between a litigious environment and changes in 
FLFD. Second, firms in highly litigious industries tend to reduce their obligation to 
update their FLFD over years in order to avoid litigation costs through reducing the 
amount of FLFD. In this case, a negative association between litigious environment and 
change in FLFD is expected. Therefore, the following hypothesis is developed:  
H2c: An association exists between litigious environment and the 
change in FLFD in UK narratives. 
4.4.2.4 Managerial ownership and change in FLFD. 
Managerial ownership is, also, referred to, in the literature, as director or insider 
ownership. The agency theory can explain the association between managerial 
ownership and narrative reporting (e.g., forward-looking disclosure). A positive 
association is expected between managerial ownership and narrative reporting because 
the extent of managerial ownership could serve to align management’s interests with 
those of other shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Eng and Mak (2003) propose 
that lower agency problems are associated with higher levels of managerial ownership. 
Consistently, firms with a higher managerial ownership have lower levels of 
information asymmetry between management and shareholders, and therefore, provide 
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more narrative reporting in their annual reports.  
Empirical research that examines the relationship between disclosure and managerial 
ownership reports mixed results. Some studies support the agency theory and find a 
positive association between managerial ownership and narrative reporting (e.g., Chau 
& Gray, 2002; Jiang & Habib, 2009). On the other hand, several studies suggest results 
that contradict with agency theory. For instance, prior studies (e.g., Barakat & 
Hussainey, 2013; Eng & Mak, 2003; Nagar, Nada, & Wysocki, 2003; Gelb, 2000; 
Ruland, Tung, & George, 1990) find a negative association between managerial 
ownership and voluntary disclosure.  
In terms of FLFD, prior studies find a negative association between managerial 
ownership and the disclosure of forward-looking information (Hussainey & Al-Najjar, 
2011; Wang & Hussainey, 2013). Their results suggest that firms with higher 
managerial ownership are more likely to provide less future oriented disclosure. 
Based on the agency theory, managers in firms dominated by managerial ownership, 
which have new information relative to prior year, may provide it voluntarily in order to 
reduce the information asymmetry between management and the outsider investors. 
Accordingly, firms with higher managerial ownership are more likely to change their 
FLFD over years to provide informative disclosure to their outsider investors. Therefore, 
the following hypothesis is set:  
H2d: A positive association exists between managerial ownership and 
change in FLFD in UK narratives.  
4.4.2.5 Auditor type and change in FLFD 
Agency theory suggests that the external auditor may act as an independent third party 
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that may help to resolve the agency conflicts between managers and investors. This may 
be because external auditors assure investors of the reliability of the accounting 
information and therefore reduce agency conflicts (Cohen, Krisnamoorthy, & Wright, 
2002; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Fan & Wong, 2005). Therefore, it is argued that quality 
of external auditor can improve firm corporate reporting (Eng & Mak, 2003).  
Larger audit firms are more likely to have higher experienced, trained, and qualified 
auditors (Barako et al., 2006), and consequently they are better in auditing performance 
compared to smaller audit firms (Depoers, 2000). Furthermore, larger audit firms are 
expected to be more independent (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002) and may demand higher 
levels of disclosure from clients (firms) to protect themselves against shareholders’ 
lawsuits which might damage their reputations (Depores, 2000).  
Prior studies, consistently, find that disclosure quality is associated with auditor type 
and, lower audit quality is associated with earnings management (e.g., Shaw, 2003; 
Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, & Subramanyam, 1998). Hail (2002) argues that the 
auditor can play an important role in improving firms’ overall reporting strategies. Thus 
we may expect firms audited by big audit firms to provide informative disclosure in 
order to reduce the information asymmetry. 
The empirical literature on the relationship between auditor type and voluntary 
disclosure reports mixed findings. For instance, Wallace, Naser and Mora (1994), and 
Aljjfri and Hussainey (2007) find no relationship between auditor type and voluntary 
disclosure. More particularly, Brown and Tucker (2011) investigate the association 
between auditor type and changes in narrative reporting in MD&A. They find no 
association between auditor type and managers’ decision to change their narratives in 
MD&A from the previous year. On the other hand, other research (e.g., Raffournier, 
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1995; Ntim, Opong, Danbolt & Thomas, 2012a; Schiehll, Terra, & Victor, 2013) find 
positive association between audit firm size and voluntary disclosure.  
In the UK, the companies’ Acts of 1985 and 2006 impose some auditing requirements 
for narrative reporting. Both acts require auditors to state whether the information given 
in firms’ narrative reporting statements for the financial year for which the annual 
accounts are prepared is consistent with those accounts and whether any matters have 
come to their attention in the performance of their functions as auditors of the company, 
which in their opinion are inconsistent with the information given in the operating and 
financial review (ASB, 2005; ASB, 2006). Thus, this may encourage managers of firms 
to provide more informative narrative reporting in their annual reports. 
Based on the above discussion, we may expect firms audited by big-audit firms to 
provide more informative disclosure in order to reduce the information asymmetry. 
Accordingly, these firms are more likely to change their FLFD from year to year. 
Therefore, our hypothesis is: 
H2e: A positive association exists between auditor type and change in 
FLFD in UK narratives.  
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4.5 CONTROL VARIABLES AND CHANGE IN FLFD  
In order to provide accurate and more generalizable results, the study controls for some 
economic environment variables that are identified as determinants of forward-looking 
disclosure in prior research. Changes in these variables reveal considerable new 
information for managers to disclose which in turn affect managers’ decision to change 
FLFD. These variables are: leverage, dividend, liquidity, and market risk exposure. 
4.5.1 Firm leverage  
The agency theory might explain the relationship between firm leverage and narrative 
reporting. Jenson and Meckling (1976) argue that high leverage firms have high 
monitoring/agency costs. Accordingly, these firms seek to reduce these costs by 
providing more information voluntarily (e.g. forward-looking disclosure) in their annual 
report in order to convey value relevant information to their creditors (Wang & 
Hussainey, 2013).  
Empirical research on the relationship between forward-looking disclosure and 
leverages reports mixed results. For instance, Lakhal (2005) finds no association 
between leverage ratios and earnings forecast disclosures. On the other hand, other 
research (Aljifri & Hussainey, 2007; O’Sullivan et al., 2008; Wang & Hussainey, 2013) 
finds a positive association between the two variables. Conversely, Al-Najjar and Abed 
(2014) find that forward-looking information is influenced negatively by firm leverage.  
Changes in firm leverage from the previous year reveal relatively new information for 
managers to disclose voluntarily in order to reduce the agency costs. Therefore, we may 
expect positive association between changes in firm leverage in change in FLFD.  
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4.5.2 Firm dividends policy 
Signalling theory suggests that firms with higher levels of information asymmetry are 
more likely to pay higher dividends and disclose more information (e.g. forward-
looking information) to signal their future prospects to their current and potential 
investors (Hussainey & Al-Najjar, 2011). It is stated that the association between FLFD 
and dividends has received much more attention in recent years (Wang & Hussainey, 
2013).  
Empirically, little research examines the association between FLFD and firm dividends. 
It finds positive association between the two variables in the UK narratives (Hussainey 
& Al-Najjar, 2011, Wang & Hussainey, 2013).  
Changes in firms’ dividends reveal that managers do have information to disclose in 
order to signal their future prospects to their current and potential investors. The study, 
therefore, expects positive association between changes in firm dividends policy and 
change in FLFD. 
4.5.3 Firm liquidity 
The Association between liquidity and narrative reporting may be explained based on 
agency and signalling theories. The agency theory suggests that managers with weak 
liquidity can provide more disclosure in order to reduce agency costs and justify their 
liquidity status (Wallace et al., 1994). Whilst, the signalling theory suggests that firms 
with high liquidity have incentives to disclose more information in order to signal their 
favourable results.  
Little research examines the association between firm liquidity and FLFD. For instance, 
Al-Najjar and Abed (2014) find positive association between the disclosure of forward-
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looking information and firms’ operating cash flow.  
In the UK, the ASB requires companies to discuss their current liquidity position in 
their OFR statements. It is argued that “The OFR shall discuss the entity’s current and 
prospective liquidity” (ASB, 2005, p.20; ASB, 2006, p. 22). Consequently, if managers 
follow the spirit of OFR statements, we expect firms’ managers to change their FLFD in 
response to changes in their liquidity status.  
4.5.4 Market risk exposure 
The association between narrative reporting and market risk exposure could be 
explained based on agency and signalling theories. Agency theory suggests that 
managers may disclose more information in order to assure their investors that they deal 
with their firms’ risk successfully and to increase their investors’ confidence (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Whilst, signalling theory suggests that managers may disclose more 
information voluntarily to signal their capabilities in identifying and managing risks, 
and to distinguish themselves from those who could not manage their market risks 
effectively (Akerlof, 1970).  
Empirically, limited research examines the association between narrative reporting and 
risk exposure. For instance, Hussainey and Al-Najjar (2011) find no evidence on the 
relationship between risk and forward-looking information. 
The ASB requires companies to discuss the risks and uncertainties that may affect their 
entities’ short and long term value in their OFR statements (ASB, 2005; ASB, 2006). 
Consequently, based on the spirit of OFR statements, this discussion should have 
forward-looking orientation.  
Therefore, based on the theoretical prediction and OFR spirit, we may expect firms to 
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provide more informative FLFD to mitigate the agency problem and signal their 
capabilities in managing risk. Accordingly, positive association is expected between 
change in firm risk exposure and change in FLFD. 
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4.6 RESEARCH DESIGN  
This part explains the research design of the current study. It is outlined as follows. 
Section 4.6.1 discusses the definitions and measurements of variables. The empirical 
model and the statistical issues are discussed in sections 4.6.2 and 4.6.3, respectively. 
Finally, section 4.6.4 explains the process of sample selection and data collection.  
4.6.1 Variables: Definitions and measurements  
This section defines the variables employed in this study and explains how each 
variable is measured. It starts by defining the dependent variable, then, defines how the 
explanatory variables are measured. 
4.6.1.1 Dependent variable 
The dependent variable is the change score in the level of FLFD, |ΔFLFD|. It represents 
the absolute change in the level of FLFD from the most recent year. For more details 
about how this variable is measured, please see chapter (3) sections 3.4 & 3.5 
4.6.1.2 Independent variables  
4.6.1.2.1 Changes in performance  
Changes in firm performance are measured using changes in firm’s return on equity 
ratio, ROE, from the previous year and refer to the variable as ΔROE. Earning is a 
visible performance measure and receives considerable attention from investors. 
Furthermore, it is important to managers either directly as a component of their 
compensation contract or indirectly through its relation to stock price (Merkley, 2014). 
Some prior research uses ROE ratio as a measure of firm performance (e.g., Bauer, 
Eichholtz & Kok, 2010; Epps & Cereola, 2008; Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003). The 
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ROE data is collected from the Datastream. The DataStream code for ROE ratio is 
(WC08301). 
4.6.1.2.2 Firm size  
Following prior research on disclosure (e.g., Athanasakoua & Hussainey, 2014; Wang 
& Hussainey, 2013; Li, 2010a), firm size is measured using the natural logarithm of 
market value of equity at the end of the current year, and refer to the variable as LnMk. 
The market value of equity at the end of the current year is collected from the 
DataStream. The Datastream code of the market value of equity at the end of the current 
year is (WC08001). 
4.6.1.2.3 Competitive environment  
Herfindahl index, Herf, is used as a proxy for industry concentration (Verrecchia & 
Weber, 2006). It is calculated, as the sum of the squared market share of each 
competitor (firm) in the industry, using the following formula: 
Herf = ∑(FS/IS)2
n
i=1
 
Where FS is the firm sales and IS refers to total industry sales 
The current study calculated Herf using the 100 firms [or less if the number of firms is 
less than 100] with the highest sales in the industry [Industry Classification Benchmark 
(ICB] is used for industry identification]. The general assumption in the literature is that 
competition decreases as market concentration increases (Botosan & Stanford, 2005; 
Deepors & Jeanjean, 2010). The lower the Herf value, the less concentrated the industry, 
the higher the competition, and the higher the potential proprietary costs. Herf is used in 
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some prior disclosure research (e.g., Deepors & Jeanjean, 2010; Brown & Tucker, 
2010) as a measure of competition within the industry. Firm sales data is collected from 
DataStream. The Datastream code of firm sales is (WC 01001). 
4.6.1.2.4 Litigious environment 
The industry classification is used to identify firms that are exposed to high litigation 
risk. Prior empirical research ﬁnds that a greater percentage of firms subject to litigation 
risk are in the technology industry (Jones & Weingram, 1996; Field et al., 2005). This is 
may be because the stocks of the technology firms are more uncertain and more volatile 
(Kim & Skinner, 2012). Accordingly, litigious environment, referred to as Litig is 
measured using dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm is in the technology 
industry and 0 otherwise. The Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) is used for 
industry identification. Some prior research uses industry classification as a measure of 
litigation environment (e.g., Brown & Tucker, 2010). 
4.6.1.2.5 Managerial ownership 
The managerial ownership variables referred to as  %MO, is measured as the percentage 
of total shares in issue of 5% or more held by employees, or by those with a substantial 
position in a company that provides significant voting power at an annual general 
meeting. This variable is collected from the Datastream (NOSHEM). This measure of 
managerial ownership is heavily used by prior research that examines the association 
between disclosure and governance mechanism (e.g., Wang & Husaainey, 2013). 
4.6.1.2.6 Auditor type 
The auditor type is the size of the audit firm (big audit firms vs. non-big audit firms). It 
is measured as a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm is audited by one of the 
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big 4 audit firms and 0 otherwise. We refer to this variable as BigN, the auditor type 
data is collected manually from each firm’s annual report. 
4.6.1.3 Control variables  
The control variables include the following: firm’s leverage, dividend, liquidity, and 
market risk exposure.  
The firm Leverage, referred to as Lev, is measured using the debt to equity ratio. The 
debt to equity ratio is the Datastream code (WC08231). Firm dividend, referred to as DY, 
is measured using the dividend yield ratio. The dividend yield is the Datastream code 
(WC09404). Firm liquidity is measured using the current ratio, and refers to the variable 
as CR. The current ratio is the Datastream code (WC08106). A firm return volatility, 
refers to as Ret. Vol, and is used to measure its market risk exposure; the higher the 
volatility, the higher the exposure. Firm return volatility is the Datastream code (458E). 
Change in these variables is measured as the value of the variables in period t minus the 
value of the variable of the same firm in period t-1. Furthermore, we control for overall 
changes in the narrative document length using change in total statements of the OFR, 
we refer to this variable as T.Stat.  
Table 4.1 delineates the variables and identifies the measurement for each variable. 
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Table 4.1  
Summary of variables: Definitions and measurements  
Definition Acronym Operationalization 
Change score in  
FLFD 
|ΔFLFD| Change score in FLFD as measured in chapter 3 sections 3.4 & 3.5 
Firm 
performance  
|ΔROE| 
Year-over-year absolute change in firm’s return of equity. 
Datastream code (WC08301).  
Firm size  LnMK 
Natural logarithm of market value of equity at the end of the 
current year. Datastream code (WC08001). 
Competitive 
environment  
Herf 
Herfendahl index measured using the 100 firms (or less if the 
number of firms is less than 100) with the highest sales in the 
industry (Industry Classification Benchmark, ICB, is used for 
industry identification). The Datastream code of firm sales is 
(WC01001). 
Litigation 
environment  
Litig 
Industry classification measured using dummy variable that is 
equal to 1 if the firm is in technology industry and 0 otherwise. 
The Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) is used for industry 
identification. 
Auditor type  BigN 
Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm is audited by one of 
the big 4 audit firms and 0 otherwise.  
Managerial  
ownership 
%MO 
The percentage of total shares held by employees, or by those with 
a substantial position in a company that provides significant voting 
power at an annual general meeting. Datastream code (NOSHEM) 
Leverage  |ΔLev| 
Year-over-year absolute change in firm’s Debt to equity ratio. 
Datastream code (WC08231). 
Dividend  |ΔDY| 
Year-over-year absolute change in firm’s dividend yield at the end 
of the fiscal year. Datastream code (WC09404). 
Liquidity  |ΔCR| 
Year-over-year absolute change in firm’s current ratio. Datastream 
code (WC08106). 
Risk exposure  |ΔRet.Vol| 
Year-over-year absolute change in firm’s return volatility – 
Datastream code (458E).  
Document 
length   
|ΔT.Stat| 
Year-over-year change in the total statements of firm’s OFR 
statements. 
This Tables provides the definitions and measurements of the variables 
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4.6.2 Empirical model  
The following model, Model 1, is developed to test the hypotheses related to the 
association between change in firm performance and change in FLFD. In addition, it 
tests the hypotheses related to firm characteristics that motivate managers to change 
FLFD over years. These hypotheses are H1a, H1b, H2a, H2b, H2c, H2d, & H2e. In 
addition, FLFD may be changed from the previous year because of the implementation 
of new narrative reporting requirements and accounting standards. For this reason, we 
use the year-fixed effect
34
 to control for change in FLFD due to this reason. 
|𝜟𝑭𝑳𝑭𝑫| =  𝜷𝟎 +  𝜷𝟏|𝜟𝑹𝑶𝑬| + 𝜷𝟐𝑳𝒏𝑴𝑲 + 𝜷𝟑𝑯𝒆𝒓𝒇 + 𝜷𝟒𝑳𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒈 + 𝜷𝟓%𝑴𝑶 +
                        𝜷𝟔𝑩𝒊𝒈𝑵 + 𝜷𝟕|𝜟𝑳𝒆𝒗|  + 𝜷𝟖|𝜟𝑫𝒀| + 𝜷𝟗|𝜟𝑪𝑹| + 𝜷𝟏𝟎|𝜟𝑹𝒆𝒕. 𝑽𝒐𝒍| +
                       𝜷𝟏𝟏|𝜟𝑻. 𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒕| +  𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓 𝑭𝒊𝒙𝒆𝒅 𝑬𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕 + 𝜺                                           (1) 
Where:  
 
𝜷𝟎  The regression intercept  
𝜷𝟏….. 𝜷𝟏𝟏 The regression coefficients  
𝜺 The error term  
 
Table 4.1 summarises the definitions and measurements of the variables 
4.6.3 Statistical issues  
It is stated that the transformation of data is basically helpful in many cases: 1) when 
non-linear relationship exists between dependent and independent variables, 2) in the 
event that the errors are not nearly normal distribution, or 3) where a problem of 
                                                 
34
 The disclosure of forward-looking information may be affected because of the financial crises, 
therefore, alternatively, the current study controls for the period of financial crises. This is done by adding 
in the regression model a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for the firm observations during the years 
2007 and 2008 and 0 otherwise. The results are largely unchanged if we use the year fixed effect instead 
of controlling for the period of financial crises. Because the year fixed effect controls for financial crises 
period in an implicit way, the current study continue the main and further analyses using year-fixed 
effect.  
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heteroscedasticity exists (Cooke, 1998)
35
.   
Following prior research on disclosure (e.g., Wang & Hussainey, 2013; Li, 2010a, 
Brown & Tucker, 2011), Firm size (LnMK) is transformed using the natural logarithm 
of the original values in order to become more approximate to a normal distribution 
(Cooke, 1998; Pallant, 2005; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  
Outliers or extreme values
36
 may lead to unreliable output (Pallant, 2005). Outliers may 
exist in the data of the current study because the sample of this study contains different 
sizes of firms (large, medium, and small firms) in order to generalize the finding. This 
generates variations in the distribution of variables (Eisenberg, Sundgren, & Wells, 
1998). These outliers may lead to bias in our findings and can potentially violate the 
OLS assumptions (Brown & Tucker, 2011). 
Using the statistical software, STATA, we check whether outliers exist in the data. This 
is done by checking whether or not the residuals are normally distributed around the 
predicted dependent variable scores. If the null hypothesis is rejected in the normality 
test, the outliers exist. Shapiro-Wilk test is used to check the normality of residual. The 
coefficient of Shapiro is significant (P<.05) indicating that the residual is not normally 
distributed. Accordingly, outliers exist in the data.  
In order to identify these outliers, the software is asked to predict the estimated score 
based upon the regression, then to predict the residuals and sort them according to their 
values. Consequently, observations with regard to the highest and lowest Z score are to 
                                                 
35
 Common transformations include logarithm, square root, inverse, reflect and log, reflect and square 
root, reflect and inverse (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). 
 
36
 The terms ‘outlier’ or “extreme value” refer to an observation of the dependent or independent 
variables, with values that are inconsistent with the rest of the observations in the data set (Rawlings, 
Pentula, & Dickey, 1998, p. 331). 
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be considered as outliers. 
There are two strategies to deal with outliers; deleting the outliers or winsorising them. 
Deleting the outliers means that all the observations that represent extreme values and 
may affect the reliability of the results are removed from the analysis. Whereas, 
winsorising is a value modification method for outliers without excluding any 
observation (Searls, 1966). It involves replacing extreme values with values that is 
closest to them in the tail of distribution in which they occur. Observations in the 
sample are part of the target population and they represent source of information that 
could be critical to the analysis. Thus, the current study does not adopt the option that 
leads to elimination of some cases. Consequently, variables are winsorised. This option 
is usually preferred by scholars in order to mitigate the effect of outliers (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2007). Ntim et al. (2012a, p. 139) state that “The main rationale for winsorising 
is to minimise potentially serious violations of the OLS assumptions”. Therefore, 
Following prior research (e.g., Brown & Tucker, 2011; Li, 2010a), all continuous 
variables are winsorised at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentile. All the change variables are 
winsorised before taking the absolute value.  
The current study uses panel data set
37 
on a sample of UK companies over a period from 
2005 to 2011. It is stated that the use of panel data has some econometric concerns 
(Wooldridge, 2003). Petersen (2009) states that the panel data creates two problems of 
dependence of the residual which bias the standard errors in the regression model.  
First, the residual of a given firm may be correlated across years of this firm. This type 
of dependence is called unobserved firm effect (Woooldridge, 2003) or time series 
dependence or auto-correlation (Peterson, 2009; Elshandidy et al., 2013). Second, the 
                                                 
37
 Panel data is data set that contains observations on multiple firms in multiple years (Petersen, 2009) 
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residuals of a given year may be correlated across different firms. This type of 
dependence is called cross-sectional dependence or heteroscedasticity. Failure to deal 
with auto-correlation and/or heteroscedasticity in the regression model leads to biased 
standard errors and consequently incorrect inferences (Petersen, 2009; Gow et al., 2010). 
Gow et al. (2010) evaluated number of different estimation methods used where panel 
data sets exist, to address the effect of auto-correlation (time series dependence or firm 
effect) and heteroscedasticity (cross-sectional dependence or time effect). These 
methods are OLS standard errors, White standard errors, Newey-West standard errors, 
Fama-MacBeth, Z2 statistic, and clustered robust standard errors. They examine these 
methods under 4 different settings: a) non-presence of auto-correlation and 
heteroscedasticity, b) presence of auto-correlation only, c) presence of 
heteroscedasticity only, and d) presence of both auto-correlation and heteroscedasticity. 
Their findings indicate that the clustered robust standard error estimation method 
produces well-specified test statistics in all the four setting examined. Consistently, 
Peterson (2009) finds that in the presence of auto-correlation and heteroscedasticity in 
the data sets, the standard error clustered by firm is unbiased and produce correctly 
sized confidence intervals whether the firm effect is permanent or temporary. In 
addition, he finds that the presence of time effect in the data set can be addressed using 
fixed effect (e.g. including time dummies). Overall, he suggests that the efficiency of 
the estimation method can be improved by adding fixed effects to the estimation method. 
In order to test the hypothesises, the current study estimates using OLS regression with 
clustered robust standard errors. This method allows standard errors to be clustered by 
firms in order to account for any residual dependence created by firm effects. The 
clustered standard error is used to mitigate the problem of time series dependence (auto-
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correlation). Petersen (2009) shows that this estimation method yields unbiased standard 
errors and consequently would improve the accuracy of the analysis through getting 
correct estimates and inferences. In addition, the current study uses the year-fixed effect 
to address the effect of cross-sectional dependence/ time effect (heteroscedasticity)
38.
 
The current study does not cluster by years in the analyses because the panel data sets of 
the current study are very short in the time series and clustering by six years may only 
add noise to the system (Petersen, 2009)
39
.  
4.6.4 Sample selection and data collection  
The current study examines the determinants of the change FLFD in OFR statements of 
FTSE all-shares listed firms in the main market of the London Stock Exchange over the 
period from 2005 to 2011. The steps followed in identifying the sample firms are 
discussed in chapter 3, section 3.3. However, when calculating the change score in the 
level of FLFD from the previous year, the current study loses one year of observations 
for each firm. Subsequently, this suggests that there are no observations for the year 
2005. In addition, we exclude observations with missing financial data for the current 
year or the previous year
40
. The screening leaves us with 1912 firm- year observations 
as listed in Table 4.2. 
 
 
                                                 
38 The unobserved residuals for the unit (the firm in the current study) may be serially correlated - because 
of an unobserved effect - across years. Furthermore, the residuals for a specific year may be correlated 
across firms (Petersen, 2009).  
 
39
 In the current study, all regressions are run using Stata software. Stata is a flexible statistical program 
that allows users to apply pre- programmed commands or use further commands that have been invented 
by different users (Hamilton, 2006). 
 
40 We have no reason to believe there is a systematic pattern in the missing observations, and hence, we 
believe that excluding observations with missing financial data will not create a bias in the results. 
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Table 4.2  
Sample selection process 
 N 
Sample as shown in chapter 3 section 3.3 2422 
Less: One year observations (2005) 346 
Less: Firm-year observations with missing financial data 164 
Final Sample  1912 
This Table reports the process of sample selection. N denotes the number of firm-year 
observations. The final sample consists of 1912 firms-year observations. 
Table 4.3 shows the final sample sorted by industry. The definition of the industry is 
based on Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB). These include Industrial, Basic 
material, Technology, Consumer goods, Consumer services, Health care, Oil and gas, 
Utilities and Telecommunication. The industrial firms represent the highest firm-year 
observations. The telecommunication firms, on the other hand, represent only 22 firm-
year observations. The classification of the sample is consistent with that shown in 
chapter 3 section 3.3. 
Most firms in the sample produce the OFR statements under the title OFR (344 firms); 
or report two separate sections Operating Review and Financial Review (727 firms); or 
produce the same OFR contents under the title Business Review (574 firms); or under 
Table 4.3 
Distribution of Sample amongst Industries  
Industry  N Percentage 
Industrial  661 35% 
Basic material  149 8% 
Technology  191 10% 
Consumer goods  211 11% 
Consumer services  427 22% 
Health care  115 6% 
Oil and gas  100 5% 
Utilities  36 2% 
Telecommunication  22 1% 
Total  1912 100% 
This Table provides the distribution of the sample among industries. Our sample consists of 1912 
observation distributed among 9 industries. The definition of the industry is based on Industry 
Classification Benchmark (ICB). 
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the title Chief Executive Review (172 firms). This sums 1817 firms, representing 95% 
of the sample. The remaining 5% produce either only an Operating Review (57 firms) 
or a Financial Review (38 firms).  
Table 4.4 presents a summary of different titles that report OFR contents. 
Table 4.4 
Different titles that report OFR contents  
 N Percentage 
OFR 344 18% 
Operating review/ financial review  727 38% 
Business review  574 30% 
Chief executive review 172 9% 
Operating review  57 3% 
Financial review  38 2% 
Total  1912 100% 
This Table reports different titles for OFR contents. Firms produce OFR statements under the title OFR; 
or report two separate sections Operating Review and Financial Review; or produce the same OFR 
contents under the title Business Review; or under the title Chief Executive Review; or produce either 
only an Operating Review or a Financial Review. 
As mentioned in chapter 3, the annual reports are collected from company’s official 
websites, Thomson one banker database and Northcote website (www.northcote.co.uk). 
In addition, all financial data is collected from Datastream. The auditor type data is 
manually collected from the companies’ annual reports.  
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4.7 THE RESULTS  
This part reports and discusses the results of the current study. It starts with reporting 
the descriptive statistics of the variables in section 4.7.1. Then, it displays the 
correlation analysis in section 4.7.2. Section 4.7.3 reports and discusses the regression 
results of the current study. Finally, further analysis is introduced in section 4.7.4.  
4.7.1 Descriptive statistics 
Panel A of Table 4.5 shows the descriptive statistics of the change score for all sample 
firms and by years. The maximum value of |ΔFLFD| of the sample firms is 58 while the 
minimum is 0. This range indicates that a variation exists between the UK firms in 
terms of their decision to change their FLFD from year to year. The sample firms have 
on average change score of 4.20. The mean values of change score over the sample 
period depict monotonic increase in the change score over the period from 2006 to 2011. 
It ranges from 3.72 in 2006 to 5.58 in 2011. This small range may be due to the soft talk 
nature FLFD which reduces the variation of change over years. 
In addition, Panel B of Table 4.5 shows the descriptive statistics of the change score for 
all sample firms and by industries. There is a variation in the mean value of change 
score across different industries. It is argued that the disclosure behaviour is similar 
between firms in the same industry, where similar business environments and operating 
conditions exist, and this behaviour tends to be different between firms in different 
industries. The highest mean value of change score is in the utilities industry (6.13) 
while the lowest mean value of the score is in the technology industry (3.00). This is 
may be consistent with the prediction that litigation is high in technology industry so 
firms tend to provide less informative disclosure and thus fewer changes. 
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Table 4.6 presents the descriptive statistics of the independent variables. Panel A 
displays the descriptive statistics of the change in firm performance variable measured 
as change in firm’s return on equity ratio from the previous year, |ΔROE|. The 
maximum value of |ΔROE| is 23.17 while the minimum is .01. In other words, the 
highest value of change in firm performance from the most recent year is 23.17 while 
the minimum value of this change from the recent year is .01. On average the sample 
firms have changes in their performance from the most recent year of 9.39.This range 
indicates that significant variation exists in firms’ earnings performance between UK 
firms. In addition, there is a variation in the change in firm performance over years. 
Specifically, the mean value of change in 2006 is 9.63 then decreased to 8.53 in 2007 
then increased in 2008 and 2009 to be 9.28 and 11.57 respectively. Then decreased to 
9.71 in 2010 and continue in decreasing to be 7.65 in 2011. 
Panels B and D of Table 4.6 show the descriptive statistics for firm characteristics 
variables. Panel B presents the descriptive statistics of the continuous variables, while, 
panel D shows the frequencies for dummy variables. These variables are expected to be 
relatively stable over years. They include firm size, competitive environment, litigation 
environment, percentage of managerial ownership, and auditor type.  
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Table 4.5  
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of change score, |ΔFLFD|,  for all the sample and by years  
 All 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Mean  4.20 3.72 3.51 4.07 4.05 4.26 5.58 
Minimum  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
25% 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Medium  3.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 
75% 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
Maximum 58.00 24.00 27.00 58.00 58.00 29.00 35.00 
N 1912 318 321 315 320 317 321 
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics of the change score, |ΔFLFD|, for all the sample and by industries  
 All Industrial 
Basic 
material 
Technology 
Consumer 
goods 
Consumer 
service 
Health 
care 
Oil and 
gas 
Utilities Tel. 
Mean  4.20 4.27 4.69 3.00 3.44 4.37 4.74 4.79 6.13 4.50 
Minimum  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
25% 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 1.00 1.75 
Medium  3.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 3.00 6.00 4.00 
75% 5.00 5.00 5.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 6.00 10.00 5.25 
Maximum 58.00 58.00 51.00 23.00 22.00 31.00 34.00 24.00 18.00 18.00 
N 1912 661 149 191 211 427 115 100 36 22 
This Table shows the descriptive statistics of the change score |ΔFL.FD| for all sample firms, by year and by industry. Panel A shows the descriptive statistics for all 
sample firms and by year. While, Panel B shows the descriptive statistics for all sample firms and by industries. The definitions of industries are based on the Industry 
Classification Benchmark (ICB). N indicates the number of observations. 
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Firm size measured as the natural logarithm of firm’s market value of equity (LnMK) 
has a mean value of 12.40 in the sample firms with minimum value of 9.59 and 
maximum value of 15.43. The mean value of LnMK is relatively stable over the sample 
period. The mean value of competitive level in industry measured using Herf index 
is .0096 in the sample firms. It is observed that the minimum level of Herf is .0002 and 
the maximum level is .045. The level of competition is relatively stable over years.  
Firm’s managerial ownership %MO measured as the percentage of ownership by firm 
directors has a mean value over the sample period of .087. This value is quite consistent 
to Wang and Hussainey (2013) who find that the percent of director ownership in the 
UK firms is 7%. The %MO variable varies significantly in the sample with a maximum 
of 99% and a minimum of 0%. The mean value of the %MO variable is relatively stable 
over the sample period. 
Panel D presents the frequencies for dummy variables. In terms of litigious environment, 
litig, 10% of our sample firms are in more litigious environment. In other words, 10% of 
the sample firms are in technology industry and this percent is stable over the sample 
period. With regard to auditor type, BigN, 83% are audited by one of the big audit firms 
whilst 17% only are audited by non-big audit firms and this percent is relatively stable 
over the sample period.  
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Table 4.6  
Descriptive statistics of independent variables   
 All 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Panel A: Changes in firm performance (|ΔROE|)  
 
Mean  9.39 9.63 8.53 9.28 11.57 9.71 7.65 
Minimum  0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 
25% 2.35 2.87 2.40 2.33 3.30 2.62 1.54 
Medium  6.51 6.93 5.73 6.27 10.58 7.36 4.27 
75% 16.9 16.87 13.78 16.23 20.31 17.55 12.75 
Maximum 23.17 23.17 23.17 23.17 23.17 23.17 23.17 
N 1912 318 321 315 320 317 321 
 
Panel B: Firm characteristics   
 
Firm size (LnMK) 
 
Mean  12.40 12.58 12.58 12.12 12.20 12.48 12.46 
Minimum  9.59 9.59 9.59 9.59 9.59 9.59 9.59 
25% 10.72 11.10 11.11 10.45 10.38 10.72 10.69 
Medium  12.33 12.50 12.51 11.94 12.12 12.47 12.38 
75% 13.96 14.05 14.04 13.53 13.81 14.15 14.07 
Maximum 15.43 15.43 15.43 15.43 15.43 15.43 15.43 
N 1912 318 321 315 320 317 321 
 
Competitive environment (Herf) 
 
Mean  .0096 .0098 .0098 .0097 .0096 .0095 .0094 
Minimum  .0002 .0002 .0002 .0002 .0002 .0002 .0002 
25% .0007 .0007 .0007 .0006 .0006 .0006 .0006 
Medium  .0026 .0028 .0026 .0024 .0025 .0023 .0026 
75% .0106 .0109 .0110 .0109 .0107 .0103 .0100 
Maximum .0457 .0457 .0457 .0457 .0457 .0457 .0457 
N 1912 318 321 315 320 317 321 
 
Managerial ownership(%MO)  
 
Mean  0.087 0.088 0.091 0.085 0.087 0.085 0.088 
Minimum  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
25% 0.00 0.00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
Medium  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
75% 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.11 
Maximum 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
N 1912 318 321 315 320 317 321 
 
Panel C: Control variables  
 
Change in firm leverage (|ΔLev|) 
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Mean  15.16 16.07 16.27 14.96 16.32 14.55 12.81 
Minimum  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
25% 2.01 1.62 2.46 2.42 2.31 2.67 1.42 
Medium  9.89 10.01 11.35 9.92 10.22 9.87 8.47 
75% 26.89 31.58 32.34 24.87 31.53 23.00 20.16 
Maximum 40.40 40.40 40.40 40.40 40.40 40.40 40.40 
N 1912 318 321 315 320 317 321 
 
Change in firm dividend (|ΔDY|) 
 
Mean  0.91 .493 .668 1.711 1.106 0.756 0.744 
Minimum  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.000 
25% 0.11 0.08 .085 0.66 0.29 0.050 0.045 
Medium  0.60 0.33 0.37 2.14 1.42 0.51 0.44 
75% 1.74 0.71 0.94 2.71 1.80 1.22 1.18 
Maximum 2.71 2.71 2.71 2.71 2.71 2.71 2.71 
N 1912 318 321 315 320 317 321 
 
Change in firm liquidity (|ΔCR|) 
 
Mean  0.223 0.231 0.226 0.219 0.229 0.226 0.206 
Minimum  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
25% 0.07 0.07 0.065 0.070 0.080 0.070 0.060 
Medium  0.18 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.16 
75% 0.38 0.43 0.465 0.35 0.36 0.43 0.33 
Maximum 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 
N 1912 318 321 315 320 317 321 
 
Change in firm risk exposure  (|ΔRet.Vol|) 
 
Mean  0.196 0.143 0.197 0.252 0.280 0.208 0.098 
Minimum  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
25% 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.13 0.15 0.10 0.030 
Medium  0.17 0.11 0.17 0.26 0.34 0.19 0.08 
75% 0.34 0.20 0.32 0.40 0.40 0.33 0.13 
Maximum 0.410 0.410 0.410 0.41 0.410 0.410 0.410 
N 1912 318 321 315 320 317 321 
 
Change in length of the document (|ΔT.Stat|) 
 
Mean  135.42 123.11 69.18 68.24 66.46 70.17 412 
Minimum  6.00 6 6 6 6 6 6 
25% 18.00 20 10 14 15 13 259 
Medium  52.00 52 35 37 40 39 550 
75% 163 143 84 83 81 82 568 
Maximum 568 568 568 568 568 568 568 
N 1912 318 321 315 320 317 321 
CHAPTER 4: MANAGERS’ INCENTIVES TO CHANGE FLFD  
 
 
 
A
p
p
en
d
ice
s 
159 
 
Panel D: Dummy variables 
 
 All 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Litigious environment (Litig)  
 
0 1722 90% 286 90% 288 90% 285 90% 289 90% 286 90% 287 89% 
1 191 10% 32 10% 33 10% 30 10% 31 10% 31 10% 34 11% 
 
Auditor type (BigN) 
 
0 327 17% 57 18% 60 19% 53 17% 53 17% 51 16% 52 16% 
1 1586 83% 261 82% 261 81% 262 83% 267 83% 266 84% 269 84% 
This Table displays the descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables for all the sample firms and by year. 
Panel A shows the descriptive statistics for change in performance variable. Panels B and C shows the 
descriptive statistics for firm characteristics and control variables, respectively. Panel D shows the frequencies 
for dummy variables. 
The variables definitions and measurements are included in Table 4.1 
 
In terms of control variables, Panel C of Table 4.6 provides their descriptive statistics. 
The mean value of change in firm leverage, |ΔLev|, is 15.16 with minimum value of .00 
and maximum value of 40.40.  
The mean value of change in firm dividend, |ΔDY|, is .91 and its minimum and 
maximum values are .00 and .271 respectively. The change in firm liquidity ratio, |ΔCR|, 
has a mean value of .223 with minimum value of .00 and maximum value of .50.  
The mean value of firm risk measured using return volatility, |ΔRet.Vol|, is.196 with 
minimum value of .00 and maximum value of .410.  
It is noticed that there is change in firms’ economic environment variables over the 
sample period. Finally, on average the change in firm’s OFR documents, |ΔT.Stat| is 
231.1166 statements.  
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4.7.2 Correlation analysis 
High correlation between pairs of variables may cause problem of multi-colinearity
41
 
(Gujarati & Porter, 2009). This problem might affect the reliability of the estimates 
(Acock, 2008). Furthermore, Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) state that multi-collinearity 
among independent variables results in a problem in terms of assessing the importance 
of each variable in the regression. Therefore, it is needed to compare the total 
relationship/correlation of the independent variables with each other (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2007).  
The Pearson correlation matrix is an initial tool to detect multi-collinearity. Gujarati and 
Porter (2009) indicate that variables are highly correlated if the correlation is greater 
than 0.80. Consequently, the multi-colinearity among variables is acceptable if the 
correlation coefficients are less than 0.80. Table 4.7 presents Pearson correlation matrix 
among dependent and all explanatory variables of the current study. The Pearson 
correlation coefficients among all variables are relatively low, less than 0.80, suggesting 
that there is no variable exhibit multi-collinearity problem.  
Further, check for multi-collinearity is performed by calculating the tolerance 
coefficients among variables (alternatively, Variance Inflation Factor or simply VIF), 
after carrying out the regression model. Statistically, the higher the correlation among 
variables, the higher the possibilities of the tolerance coefficients will approach to zero 
and the higher the possibilities to have multi-colinearity problem. If the tolerance of any 
variable is less than 0.1 (alternatively, VIF is more than 10), this suggests a multi-
collinearity problem (Field, 2009). The mean and maximum values of VIF test are 
                                                 
41
 Multi-colineairty (also, multicolinearity or colinearity) exists when two or more variables are highly 
correlated meaning that one can be linearly predicted from the other (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007; Gujarati 
& Porter, 2009) 
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tabulated with the regression results and indicate that there is no concern about this 
problem.  
In addition to diagnose the multi-colinearity problem among variables, the Pearson 
correlation matrix is used to measure the strength and direction of the linear association 
between any pair of variables. It provides evidence that change in FLFD is statistically 
correlated positively with changes in firm performance (p<0.01). This result is 
consistent with prior research (e.g. Miller, 2002; Merkley, 2014) who suggest change in 
disclosure is associated with change in performance.  
Furthermore, the Pearson correlation matrix indicates significant association between 
change in FLFD and all explanatory variables except |ΔRet.Vol|. It finds statistical 
positive correlation between change in FLFD and some firm characteristics such as firm 
size (LnMK), competitive environment (Herf), and auditor type (BigN). However, 
negative correlation exists with other firm characteristics such as litigious environment 
(Litig) and managerial ownership (%MO). Some of these significant associations, 
especially firm size (LnMK), competitive environment (Herf), litigious environment 
(Litig) and managerial ownership (%MO) are consistent with prior research (e.g., 
Brown & Tucker, 2011), which add validity that the change score captures new 
information. In other words, this result adds validity to the idea that change in the level 
of disclosure captures new information. 
In terms of control variables, changes in firm’s leverage (|ΔLev|), dividend ((|ΔDY|), 
liquidity (|ΔCR|) and total statements (|ΔT.Stat|) are positively correlated with change in 
FLFD. 
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Table 4.7 
Pearson Correlation Matrix  
 
|ΔFLFD| |ΔROE| LnMk Herf Litig %MO BigN |ΔLev| |ΔDY| |ΔCR| |ΔRet.Vol| |ΔT.Stat| 
|ΔFLFD| 1.0000 
         
  
             
|ΔROE| 0.0926*** 1.0000 
        
  
 0.0001            
LnMk 0.2755*** 0.0296 1.0000 
       
  
 0.0000 0.1986           
Herf 0.2647*** -0.0040 0.6880*** 1.0000 
      
  
 0.0000 0.8611 0.0000          
Litig -0.0791*** -0.0069 -0.2046*** 0.0545** 1.0000 
     
  
 0.0002 0.7638 0.0000 0.0179         
%MO -0.1496*** 0.0723*** -0.3582*** -0.2431*** 0.1063*** 1.0000 
    
  
 0.0000 0.0017 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000        
BigN 0.1595*** 0.0231 0.4504*** 0.2695*** -0.1113*** -0.3242*** 1.0000 
   
  
 0.0000 0.3158 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000       
|ΔLev| 0.0779*** 0.1289*** 0.1692*** 0.1010*** -0.1813*** -0.0693*** 0.1698*** 1.0000 
  
  
 0.0010 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0026 0.0000      
|ΔDY| 0.0425* -0.0103 -0.0424* -0.0086 -0.0981*** 0.0248 0.1041*** 0.0533** 1.0000 
 
  
 0.0598 0.6542 0.0652 0.7097 0.0000 0.2812 0.0000 0.0205     
|ΔCR| 0.1033*** -0.0058 0.2586*** 0.1650*** -0.1556*** -0.0778*** 0.1397*** 0.1690*** 0.1062*** 1.0000   
 0.0000 0.7995 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0007 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000    
|ΔRet.Vol| -0.0368 -0.0266 -0.1268*** -0.0748*** 0.0968*** -0.0186 0.0211 -0.0128 0.1009*** 0.0035 1.0000  
 0.1225 0.2479 0.0000 0.0011 0.0000 0.4186 0.3599 0.5795 0.0000 0.8798   
|ΔT.Stat| 0.2786*** 0.0354 0.2062*** 0.2115*** -0.0466** -0.0883*** 0.0918*** 0.0105 -0.0334 0.0703*** -0.2048*** 1.0000 
 0.0000 0.1239 0.0000 0.0000 0.0430 0.0001 0.0001 0.6483 0.1467 0.0022 0.0000  
This Table presents the Pearson Correlation Matrix for all variables in model 1.  
Variables’ definitions and measurements are the same as summarized in Table 4.1. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
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4.7.3 Empirical results  
Table 4.8 reports the multivariate results which are robust to heteroscedasticity and 
auto-correlation. Columns (1) & (2) provide the estimation of model (1) in two different 
ways. Column (1) uses the absolute values of change in earnings performance. This 
estimation preserves the magnitude of earnings performance change. Column (2) uses 
the quartile ranking of absolute change in earnings performance with 1 being the 
smallest absolute change group and 4 being the largest absolute change group. This 
approach allows us to examine whether firms with a larger change in earnings 
performance change their FLFD more than those with smaller performance changes. 
Furthermore, by using scale, this approach mitigates the influences of extreme values 
and relaxes the OLS linearity assumption (Brown & Tucker, 2011). Because of these 
advantages, column (2) is treated as the primary analysis. The t- Statistics presented in 
parentheses are based on standard error clustered by firm.  
The model in columns (1) & (2) is statistically significant at 1% level of significance 
(P<.01) and the adjusted R-squared values are 14.51% and 13.99%, respectively. These 
values imply a good overall model fit which indicate that the model explains some 
variation in |ΔFLFD|.  
In column (1), the current study finds that the coefficient of |ΔROE| is 0.0017 and is 
statistically significant at the 1% significance level (t = 4.26). This result indicates that 
|ΔFLFD| is positively associated with |ΔROE|, meaning that firms change their FLFD in 
response to the change in their earnings performance. In column (2), the coefficient of 
|ΔROE| is 0.1809, and is significant at 10% level of significance (t = 1.71). This result 
indicates that firms with larger changes in their earnings performance change their 
FLFD more than those with smaller performance changes.  
CHAPTER 4: MANAGERS’ INCENTIVES TO CHANGE FLFD  
 
 
 
A
p
p
en
d
ice
s 
164 
These results suggest that firms change their FLFD in response to changes in their 
earnings performance. In addition, firms with larger changes in their earnings 
performance are more likely to change their FLFD than those with smaller performance 
changes. These results are consistent with the spirit of OFR statements that managers 
provide discussion and analysis of firm performance with forward-looking orientation 
and update their discussion from year to year in response to changes in firm 
performance over years. Therefore, the researcher accepts H1a and H1b. 
The results are consistent with the current study expectations based on managers’ 
incentive theories and empirical research. Agency theory suggests that managers that 
have new information relative to the prior year may provide it voluntarily to reduce 
agency costs, resulting in reduced information asymmetry. Signalling theory suggests 
that managers with new information relative to prior year may provide it voluntarily in 
order to signal their good news or signal their capabilities and strengths to manage the 
bad news. 
The results are also consistent with prior empirical research that suggests that change in 
disclosure is associated with change in firm performance (e.g., Lang & Lundholm, 
1993; Miller, 2002; Abraham & Tonks, 2006; Merkley, 2014). Moreover, they are 
consistent with Brown and Tucker (2011) who find that firms with larger changes in 
their economic environment variables tend to change their narratives reporting in 
MD&A more than those with smaller changes in their economic environment.  
Obviously, there is a weak statistical significance level (10%) that firms with larger 
changes in their earnings performance are likely to change their FLFD more than those 
with smaller performance changes. This may be due to the soft talk (vs. hard facts) 
nature of narrative reporting in general and FLFD in particular. This nature may 
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encourage managers of firms to use the FLFD of the previous years as templates 
without making extremely significant changes, which in turn reduces the variation of 
change in FLFD.  
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Table 4.8 
Empirical results: Incentives to change FLFD 
   (1) (2) 
 
Variables 
Pred. 
Sign 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Constant   
-.4487  
(-0.32) 
-1.1353 
(-0.82) 
Performance |ΔROE| + 
.0017*** 
(4.26) 
.1809* 
(1.71) 
Size  LnMK + 
.2651*** 
(2.64) 
.2938*** 
(2.95) 
Competitive 
environment  
Herf + 
47.6255*** 
(2.64) 
46.2672*** 
(2.57) 
Litigious environment  Litig +/- 
-.8120** 
(-2.15) 
-.7629** 
(-2.04) 
Managerial ownership  %MO + 
-1.7284*** 
(-2.73) 
-1.4811** 
(-2.21) 
Auditor type  BigN + 
.3395 
(1.23) 
.3370 
(1.21) 
Leverage  |ΔLev.| + 
.0063 
(0.75) 
.0066 
(0.74) 
Dividend  |ΔDY| + 
.2546* 
(1.75) 
.2514* 
(1.72) 
Liquidity  |ΔCR| + 
.0194 
(0.13) 
.0042 
(0.03) 
Business risk  |ΔRet. Vol| + 
1.1906 
(1.27) 
1.0224   
(1.11) 
Document length  |ΔT.Stat.| + 
.0017** 
(2.26) 
.0018** 
(2.28) 
Fixed effect Year Year 
Standard error clustering  Firm  Firm  
Model F 
Prob > F 
11.80*** 
0.0000 
10.74*** 
0.0000 
Adjusted R- squared 14.51% 13.99% 
VIF: Mean 
         Max.  
1.35 
2.18 
1.37 
2.18 
Observation (N) 1,912 1,912 
This Table reports the coefficients estimates of model (1). Column 1 uses the absolute values of change 
in earnings performance while column 2 uses the quartile ranking of absolute change in earnings 
performance with 1 being the smallest absolute change group and 4 being the largest absolute change 
group. The t-Statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard error clustered by firm to control for 
auto-correlation and heteroscedasticity. 
Variables definitions and measurements are the same as discussed in Table 4.1. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
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In this part, changes in firms’ earnings performance are held constant, and the current 
study examines which firm characteristics are associated with change in FLFD. As 
mentioned before, column (2) is treated as the primary analysis. 
In column (2), the coefficient on LnMK is 0.2938 and is statistically significant at 1% 
level of significance (t = 2.95). This result indicates that |ΔFLFD| is positively 
associated with LnMK, meaning that a positive association exists between firm size and 
the change in FLFD. In other words, this result suggests that larger firms are more likely 
to change their FLFD than smaller firms. Therefore, the researcher accepts H2a. 
The result may be rationalised from two different perspectives. First, from the political 
costs perspective, larger firms are politically visible and so they are likely to update 
their disclosure periodically in order to avoid political costs of being perceived as being 
ambiguous. Second, from the direct costs of disclosure perspective, reporting 
information is costly; hence, large firms have sufficient resources to update their 
disclosure periodically, whilst, small firms may be more likely to cut and paste 
narratives from previous year in order to save the preparation costs. Consistently, prior 
research finds that large firms tend to provide informative disclosure (Al-Najjar & Abed, 
2014; Wang & Hussainey, 2013). 
The coefficient on Herf index is 46.2672 and is statistically significant at 1% level of 
significance (t = 2.57). This result indicates that |ΔFLFD| is positively associated with 
Herf index.  Because the lower the Herf value, the higher the competition, this result 
indicates that a negative association exists between competitive environment and the 
change in FLFD. In other words, the result suggests that firms facing more competition 
are less likely to change their FLFD from the previous year. Therefore, the researcher 
accepts H2b. 
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This result is consistent with the proprietary cost of disclosure expectation. Proprietary 
cost of disclosure represents competitive disadvantage because information disclosed by 
companies may be used by their competitors (Verrrcchia, 1983; Edwards & Smith, 
1996; Radebaugh & Gray, 1997). Therefore, firms in more competitive environment are 
likely to provide less informative disclosure in order to maintain their competitive 
position in the market. Consequently, these firms are less likely to change their FLFD 
over years.  
Prior research (e.g., Verrecchia & Weber, 2006; Dedman & Lennox, 2009; Depoers & 
Jeanjean, 2012) consistently finds that companies have an incentive for non-disclosure 
of information in order to prevent competitors from using their disclosed information. 
Particularly, Brown and Tucker (2011) find that firms facing more competition are less 
likely to change their narratives reporting in MD&A from year to year and consequently 
they provide less informative narrative reporting in their MD&A. 
The coefficient on Litig is -.7629 and is statistically significant at the 5% level of 
significance (t = -2.04). This result indicates that |ΔFLFD| is negatively associated with 
Litig, meaning that a negative association exists between litigation industries and the 
change in FLFD. In other words, the result suggests that firms in more litigious 
industries are less likely to change their FLFD from the previous year. Therefore, the 
researcher accepts H2c. 
The result is consistent with the litigation cost of disclosure prediction that firms in 
highly litigious industries tend to reduce their obligation to update their forward-looking 
disclosure over years in order to avoid the litigation costs. This may be done by 
reducing the amount of forward-looking information and consequently reducing the 
change in such disclosure. This result, therefore, supports Healy and Palepu (2001) 
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theoretical prediction that firms reduce their future oriented disclosure when they face 
risk of being penalised against their forecast. 
The result is consistent with some prior research. For instance, it is consistent with 
Rogers and Van Buskirk (2009) who find that firms reduce their litigation costs by 
reducing disclosure for which they may later be held accountable to update it. It is also 
consistent with Kaszink (1996) who finds that firms in more litigation environment 
narrow their estimated earnings forecasts in order to avoid litigation costs. On the other 
hand, this result is not consistent with Brown and Tucker (2011) who find that firms in 
more litigation environment tend to change their narratives reporting in MD&A to 
larger degree from year to year.  
The coefficient on %MO is -1.4811 and is statistically significant at 5% level of 
significance (t = -2.21). This result indicates that |ΔFLFD| is negatively associated 
with %MO, meaning that a negative association exists between percentage of 
managerial ownership and the change in FLFD. This result suggests that firms 
dominated by managerial ownership are less likely to change their FLFD from the 
previous year and thus provide less informative forward-looking information. However, 
this result is statistically significant; the researcher rejects H2d due to the direction of 
the result. 
Theoretically, this result is not consistent with agency theory. Agency theory suggests 
that managerial ownership might serve to align the interests of management with those 
of shareholders and thus managers change narratives from the recent year to provide 
informative disclosure. However, the result could be explained from other theoretical 
perspective such as management entrenchment perspective. Under this perspective, high 
managerial ownership can be counterproductive to the firm because managers are more 
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likely to maximize their private controlling benefits by providing less informative 
disclosure (Randall, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988).  
Empirically, the result is consistent with prior research of voluntary disclosure in 
general (e.g., Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Eng & Mak, 2003; Nagar, Nada, & Wysocki, 
2003; Gelb, 2000; Ruland et al., 1990) and forward-looking disclosure in particular (e.g., 
e.g., Hussainey & Al-Najjar, 2011; Wang & Hussainey, 2013). This research finds a 
negative association between managerial ownership and disclosure of voluntary 
information. 
The coefficient on BigN is .337 and is not statistically significant at any level of 
significance (t = 1.21). This result indicates that |ΔFLFD| is not statistically associated 
with BigN, meaning that no association exists between auditor type and the change in 
FLFD in UK narratives. This result suggests that there is no role of the auditor in 
overseeing forward-looking statements in UK narrative reporting. Therefore, the 
researcher rejects H2e due to insignificance of the result. 
This result is not consistent with the theoretical expectations of managers’ incentive 
theories. Agency theory suggests that external auditor assures shareholders of the 
reliability of annual reports and hence this reduces information asymmetry and agency 
conflicts. Signalling theory suggests that firms audited by audit firms provide high 
quality information in order to distinguish themselves from firms audited by non-big 
audit firms. Empirically, the non-significance of result is consistent with Aljifri and 
Hussainey (2007) who find no association between auditor type and disclosure of 
forward-looking information. 
The insignificant association between auditor type and change in FLFD can be 
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explained from two different perspectives. First, from the nature of forward-looking 
statements in UK narratives perspective, these statements are qualitative in nature. This 
nature makes forward-looking statements difficult to be audited. Second, from 
enforcement action perspective, the risks of ASB enforcement actions on auditors are 
small because narratives are soft talk not hard facts. 
In sum, by holding changes in firm’s current earnings performance constant, the study 
finds that changes in FLFD is associated positively (negatively) with firm size, 
(competitive environment), (litigious environment), and (percentage of managerial 
ownership). This result adds validity to the change score that changes in the level of 
disclosure captures new information. 
In terms of a firm’s economic environment control variables, the coefficient on |ΔDY| 
is .2514 and is statistically significant at the 10% level of significance (t = 1.72). This 
result indicates that |ΔFLFD| is positively associated with |ΔDY|, meaning that a 
positive association exists between changes in firm’s dividend and the changes in FLFD. 
The result suggests that firms change their FLFD in response to changes in their 
dividend. 
This result is consistent with managers’ incentive theories and empirical research. 
Agency theory suggests that managers that have new information relative to the prior 
year may provide it voluntarily to reduce agency costs, resulting in reduced information 
asymmetry. Signalling theory suggests that managers with new information relative to 
prior year may provide it voluntarily in order to signal their good news or signal their 
capabilities and strengths to manage the bad news.  
Furthermore, it is consistent with prior research that finds a positive relationship 
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between dividend policy and the disclosure of forward-looking information (e.g., 
Hussainey & Al-Najjar, 2011, Wang & Hussainey, 2013).  The result is also consistent 
with the result concerning the effect of changes in firm’s performance on change in 
firm’s FLFD (H1a).  
The coefficient on |ΔT.Stat.| is .0018 and is statistically significant at 5% level of 
significance (t = 2.28). This result indicates that |ΔFLFD| is positively associated with 
|ΔT.Stat.|, meaning that positive association exists between change in firm’s narrative 
document length and changes in firm’s FLFD. In other words, the result suggests that 
firms change their FLFD as long as they change the length of their narrative document 
from year to year. 
On the other hand, the coefficients on |ΔLev.|, |ΔCR|, and |ΔRet.Vol| are .0066 (t =0.74), 
0042 (t = .03), and 1.0224 (t = 1.11), respectively. These results indicate that |ΔFLFD| is 
not statistically associated with |ΔLev.|, |ΔCR|, and |ΔRet.Vol|, meaning that change in 
FLFD is not affected by changes in firm’s leverage, firm’s liquidity and firm’s business 
risk. 
Table 4.9 presents a summary of the results of the hypotheses. 
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Table 4.9  
Summary of hypotheses tests 
Variables Hypotheses 
Regression 
results 
Notes 
Firm 
performance 
H1a: A positive association exists between change in firm performance and change in 
FLFD in UK narratives. 
A 
+ 
 
H1b: Firms with larger changes in their performance tend to change their FLFD more 
than those with smaller performance changes in UK narratives. 
A 
+ 
 
Firm 
characteristics 
H2a: A positive association exists between firm size and change in FLFD in UK 
narratives 
A 
+ 
 
H2b: A negative association exists between competitive environment and change in 
FLFD in UK narratives. 
A 
+ 
 
H2c: An association exists between litigious environment and change in FLFD in UK 
narratives 
A 
+ 
 
H2d: A positive association exists between managerial ownership and change in 
FLFD in UK narratives 
R 
- 
Rejected due to 
direction 
H2e: A positive association exists between auditor type and change in FLFD in UK 
narratives 
R 
+ 
Rejected due to 
insignificance 
Control variables 
Changes in firm’s leverage effect 
R 
+ 
Rejected due to 
insignificance 
Changes in firm’s dividend policy effect 
A 
+ 
 
Changes in firm’s liquidity effect 
R 
+ 
Rejected due to 
insignificance 
Changes in market risk  effect 
R 
+ 
Rejected due to 
insignificance 
Changes in total statements effect 
A 
+ 
 
This Table provides summary of the hypotheses tests. A means acceptance that there is significant association, R means rejection that there is significant association, + 
means positive direction, - means negative direction. 
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4.7.4 Further analysis  
4.7.4.1 Well and poorly performing firms 
Based on signalling theory, firms with poor performance (e.g., losses) may provide 
more informative disclosure in order to explain to their investors why losses arise, as 
well as to signal their strengths to eliminate such losses in the future. This section 
examines whether the association between the change in FLFD and change in earnings 
performance differ based on the sign of earnings performance change.  
The sample is divided into two subsamples: well-performing and poorly performing 
firms based on the direction of change in firm’s ROE. Firms that have positive change 
in ROE from the previous year (ΔROE>0) are regarded as well-performing firms, while 
firms with negative change in ROE from the previous year (ΔROE<0) are regarded as 
poorly performing firms.  
Table 4.10 reports the estimation of the model (1) for samples of well-performing firms 
(earnings increase) and poorly performing firms (earnings decrease) separately. Column 
(1) presents the regression results for well-performing firms sample, while column (2) 
displays the results for poorly performing firms sample. 
While the coefficient of |ΔROE| for well-performing firms is .0008 and is statistically 
significant at the 10% level of significance (t = 1.73), the coefficient of |ΔROE| for 
poorly performing firms is .0025 and is statistically significant at the 1% level of 
significance (t = 5.94). This result indicates that a positive association exists between 
change in earnings performance and change in FLFD for both well-performing and 
poorly performing firms. However, this association is more positive and statistically 
significant for poorly performing firms compared to well-performing firms.  
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These results may be rationalised from two perspectives. First, from the point of view of 
well-performing firms, managers of these firms feel that their investors are satisfied 
with the good performance of their firms and consequently they would not wish for 
more information (Wallace & Naser, 1995). Second, from the point of view of poorly 
performing firms, managers of these firms react to bad earnings performance by 
increasing discussion on activities with a potential positive effect on future performance 
(Merkley, 2014). Those two perspectives suggest that poorly performing firms are more 
likely to provide informative disclosure than well-performing firms. 
Consistently, prior empirical research in the UK finds that forward-looking disclosures 
are more likely to be used by unprofitable firms than by profitable firms (Hussainey & 
Al-Najjar, 2011; Wang & Hussainey, 2013). In addition, Schleicher et al. (2007) find 
that loss-making firms provide more relevant forward-looking information to their 
investors than profit-making firms. 
In summary, the results indicate that poorly performing firms are more likely to change 
their FLFD in response to changes in performance than well-performing firms. 
Consequently, poorly performing firms provide more informative FLFD compared to 
well-performing firms. 
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Table 4.10 
Model (1) results: Well-performing and poorly performing firms 
   (1) (2) 
   ΔROE>0 ΔROE<0 
 
Variables 
Pred. 
Sign 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Constant   
-2.1794 
(-1.24) 
1.1530 
(0.85) 
Performance |ΔROE| + 
.0008* 
(1.73) 
.0025*** 
(5.94) 
Size  LnMK + 
.3347** 
(2.56) 
.1715 
(1.48) 
Competitive 
environment  
Herf + 
52.4033** 
(2.33) 
38.6538** 
(2.01) 
Litigious environment  Litig +/- 
-.9159* 
(-1.89) 
-.5151 
(-1.09) 
Managerial ownership  %MO + 
-1.8560* 
(-1.96) 
-1.4982** 
(-2.01) 
Auditor type  BigN + 
.1612 
(0.37) 
.6986** 
(2.23) 
Leverage  |ΔLev| + 
.0136 
(1.15)  
-.0024 
(-0.20) 
Dividend  |ΔDY| + 
.3102 
(1.42) 
.1855 
(1.27) 
Liquidity  |ΔCR| + 
.1358 
(0.67) 
-.1175 
(-0.67) 
Business risk  |ΔRet. Vol| + 
2.0645* 
(1.76) 
-.0686 
(-0.05) 
Document length  |ΔT.Stat| + 
.0011* 
(1.66) 
.0033*** 
(3.08) 
Fixed effect Year Year 
Standard error clustering  Firm  Firm  
Model F 
Prob > F 
7.56*** 
0.0000 
11.03*** 
0.0000 
Adjusted R- squared 15.53% 15.71% 
VIF: Mean 
         Max. 
1.34 
2.16 
1.53 
2.32 
Observation (N) 946 966 
This Table reports the coefficients estimate of model (1) for well and poorly performing firms. Column 1 
provides the estimates for well-performing while column two reports for poorly performing firms. The t-
Statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard error clustered by firms to control for auto-
correlation and heteroscedasticity. 
Variables definitions and measurements are the same as discussed in Table 4.1. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively 
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4.7.4.2 Auditor type  
Column (2) of Table 4.8 shows that the coefficient on BigN is .337 and is not 
statistically significant at any level of significance (t = 1.21). This result suggests that 
there is no role of the auditor in overseeing forward-looking disclosure in the UK 
narrative reporting statements.  
When the current study distinguishes between well-performing and poorly performing 
firms, the regression results in Table 4.10 show that the coefficient on BigN for well-
performing firms is .1612 and is not statistically significant at any level of significance 
(t = 0.37). However, the coefficient on BigN for poorly performing firms is .6986 and is 
statistically significant at 5% level of significance (t = 2.23). These results indicate a 
positive association between auditor type and the change in FLFD in the UK narratives 
exists when firms are poorly performing. However, these results are not existed for 
either all sample firms or for well-performing firms. 
These results suggest that the role of the auditor in overseeing narrative reporting is not 
appearing for the all sample firms or for well-performing firms, however, it is 
observable only when firms are poorly performing.  
These results may be due to the higher liquidation risk of poorly performing firms 
which in turn increases the risk that the auditor will be sued. This may encourage 
auditor to exercise more effort when auditing poorly performing firms. Consistently, 
Walker and Casterella (2000) find that auditors are less willing to offer discounts when 
auditees show losses in the year prior to the new audit engagement. This is because of 
the increased audit risk which requires more audit engagements tests. 
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4.7.5 Endogeneity test    
Endogeneity is a statistical concern in the disclosure literature (Ammann, Oesch, & 
Schmid, 2011). It is considered an important issue which may affect the validity of the 
regression results (Chenhall & Moers, 2007). There are two causes that lead to 
endogeneity; omitted variables and Simultaneity. Omitted variables refer to that the 
dependent and explanatory variables have systematic relationships with other variables 
that are not included in the model. Those variables that are not included in the model are 
referred to as omitted variables (Chenhall & Moers, 2007). Apart from omitted variable, 
simultaneity may occur when the association between dependent and independent 
variables runs in both ways (Chenhall & Moers, 2007), 
The results of the current study are further analysed to examine the extent to which 
endogeneity problem exists among variables. The study examines the two issues that 
may cause endogeneity problem by conducting an instrumental Two-Stage Least Square 
(2SLS) regression. The 2SLS is widely used technique to detect endogeneity (Black, 
Jang, & Kim, 2006a; Henry, 2008; Ntim et al., 2012b). It helps in assessing whether 
there are serious variations between the regressor variables and either the error term 
(omitted variables) or risk disclosures (simultaneity problem). 
To this end, managerial ownership and auditor type variables are introduced in the 
regression analysis as instrument variables, and the other variables are introduced as 
regressor variables. The analysis is run for all sample firms are for well and poorly 
performing firms, separately. This helps to observe any variation over change score and 
to minimize the possible drawbacks of using the instrumental variable (Larcker & 
Rusticus, 2010). 
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Because of the effects associated with incorrect identification of instrumental variables, 
the instrumental variables are further validated to detect whether or not the data set 
exhibits endogeneity. The validity of instruments is checked using Sargan and Basmann 
statistics. The existence of simultaneity is checked using Durbin and Wu–Haumsan 
statistics.  
Sargan and Basmann statistics are used to examine the over-identifying restrictions that 
may arise due to having more than one instrumental variable. The null-hypothesis of 
these tests is that: the mean value of the instruments and residuals are equal to zero. 
These two tests are based on the Chi-square statistic. In addition, Durbin and Wu–
Haumsan tests are used to examine the extent to which dependent variable and 
endogenous variables are exogenous. The null-hypothesis of these tests is that: the 
covariance of the endogenous variables and the residuals is equal to zero. The Durbin 
statistic is based on Chi-square statistic, and the Wu–Haumsan statistc is based on F-
statistic. 
Table 4.11 reports the results of the endogeneity tests. Column (1) presents the results of 
endogeneity test for the whole sample firms. While, Columns (2) and (3) report the 
endogeneity test results for well-performing and poorly performing firms, respectively. 
Sargan and Basmann statistics indicate that the instrumental variables employed in the 
endogeneity tests are valid and are considered appropriate for the use in the regression 
model. Durbin and Wu-Haumsan statistics suggest that the exogeneity of regressor 
variables are acceptable. These results indicate that there is no concern arising from 
endogeneity. 
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Table 4.11 
Endogeneity tests results 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Whole 
sample 
Well-
Performing 
Poorly 
Performing 
Sargan statistic 
1.523 
(.524) 
1.906 
(0.781) 
1.884 
(0.142) 
Basmann statistic 
1.253 
(0.540) 
1.679 
(0.787) 
1.723 
(0.185) 
Durbin statistic 
0.986 
(0.501) 
0.675 
(0.745) 
1.265 
(0.239) 
Wu–Haumsan statistic 
0.892 
(0.572) 
0.530 
(0.751) 
1.349 
(0.269) 
This Table reports the endogeneity tests’ results for all sample firms and for well and poorly performing 
firms, separately. ` 
The Chi-square and the F values are given in parentheses. 
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4.8 CONCLUDING REMARKS  
This chapter provides answers to the research questions Q1a, Q1b, Q1c, Q2a, Q2b, Q2c, 
Q2d, & Q2e. It investigates theoretically and empirically the factors that may drive 
managers of firms to change FLFD over years for a large sample of the UK all-shares 
firms over an extended time period from 2005 to 2011.  
Theoretically, firms’ managers’ decision to change their FLFD over years depends on 1) 
the likelihood that managers have new information to disclose relative to prior year, and 
2) the cost of including more or less information in the narrative document. Managers 
that have new information relative to the prior year may disclose it voluntarily in order 
to 1) reduce information asymmetry, 2) signal their favourable results in case of good 
news information and 3) signal their capabilities and strengths for future growth in case 
of bad news information. Furthermore, the costs of including more or less information 
include the following: 1) direct costs of disclosure, 2) political costs, 3) proprietary 
costs, and 4) litigation costs. 
The study estimates using the OLS regression with clustered robust standard errors and 
uses year-fixed effect. This estimation method accounts for any residual dependence 
created by firm effects (auto-correlation) and time effect (heteroscedasticity). 
The correlation analysis provides evidence that change in FLFD is statistically 
correlated positively with changes in firm performance. In terms of firm characteristics, 
there are statistical positive correlation between change in FLFD and some firm 
characteristics such as firm size, competitive environment, and auditor type. However, 
negative correlation exists with other firm characteristics such as litigious environment 
and percentage of managerial ownership.   
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In the multivariate analysis, the study finds an association between change in firms’ 
earnings performance and change in FLFD. However, it offers evidence that firms with 
larger changes in earnings performance are more likely to change their FLFD than those 
with smaller performance changes. Furthermore, when we distinguishes between well 
and poorly performing firms, the study finds that change in FLFD is more positively 
associated with poorly performing firms compared to well-performing firms. These 
results are consistent with the managers’ incentive theories and empirical research (e.g., 
Lang & Lundholm, 1993; Miller, 2002; Schleicher et al., 2007; Brown & Tucker, 2011; 
Merkley, 2014).  
Furthermore, by holding changes in firm current earnings performance constant, the 
study finds that change in FLFD is associated positively (negatively) with firm size, 
(competitive environment), (litigious environment), and (percentage of managerial 
ownership). This result adds validity to the change score that change in the level of 
disclosure captures relatively new information. Obviously, the study finds that the 
auditor has no role in overseeing narratives. However, in the further analysis, it finds 
that the role of the auditor in overseeing narrative reporting is observable only when the 
firms are poorly performing. 
This chapter offers two contributions to narrative reporting literature in general and 
forward-looking disclosure in particular. First, it contributes to the body of knowledge 
on methodological developments in the estimation method in empirical tests. The study 
uses OLS regression with robust standard error clustered by firm to mitigate the residual 
dependence problems caused by time effect (heteroscedasticity) and firm effect (auto-
correlation). This estimation method accounts for the residual dependency problems 
frequently neglected in market-based accounting research (Gow, Ormazabal, & Taylor, 
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2010).  
Second, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first UK evidence on the extent to 
which firms change their FLFD from the previous year in response to change in 
performance. The results help in understanding managers’ behaviour while preparing 
narrative reporting. Given that IASB concerns about the informativeness of narrative 
disclosure, this study provides fresh evidence that FLFD in UK narrative statements 
includes some content about firm performance. The results are, also, helpful for wide 
range of stakeholders dealing with firms with different characteristics (e.g. large or 
small firms; good or poorly performing firms; facing more or less disclosure costs) 
This study has implications for the emphasis in the UK regulatory bodies (e.g., IASB) 
on setting clear best practise guidance for narrative reporting such as OFR, business 
review and management commentary. In the UK, managers have flexibility in terms of 
the amount and content of narrative reporting. This room of discretion may encourage 
managers to strategically obscure the financial results of the company in their narrative 
discussion. In this case narratives are a mean for managers to mislead investors. Thus, 
guidance has to be set for managers while preparing their narrative discussions.  
Furthermore, the results have important implications for users of annual report 
narratives. The importance of the narrative discussion and analysis in the annual report 
depends concomitantly on firm performance. In the UK, this narrative discussion is not 
currently subject to external audit or assurance. The results suggest that users of annual 
reports may desire some element of assurance that this narrative discussion is consistent 
with firm performance. The external auditors may be able and willing to provide such 
assurance. However, some enforcement actions from regulatory bodies may be required. 
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The current study has some limitations which have to be considered as potential 
avenues for future research. First, it uses firm earning performance proxied by return on 
equity ratio as a measure for firm performance. The main limitation in this is related to 
using only just one variable to measure firm performance. Employing more than one 
variable to measure firm performance could be an area of interest for future research.  
Second, it uses only two proxies for governance that are managerial ownership and 
auditor type. Not considering other corporate governance mechanisms such as the 
characteristics of the board of directors (e.g., Elshandidy et al., 2013) could be a 
limitation for the current study and, also, an area of interest for future research.  
Chapter 5 will discuss the investors’ response to change in FLFD. Particularly, it will 
examine the association between change in FLFD and the future value of a firm. 
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CHAPTER 5 : ASSOCIATION BETWEEN CHANGE IN FLFD AND 
FIRM VALUE 
5.1 OVERVIEW  
Exploring whether investors response to change in FLFD over years is the main 
objective of this chapter. Particularly, this chapter uses firm value at three months of the 
annual report date to measure the investors’ response to changes in FLFD. The chapter 
discusses the theoretical expectations, the research design and the empirical results 
concerning the association between change in FLFD and firm value. Hence, it would 
provide an answer to the research question: Q3. 
The chapter is outlined as flows. Section 5.2 discusses the relevant theories that explain 
the association between change FLFD and firm value. The review of the literature is 
discussed in section 5.3. It highlights the previous research on the association between 
disclosure and cost of capital in section 5.3.1, association between disclosure and firm 
value in section 5.3.2, and the economic consequences of FLFD in section 5.3.3. 
Section 5.4 highlights gaps in prior research. Section 5.5 develops the hypothesis of the 
current study. Section 5.6 presents the literature on variables that may affect the value of 
a firm (control variables). Section 5.7 details the research design. It draws on the 
variables’ definitions and measurements in section 5.7.1, the empirical model on section 
5.7.2, the statistical issues in section 5.7.3, and the sample selection and data collection 
in section 5.7.4. The results of the current study are presented in section 5.8. This 
section reports the descriptive statistics in section 5.8.1, the correlation analysis in 
section 5.8.2, the empirical results in section 5.8.3 and the further analysis and the 
robustness test in section 5.8.4. Section 5.9 provides the concluding remarks 
CHAPTER 5: CHANGE IN FLFD AND FIRM VALUE 
 
 
 
A
p
p
en
d
ice
s 
186 
5.2 THEORIES  
Accounting information might play a vital role in capital markets. It is argued that 
“accounting information is relevant if it has a predicted association with equity market 
values” (Barth, Beaver, & Landsman, 2001, p. 79). It may serve the market participants 
through two main roles; valuation and stewardship roles. The valuation role of 
accounting information permits capital providers to evaluate the potential return of a 
certain investment opportunity (Beyer et al., 2010). Whilst, the stewardship role allows 
capital providers to manage and utilise their invested capital in a certain firm. More 
importantly, if we consider the information asymmetry problem, the role of accounting 
information in the market becomes even more obvious.  
Healy et al. (1999) argue that disclosure can provide several benefits. First, it can help 
to correct any firm miss-valuation. Second, it can increase firm’s stock liquidity. 
Therefore, disclosure strategies may provide important means for corporate managers to 
convey their knowledge to outside investors (Healy & Palepu, 1993). Lang, Lins and 
Miller (2004) argue that higher market valuation is associated with better information 
environment. Consequently, informative disclosure adds some credibility to financial 
reports and enhances the investors’ perception of firms; in turn, such investors’ 
perceptions are reflected in firm value (Healy et al., 1999). Obviously, this assumption 
relies deeply on the quality of disclosed information to the market. Investors value 
disclosure if it is of high quality rather than being meaningless talk (boilerplate 
statements) from management. 
The firm OFR statements are regarded as an important venue for investors to know 
more about the company from the eyes of the board of directors and through which 
managers can communicate what cannot be delivered by financial statements numbers. 
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Change in FLFD is, thus, expected to be useful. This is because as long as firms change 
their level of FLFD from year to year relatively new information is disclosed to 
investors.  
In the current study, firm value
42
 is used to measure investors’ response to changes in 
FLFD. Theoretically, disclosure can affect the value of the firm either by affecting its 
cost of capital or its expected cash flow to its shareholders, or both (Diamond & 
Verrecchia, 1991, Hassan et al., 2009; Elzahar et al., 2015). Particularly, the study 
depends on the agency theory, finance theory, and efficient market hypotheses to 
explain the relationship between such information released as a result of changes in 
FLFD and firm value.  
Agency theory is based on the separation of ownership and control, whereby the 
principal (shareholders or debt holders) delegate the responsibility to manage the firm to 
agents (managers), this separation of ownership and control create conflict of interest 
between principal and agent. Agents have much more information than principals which 
in turn led to asymmetry in terms of the information available to principles which 
causes uncertainty to shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This problem is referred 
to as information asymmetry problem between management and investors. Investors 
usually do not have access to internal information about the company which is available 
to managers. One way to mitigate information asymmetry is to provide disclosure 
(Hassan et al., 2009).   
                                                 
42
 Firm value is an economic measure that reflects the market value of the business as a whole and it takes 
into account the value of firm’s debt. Both firm value and market capitalization are often used 
interchangeably. However, firm value provides more accurate valuation of the firm than market 
capitalization. Furthermore, Hassan et al. (2009) define firm value as the cash flow expected to be 
generated by the company in the future, discounted at company’s cost of capital.. The cost of capital is the 
rate of return that the company has to provide to finance providers in order to induce them to buy and 
hold firm’s financial security (Arnold, 2005). Hence, there are two factors that might affect firm’s value: 
expect cash flows and cost of capital. 
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The agency theory might explain the effect of information on the value of a firm from 
two perspectives:  
First, the information released by the firm decreases the information asymmetry 
between the management and the investors. This in turn reduces the uncertainty 
surrounding firm’s future performance. This expectation is supported by Healy and 
Palepu (1993) who argue that the better the managers’ disclosure behaviour, the higher 
the possibility that investors understand their business activities. Consequently, decrease 
in the uncertainty surrounding firm’s future performance may affect its share price and 
consequently its value (Hassan et al., 2009; Hunter & Smith, 2009).  
Second, disclosure could reduce the private benefits that controlling shareholders and 
management might get from controlling the firm (monitoring costs). This reduction in 
monitoring costs could increase the expected cash flow to investors (Coffee, 1999; Stulz, 
1999) which in turn increases its value. 
Finance theory, also, may provide a theoretical framework to explain how disclosure 
could affect the value of a firm.  
Finance theory suggests that information could affect the value of a firm either by 
affecting its future cash flow or/and its cost of capital (Hassan et al., 2009). An 
investor’s decision to buy or hold company’s financial securities depends on his or her 
expectations regarding its future cash flows or its returns. This investor’s expectations 
are based on exploiting all available information. The information released as a result of 
change in FLFD from year to year may help investors to build up their expectations 
about firm’s future cash flows and its returns which in turn affect the value of this firm. 
However, the information asymmetry problem may, also, arise among investors. This is 
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occurred when the level of information available to a particular investor is different 
from that to another investor. This problem may affect firm cost of capital through two 
main factors; estimation risk and stock liquidity.  
In terms of estimation risk, disclosure may affect the firm cost of capital through its 
effect on the investors’ estimation of the risk level which affects the required rate of 
return when acquiring a firm’s shares (Coles, Loewenstein, & Suay, 1995; Clarkson, 
Guedes, & Thompson, 1996). The investors’ estimation risk can be defined as “investor 
uncertainty about the parameters of the return- or cash flow- generating process” 
(Shanken & Lewellen, 2000, p. 2). The true parameters of security’s future cash flow or 
return are unknown. Therefore, investors try to predict them using whatever information 
is available (Hassan et al., 2009). Investors’ prediction always carries the risk of 
uncertainty. This uncertainty might arise because the amount of information available 
about alternative shares is different. For instance, there is significant variation in the 
level of voluntary information disclosed by different firms. This kind of uncertainty, 
caused by variation in information available about alternative securities, is usually 
called asymmetric estimation risk (Hassan et al., 2009)
43
 . 
This asymmetric estimation risk is believed to have a systematic component
44
 and hence 
should be priced to some extent. Given that the systematic risk is common to all 
companies to a greater or lesser extent and cannot be eliminated by holding a 
                                                 
43
 Coles et al. (1995: p. 347) explain this element of risk as a result of information asymmetry as follows: 
“The standard theoretical analysis of portfolio choice and equilibrium asset pricing assumes investors 
know the parameters that govern the distribution of payoffs or returns of the various assets. But the 
investor must, in any application, estimate these parameters. For example, the investor may need to 
estimate the vector of means and covariance matrix of asset returns or payoffs. For some securities, the 
investor may have the same number of sample observations (information asymmetry problem does not 
exist). In this case, parameter uncertainty is said to be symmetric. In other cases, estimation is 
complicated by missing data and unequal numbers of observations on assets (information asymmetry 
problem exists), hereafter, asymmetric or differential parameter uncertainty” 
44
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) defines the systematic risk as market beta.  
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sufficiently large portfolio (non-diversifiable), investors require higher returns for 
riskier securities in terms of systematic risk. This, in turn, means that this element of 
risk, the asymmetric estimation risk, increases the firm’s cost of capital. 
The second factor that might affect firm cost of capital is stock liquidity. The liquidity 
of stock can be defined as “a measure of the ease with which cash can be converted to 
an investment in the stock or vice versa. Illiquidity is driven by the explicit and implicit 
costs of buying or selling the stock” (Amihud & Mendelson, 2000, p. 9). There are three 
types of costs associated with liquidating the stocks:  a) the transaction costs of trading 
such as commission, b) the adverse selection costs such as bid ask spread
45
 , and c) the 
opportunity costs of liquidating stock. Obviously, the rate of return required by an 
investor when buying or selling a stock is positively associated with the liquidity costs 
of this stock.   
Finance theory suggests that as long as the information asymmetry among investors 
increases, the liquidity costs increases. This, hereafter, reduces the stock liquidity and 
consequently increases the rate of return required by investors to invest in a firm shares. 
More clearly, an uninformed investor, who has no private information about the stock, 
requires a premium for the risk he bears as a result of trading with an informed investor, 
who has private information about the stock. This premium is argued to be an important 
component of the firm’s cost of equity capital. 
To conclude, disclosure is expected to reduce the information asymmetry problem either 
between managers and outside investors or among investors. This reduction in 
                                                 
45
 “The bid and ask prices quoted for a stock are the prices at which investors can trade a small order 
instantaneously; a small sell order can be instantaneously executed at the market bid price, and a small 
buy order can be executed instantaneously at the ask price. The difference between the highest bid 
(buying) price and the lowest ask (selling) price- the bid-ask spread- thus represents a liquidity cost. A 
liquid stock has a narrow bid-ask spread, which implies a lower cost for an instantaneous “round-trip” 
transaction” (Amihud & Mendelson, 2000, p. 9). 
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information asymmetry reduces firm cost of capital, and increase expected cash flow. 
Since firm value is a negative (positive) function of its cost of capital (expected cash 
flow), it is expected that, ceteris paribus, reducing the firm cost of capital (the required 
rate of return) will increase its value. In addition increasing expected cash flow will 
enhance firm value.  
For clarity, Figure 5.1 shows how information asymmetry might affect firm value. 
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Figure 5.1: Information asymmetry effect on firm value 
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Apart from information asymmetry, how information affects firm value could be 
explained in the light of Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH). Simply, according to 
EMH, we expect change in FLFD to release considerable new information for investors. 
This information adjusts prices of a firm security either up or down. This is in turn 
affects a firm value.  
The idea beyond EMH is developed by Fama (1970). Fama (1970) argues that the 
market price of a security reflects the true price of the security as long as all available 
value relevant information is incorporated into security price. Thus, rational investors 
can determine the expected future cash flows of the security, its riskiness, and the 
appropriate discount rate. Fama (1970) distinguishes between three forms of the market 
based on the degree of efficiency; strong-form efficiency, semi-strong-form efficiency, 
and weak-form efficiency.    
In the strong-form of market efficiency, the security prices reflect all available 
information and, thus, there is no chance for abnormal return. In the semi-strong- form 
of market efficiency, the security prices may be adjusted based on the public 
information disclosed and profit can be made via not publically available information. 
Finally, in the weak-form of market efficiency, the security prices follow random walk 
which means that security prices cannot be predicted by analysing prices from the past. 
Ogden, Jen, and O’Connor (2003) argue that there are three degrees of market 
efficiency because there are some factors that may modify the efficiency of the market. 
Such factors include characteristics of security, issuer and market in which the security 
is traded, and the efficiency of technology available to gather and process information. 
Furthermore, they argue that if the market is perfectly efficient, there is no abnormal 
return, except when investors learn new information. In contrast, if the market is not 
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perfect, there will be a delay in change of stock prices. Consequently, this delay leads to 
adjustments in security prices and investors can benefit from it. This explains the 
importance of information. 
The information disclosed is critical to an investor decision-making process and may 
have immediate pricing effect on securities market. Considering that changes in the 
level of disclosure release considerable new information. In this case, whatever the form 
of market efficiency, the security prices would be adjusted, either up or down, as a 
result of this new information. Accordingly, the participants of the market would not be 
able to obtain abnormal return because all information would be reflected in the security 
prices.  
Overall and in sum, changes in FLFD reveal relatively new information to investors. 
This information might have an effect on the value of the firm through affecting its cost 
of capital or its expected cash flow. This could be explained from different perspectives. 
First, it decreases the information asymmetry between management and investors. This 
reduces the uncertainty surrounding firm’s future performance which in turn affects its 
shares’ price. Second, it reduces the private benefits that controlling shareholders and 
management might get from controlling the firm. This in turn increases the expected 
cash flow to shareholders. Fourth, disclosure affects the investors’ estimation of risk 
level and, therefore, affects the required rate of return when acquiring a firm’s shares. 
Fifth, it may reduce the liquidity costs, hereafter, increasing stock liquidity and, 
therefore, reducing the rate of return required by investors to invest in a firm’s shares. 
Finally, consistent with efficient market hypothesis, stock prices are adjusted, move up 
or down, in response to information available.  
Table 5.1 provides summary for the theories that explain the effect of information on 
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firm value. 
Table  5.1 
Summary of theories explaining the effect of disclosure on firm value  
Theory  Explanation (summary) 
Agency theory  
Information decreases the information asymmetry 
between management and investors. This may reduce the 
uncertainty surrounding firm’s future performance which 
in turn affects its shares’ price. 
Information reduces the private benefits that controlling 
shareholders and management might get from controlling 
the firm. This .increases the expected cash flow to 
shareholders. 
Finance theory  
 Investor uses information to build his decision to buy or 
hold firm’s securities.  
Information reduces the cost of capital because it leads 
investors to reduce their estimation of the risk level, and 
therefore reduces the required rate of return when 
acquiring a firm’s shares. 
Information reduces the liquidity costs, hereafter 
increasing stock liquidity and therefore reducing the rate 
of return required by investors to invest in a firm’s 
shares. 
Efficient Market 
Hypothesis (EMH) 
Share prices are adjusted up and down in line with the 
information available 
This Table summarises the theories that explain the effect of disclosure on firm value. 
 
On the other hand and despite of the above discussion, the effect of change in FLFD on 
firm value may not be visible. This may be because of one or more of the following 
reasons.   
First, managers have flexibility in how and what information to disclose and so they 
may use their disclosure discretion to mislead investors (Marquardt & Wiedman, 2005). 
Li (2008) concludes that managers can use their discretion in preparing narrative 
reporting to strategically obfuscate the financial results. Furthermore, Athanasakou and 
Hussainey (2014) argue that managers use future oriented information when they have 
incentives to mislead and provide untruthful disclosure. If so, even if managers update 
their discussion according to changes in firm performance, investors will not have a 
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clear view of the business and therefore their response to FLFD in OFR statements may 
be faint.  
Second, the doubt about the usefulness of OFR statements could be arising from the 
relative lack of the timeliness of the annual report publication time. Therefore, even if 
managers change FLFD of their firms in good faith and provide clear analysis regarding 
business performance, the information released is likely to be forestalled by other 
disclosure media.  
Third, disclosure is not cost-free decision and firms’ managers have concern about the 
costs of disclosure. For instance, proprietary costs of disclosure may prevent firms from 
providing informative disclosure. In addition litigation costs may reduce managers’ 
incentives to provide informative narrative reporting.  
The above three reasons make the investors’ responses to changes in FLFD in OFR 
statements an empirical issue and, therefore, needs more investigation. 
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5.3 LITERATURE REVIEW  
This section highlights the previous research on the effect of disclosure on firm value 
either directly or indirectly through its effect on the firm cost of capital
46
. In addition, 
this section reviews the empirical research on the usefulness of forward-looking 
disclosure. 
The section is organized as follows. It starts by exploring the research that examines the 
relationship between disclosure and firm cost of capital. Then, it reviews the literature 
that directly investigates the relationship between disclosure and firm value. Finally, it 
presents the literature related to the economic consequences of the forward-looking 
disclosure.  
5.3.1 Disclosure and cost of capital 
This research stream attempts to review the research that examines the effect of 
disclosure on firm value through its effect on cost of capital of a firm. The association 
between accounting information and firm cost of capital is one of the fundamental 
issues in accounting (Lambert, Leuz, & Verrecchia, 2007). It is argued that the value of 
the firm is a decreasing function of its cost of capital. In other words, the lower the firm 
cost of capital, the higher the firm value. A substantial prior research has examined the 
relationship between disclosure and cost of capital. This research suggests negative 
relationship between voluntary disclosure of a firm and its cost of capital.  
Extensive studies have directly examined the relationship between voluntary disclosure 
of a firm and its cost of capital. One strand of this research has find that disclosure 
                                                 
46
 There is a substantial research that explores the economic benefits of firm disclosure (e.g., Diamond & 
Verrecchia, 1991; Lev, 1992; Kim & Verrecchia, 1994; Elliot & Jacobson, 1994;Leuz & Verrecchia, 
2000; Verrecchia, 2001; Hail, 2002; Lam & Du, 2004; Lambert et al., 2007; Francis, Nanda, & 
Olsson,2008; Kim & Shi, 2011; Sadka, 2011;Lang & Maffett, 2011; Ng, 2011;) 
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improves cost of equity capital and, thus, reports a negative relationship between 
disclosure level of a firm and its cost of capital. For instance, Botosan (1997) find a 
negative relationship between firm disclosure and its cost of equity capital. However, 
this result is documented only for firms with lower analyst following.  
Hail (2002) investigates the association between disclosure quality and the cost of 
equity capital for sample of Swiss firms. He finds a strong negative relationship 
between a firm disclosure and its cost of capital. In addition, Rashid (2000) examines 
the association between firm disclosure and its cost of capital. He uses sample from 
retail banks listed within the London Stock Exchange. He finds negative association 
between disclosure and cost of capital, suggesting that banks with higher disclosure 
score experience lower cost of capital. 
Furthermore, Francis, Nanda, & Olsson (2008) find negative relationship between 
voluntary disclosures, measured using the number of conference calls made by firms, 
and the cost of capital; however, this relationship disappears after they control for 
earnings quality. In addition, Barth, Konchitchki, and Landsman (2013) find that firms 
with high transparent earnings exhibit lower costs of capital.  
Using Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) information as a proxy for voluntary 
disclosure, the prior research documents either negative or non-significant relationship 
between CSR disclosures and cost of capital. For instance, Clarkson, Fang, & 
Richardson (2011) find non-significant association between firms’ environmental 
disclosure and their costs of capital. On the other hand, some prior research (e.g., 
Plumlee, Broen, & Marshall, 2009; Dhaliwal et al., 2009) finds negative association 
between firm CSR disclosure level and its cost of capital. This result suggests that firms 
with greater CSR disclosure exhibit lower costs of capital. Furthermore, they 
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demonstrate that a high level of CSR disclosure has some other economic benefits such 
as increasing institutional shareholder ownership, improving analyst coverage, 
enhancing analyst forecast accuracy and reducing analyst forecast dispersion.  
Moreover, Kim and Shi (2011) use management earnings forecasts as a proxy for 
voluntary disclosure. They examine association between the tone of management 
earnings forecasts (good news vs. bad news) and cost of capital. They find a positive 
association between bad news forecasts and cost of capital suggesting that bad news 
information increase the cost of capital. On the other hand, they find no association 
between good news forecast and cost of capital meaning that good news information has 
no effect on the firm cost of capital. They suggest that the cost of capital does not 
respond to good news forecasts because investors presume that they do not provide 
credible information.  
On the other hand, Botosan and Plumblee (2002) re-examine the association between 
firm corporate disclosure and its cost of capital. In contrast to their expectation, they 
find that increase in the level of disclosure is associated with a higher cost of capital. 
Then, they examine whether the relationship between disclosure and cost of equity 
capital varies based on the timing of disclosure. Their results suggest that annual report 
disclosure reduces the cost of equity capital; however, disclosure of quarterly reports 
increases the cost of equity capital. They do not report any association between investor 
relations and cost of equity capital. 
Besides, limited prior research examines the effect of disclosure on cost of capital 
through examining the effect of disclosure on asymmetric estimation risks. It is argued 
that market beta is an increasing function of asymmetric estimation risk (Hassan, 
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2006)
47
. Consequently, prior research suggests negative relationship between disclosure 
and market beta. For instance, Clarkson and Thompson (1990) investigate the 
relationship between information available about stock and market beta using sample of 
US initial public offering (IPO). They argue that information is increasing overtime and 
they used the listing period as proxy for the amount of information available for stock. 
They find negative association between amount of information available about stock 
and market beta. This result suggests a negative relationship between disclosure and 
cost of capital. However, time cannot capture the difference in information among 
different firms, so it may not be an effective proxy for the quantity of information 
(Barry & Brown, 1985).  
In addition, Lam and Du (2004) investigate the relationship between disclosure and 
market beta. Their preliminary evidence suggests negative association between 
disclosure and market beta and consequently negative association with cost of capital. 
However, the regression analysis does not support such association. They add that their 
results may not be generalizable because their data were very noisy.  
Furthermore, some prior research examines the association between disclosure and 
some other variables that may indirectly affect firm cost of capital between. For instance, 
Healy et al. (1999) find that firms with increased level of disclosure experience 
improvements in the bid ask spread. In addition, Lambert et al. (2007) demonstrate that 
better disclosure reduces the amount of managerial appropriation. This effect generally 
reduces a firm’s cost of capital. 
                                                 
47
 Market beta increases as long as asymmetric estimation risks increase and, consequently, firm cost of 
capital increases. 
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5.3.2 Disclosure and firm value 
This research stream attempts to explore the research that directly links disclosure to 
firm value. It is suggested that disclosure could affect the value of the firm either by 
affecting its cost of capital or/and its expected cash flow that accrue to its shareholders. 
However, there is a lack of empirical research that directly investigates the relationship 
between disclosure and firm value.  
For instance, Patel, Balic and Bwakira (2002) use Standard and Poor’s dataset on 
Transparency and Disclosure (T&D) scores to examine the relationship between T&D 
scores and firm value. Their results suggest that firms with higher T&D scores have 
higher value compared to firms with lower T&D scores. However, they do not control 
for variables that may influence firm value causing an omitted variable bias problem.  
In addition, Beak, Kang and Park (2004) use the listing in ADR as proxy for disclosure 
quality to examine the relationship between disclosure quality and firm value. Their 
results suggest positive association between ADR listing (disclosure quality) and firm 
value. Furthermore, Da-Silva and Alves (2004) examine the relationship between 
internet disclosure and firm value. They find that firm value is positively associated 
with internet disclosure. 
Hassan et al. (2009) find that the relationship between disclosure and firm value 
depends on the type of disclosure: mandatory vs. voluntary disclosure. They find 
negative association between firm value and mandatory disclosure made by Egyptian 
firms. However, they report non-significant relationship between firm value and 
voluntary disclosure. Further, Clarkson et al. (2011) and Plumlee et al. (2010) find 
positive association between voluntary disclosure and firm value. 
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 Recently, Elzahar et al. (2015) examine the effect of the disclosure of Key Performance 
Indicators (KPIs) on cost of capital and directly on firm value. They find significant 
negative relationship between the disclosure of KPIs and the cost of capital. However, 
they find weak positive relationship between disclosure of KPIs and firm value.  
Apart from the type of disclosure, Uyar and Kiliç (2012) find that the relationship 
between disclosure and firm value depends on the measure of firm value; market to 
book value vs. market capitalization. They find that disclosure is positively associated 
with market to value measure of firm value. However no significant association exist 
when market capitalisation is used.  
5.3.3 Economic consequences of FLFD 
Prior empirical research examines the economic consequences of the disclosure of 
forward-looking information through the impact of this type of information on different 
variables. It finds that the publication of forward-looking information is associated with 
1) the prediction of future performance, 2) the accuracy of analyst forecasts, and 3) 
anticipation of the stock price. 
For instance, Clarkson, et al. (1994) find that the publication of forward-looking 
information in the annual reports is informative with respect to future performance. In 
addition, they provide evidence that the change in forward-looking disclosure level in 
MD&A is positively associated with future firm performance. This evidence suggests 
that forward-looking disclosure in MD&A provides value relevant information. 
Furthermore, Li (2010a) examines whether forward-looking statements in MD&A are 
informative about future performance. He finds that forward-looking statements in 
MD&A are informative with respect to future firm performance. 
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Large body of prior research focuses on the association between forward-looking 
disclosure and financial analyst forecasts. Generally, Lang and Lundholm (1996) report 
that analysts rely on value relevant information in deriving their forecasts. Such findings 
support Lev and Zarowin’s (1999) argument that the value relevance of historical 
information is decreasing. In terms of forward-looking disclosure, Barron et al. (1999) 
find that higher levels of forward-looking disclosure about capital expenditure and 
operations are associated with more accuracy in the analyst forecasts.  
Furthermore, Walker and Tsalta (2001) find a positive association between analyst 
forecasts and the quality of forward-looking disclosure published in the UK annual 
reports. Moreover, Vanstraelen et al. (2003) find that disclosure of forward-looking 
information increases analysts’ accuracy of forecasts, whereas historical information 
does not affect the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts. Furthermore, Bozzolan et al. (2009) 
argue that forward-looking information reflects the expected impact on firm 
performance and hence is considered effective at improving the accuracy of analyst 
forecasts. 
A further group of research examines the effect of publishing forward-looking 
information in the annual reports on the stock market. This research assesses the 
usefulness of forward-looking statements in narrative reporting, by their impact on 
future earnings. For example, Muslu et al. (2011) examine whether disclosure of 
forward-looking information in MD&A helps investors to anticipate future earnings. 
They find that additional disclosure of forward-looking information in MD&A helps 
investors to anticipate future earnings especially when there no earning guidance.   
On the other hand, some prior research focuses on the association between disclosure of 
forward-looking information and future return in the UK narrative reporting. Schleicher 
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and Walker (1999) and Hussainey et al. (2003) provide evidence that high levels of 
forward-looking disclosure in the narrative statements of the annual report improve the 
ability of stock market to anticipate future earnings changes.  
Moreover, Schleicher et al. (2007) find that the ability of stock returns of loss firms to 
anticipate next period’s earnings change is significantly greater when the firm provides 
a large number of profit predictions in the annual report narratives. Furthermore, Wang 
and Hussainey (2013) find that forward-looking information in the OFR statements of 
well-governed firms improves the stock market ability to anticipate future earnings. 
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5.4 THE CURRENT STUDY 
There is a limited literature that directly examines the relationship between firm value 
and disclosure (e.g., Patel et al., 2002; Da-Silva & Alves, 2004; Hassan et al., 2009; 
Clarkson et al., 2011; Plumlee et al., 2010). This is may be because the fact that the 
association between disclosure and firm value may be perceived as a logical conclusion 
rather than hypothesis to be tested. For instance, some prior research examines the 
relationship between disclosure and firm value through its effect on firm cost of capital 
(e.g., Botosan & Plumblee, 2002; Kim & Shi, 2011). Their empirical findings support 
the positive relation between the two variables. Consequently, they suggest a positive 
association between disclosure and firm value. The current study investigates directly 
the relationship between FLFD and firm value. 
Prior empirical research assesses the investors’ response to the publication of forward-
looking information by their impact on future performance (e.g., Li, 2010a), accuracy of 
analyst forecasts (e.g., Bozzolan et al., 2009), and future earnings (e.g., Wang & 
Hussainey, 2013; Muslu et al., 2011). To the best of our knowledge, there is no prior 
empirical research that directly investigates the relationship between the publication of 
forward-looking statements and firm value in the UK. Furthermore, research that 
investigates investors’ response to the UK OFR statements is limited (Wang & 
Hussainey, 2013). The current study uses a sample from the UK to examine the 
association between the change in FLFD in OFR statements and firm value.  
Various theoretical models predict that a firm commitment to disclosure is negatively 
related to its cost of capital (e.g., Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991; Easley & Maureen, 
2004; Lambert et al., 2007). Despite of its importance and plausibility, the nature of this 
link is still an open question. Empirical literature provides cross-sectional evidence that 
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firms with more extensive voluntary disclosures exhibit less information asymmetry and 
have a lower cost of capital. However, there are substantial concerns about whether this 
relation can be interpreted in a causal way. Firms are likely to choose disclosures with 
the effect on their cost of capital in mind, creating an endogeneity problem for which it 
is difficult to find valid instruments. The current study uses an alternative strategy 
which is the use of a change measure of narrative disclosure. As stated by Li (2010b) 
using change methodology in measuring narrative disclosure may mitigate the problem 
of endogeneity.  
Research that directly examines the relationship between disclosure and firm value 
provides cross-sectional evidence that firms with more disclosure exhibit high values. 
Panel data analysis is rarely used. Cross sectional analysis suffers from many problems 
such as heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation. Accordingly, there is a substantial 
concern about the validity of results. The current study uses a panel data analysis 
technique (OLS with robust standard errors) to solve the problems associated with 
cross-sectional analyses (Petersen, 2009).  
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5.5 HYPOTHESISES DEVELOPMENTS 
The informativeness of forward-looking disclosure is still under-research (Wang & 
Hussainey, 2013). The OFR statements are considered to be as an important venue for 
investors to know more about the company from the eyes of the board of directors, and 
through which managers can communicate what cannot be delivered by financial 
statements numbers. The change in FLFD is, thus, expected to be useful as it reveals 
much considerable new information for investors.  
This information is expected to help investors to build up their expectation about firm 
future cash flows which in turn affects the value of the firm. In addition, it is expected 
to affect stock liquidity through its impact on liquidity costs, and the demand for firm 
shares. In addition, this information is likely to have an effect on investors’ estimation 
of risk and consequently the rate of return required by investor to buy firm share. 
Consequently, there will be an impact on the cost of capital which affects the value of 
the firm. Furthermore, this information might have particular impact on the firm value 
through its influence on the expected cash flow that may accrue to shareholders through 
its effect on the monitoring costs. Finally, information causes stock prices to move up 
and down which in turn affects the value of the firm in the market.  
A review of literature indicates that empirical studies have focused on examining the 
association between disclosure level and cost of equity (e.g., Hail, 2002; Lam & Du, 
2004; Francis et al., 2008; Kim & Shi, 2011). Limited research exists with respect to the 
direct association between disclosure level and firm value (e.g. Hassan et al., 2009; 
Elzahar et al., 2015).  
The empirical evidence regarding the influence of disclosure on firm value is still 
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inclusive. Some studies maintain that narrative disclosure adds to firm value (e.g., Beak 
et al., 2004; Cheung et al., 2010; Elzahar et al., 2015) while others (e.g., Hassan, et al., 
2009) do not find evidence to support this assumption. Obviously, the association 
between change in FLFD and firm value has not been investigated in prior research. 
Based on the review of the theories and literature, it is expected that change in FLFD 
may affect the value of a firm. Therefore, the current study hypothesises that: 
H3: An association exists between the change in forward-looking 
financial disclosure and firm value in UK narratives. 
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5.6 CONTROL VARIABLES AND FIRM VALUE  
In order to provide accurate and more generalizable results, the study controls for 
variables identified from prior research that might affect firm value (e.g., Hassan et al., 
2009). The use of control variables reduces the potential omitted variable bias (Ntim et 
al., 2012a). Therefore, the study controls for the following variables: firm size, firm 
current earnings, firm leverage, firm dividend, firm liquidity, firm growth, firm capital 
expenditure, and firm managerial ownership.  
5.6.1 Firm size  
Firm size is widely used variable in prior research. It is regarded as an important factor 
that influences firm performance (Eisenberg et al., 1998; Samaha et al., 2012). This may 
be because larger firms have more resources than smaller firms. Larger firms are more 
likely to employ more skilled managers; in addition, they may find easily secure 
external finance (Black, Jang & Kim, 2006a; Black, Love, & Rachinsky, 2006b).  
Furthermore, they tend to have a large asset base that can be used as collateral (Baek et 
al., 2004).  Therefore, larger firms are expected to have higher values than smaller firms. 
Consistently, some prior empirical research reports a positive association between firm 
size and its value (e.g. Baek et al., 2004; Hassan et al., 2009; Liu, Uchida & Yang, 
2010).  On the other hand, other prior research (e.g, Black et al., 2006a&b; Cho & Kang, 
2002; Ammann, Oesch & Schmid, 2009) find a negative association between firm size 
and its value, suggesting that larger firms have lower values. This negative relation may 
be because small firms tend to enhance their governance mechanisms which in turn 
affect their values (Klapper & Love, 2004).  
Based on these mixed arguments and findings, the relationship between firm size and 
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firm value is still an empirical issue that requires more examination. Consequently, this 
study adds the firm size to the analysis as a control variable. 
5.6.2 Firm current earnings  
Generally, investors pay much more attention to the firm’s earnings level (Merkly, 
2014). Thus, firms that report higher earnings may signal their good performance 
information to their investors. It might be perceived that these firms have competitive 
advantages that enable them to achieve higher profits which positively affect 
shareholder value. In addition, firms with high earnings are perceived as firms with 
more growth opportunities. Furthermore, prior research argues that firm’s earnings 
influence positively its market value (Henry, 2008; Hassan et al., 2009; Price, Roman, 
& Rountree 2011). Therefore, firms that have higher earnings may be perceived to have 
higher value because investors expect this level of good earnings to be maintained in the 
future (Chaney & Lewis, 1995).  
Empirically, some prior research, consistently, finds a positive relationship between 
earnings levels and firm value (e.g., Hassan et al., 2009; Elzahar, 2013). Based on the 
above discussion, positive relationship is expected between firm’s earnings and its value. 
5.6.3 Firm leverage 
The association between leverage and firm value can be explained from two different 
perspectives. First, leverage may have positive effect on firm value. This may be 
because the following: a) tax deductibility on borrowing might cause decrease in the 
cost of capital which increases firm value (Hodgson & Stevenson-Clarke, 2000), and b) 
debt may be used as monitoring tool by creditors (Jensen, 1986; Hart & Moore, 1990; 
Jensen, 1993). Lins (2003, p. 169) argues that “I control for debt to account for the 
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possibility that creditors are able to lessen managerial agency problems”. Thus, 
creditors are expected to act as external monitors that could provide a beneficial 
governance role in reducing managerial agency problems. Consistently, Haniffa and 
Cooke (2002) argue that firms’ existing debt may help the board of directors in their 
monitoring role. Furthermore, it is suggested that firms with high leverage tend to have 
large investments and thus higher earnings growth (Murekefu & Ouma, 2012). 
Empirically, McConnell and Servaes (1985) find positive relationship between 
corporate value of firm and its leverage.  
Second, on the other hand, leverage may negatively affect the value of a firm. Leverage 
may be a signal of potential financial problem or increase in the cost of capital (Henry, 
2008). Hence, negative effect of leverage on firm value is expected. Some prior research 
suggests a negative relationship between leverage and firm performance (Ammann et al., 
2009; Jackling & Johl, 2009; Mangena, Tauringana, & Chamisa, 2012).  
Based on the above discussion, the relationship between firm leverage and firm value is 
an empirical issue that still requires examination. Consequently, this paper adds 
leverage to the analysis as a control variable. 
5.6.4 Firm dividends  
Dividends distribution is one of the most important financial decisions by management. 
The payment of dividends is preferable if it increases the owners’ wealth. However, if it 
does not, the firm should not pay dividends and retain profit.  
The effect of dividends payment on firm value can be explained from two different 
perspectives. First, firms may increase their dividends pay-out. This is to a) signal that 
they have expected future cash flows that are sufficiently large to meet dividend 
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payment without increasing the probability of bankruptcy, or/ and  b) to reduce the 
agency problem between managers and shareholders which in turn enhances firm value 
to shareholders (Dhanani, 2005). Consistently, prior research shows that the value of the 
company increases because dividends are taken as signals that the firm is expected to 
have higher future cash flows (Miller & Rock, 1985).  
Second, however, the dividends initiation signal the good profitability and cash flow for 
the initiating firms, this may limit management ability to make future investments 
which in turn lowers firm value (Officer, 2011). Consistently, Officer (2011) finds that 
firms with a low firm value (Tobin’s Q) have significantly more positive dividends 
initiation announcement returns than other firms. However, an association may exist 
between lower dividends and lower growth because of the suboptimal investment 
decisions by management (Arnott & Asness, 2003).  
Given these mixed perspectives on the association between firm dividends and its value, 
this study empirically examines the relationship between dividends payment and firm 
value. Thus, we may expect positive or negative relationship between the two variables. 
5.6.5 Firm liquidity  
Liquidity might play a vital role in enhancing the value of the firm. Signalling theory 
suggests that firms with increasing liquidity tend to signal their favourable liquidity 
results in order to signal their capabilities to their investors. Furthermore, firms with 
high liquidity have greater freedom to invest than those with low liquidity status which 
in turn affects its value. Additionally, liquidity might affect management decision to pay 
dividend which in turn affect firm value.  
Conversely, firms experiencing liquidity shocks can turn to external capital markets or 
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internally generate cash flow or may curtailing new investments (Beak et al., 2004). 
Given that prior research (Fazzari, Hubbard, & Petersen, 1988; Hoshi, Kashyap, & 
Scharfstein, 1991; Whited, 1992) find significant positive association between liquidity 
and investment level, thus this liquidity shock might affect the growth opportunities of 
the company and therefore affects its value. Furthermore, firms with greater liquidity 
are subject to smaller stock prices reduction (Liu et al., 2010). This is in turn enhances 
firm value.  
Based on the above discussion, this study expects positive association between a 
liquidity of a firm and its value.  
5.6.6 Firm growth 
Firm growth is closely related to firm survival. More precise, firms experiencing 
continuous growth will have higher probability of survival in the market.  
Theoretically, the firm growth is accompanied by an increase in its business activities 
(Henry, 2008). This implies an increased need for external capital (Beiner, Drobetz, 
Schmid, & Zimmermann, 2006; Chung & Zhang, 2011). It is argued that firms with 
better growth opportunities are more attractive and, thus, are more likely to receive 
better valuation (Henry, 2008).  
Empirically, prior studies support the above argument and find a positive and significant 
relationship between firm growth and firm performance (e.g., Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; 
Henry, 2008). Therefore, positive relationship is expected between firm growth and its 
value  
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5.6.7 Capital expenditure 
Capital expenditure is related to firm’s investment policy. This policy is usually done 
when the firm aims to expand its business through expansion of its production capacity, 
modernization or building new factories. Furthermore, one of the main determinates of a 
firm growth is its capital expenditure (Pfeffer, 1972; Pearce & Zahra, 1992). Therefore, 
increase in capital expenditure may have significance to make the value of the company 
increase. Empirically, McConnell and Muscarella (1985) find that the announcement of 
an increase (decrease) in capital expenditure has positive (negative) effect on stock 
return. However, this requires enhanced monitoring by board of directors to protect the 
shareholders’ wealth (Nicholson & Kiel, 2007; Conyon & He, 2011).  
Empirical research on the relationship between capital expenditure and firm 
performance reports mixed results. On one hand, Weir, Laing and McKnight (2002), 
and Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) find a positive relationship between capital expenditure 
and firm performance. While, on the other hand, Jackling and Johl (2009) and Mangena 
et al. (2012) find a negative relationship between the two variables.  
Based on the above argument, positive association is expected between firm capital 
expenditure and its value. 
5.6.8 Managerial ownership 
The previous literature has shown mixed results with respect to the impact of 
managerial ownership on the value of a firm. For instance, Morck et al. (1988) report 
that, at relatively low and high levels of ownership, the value of a firm is positively 
associated with its level of managerial ownership. However, this relationship turns out 
to be negative at the medium level of the percentage of the managerial ownership.  
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On the other hand, Cheng, Su, and Zhu (2012) find that management entrenchment 
causes the association between managerial ownership and firm value to be negative at 
low and high levels of ownership. In turn, this relationship becomes negative between 
the two variables at the medium level of ownership due to a convergence of interests 
effect.  
Based on the above discussion, the relationship between managerial ownership and firm 
value is an empirical issue that still requires examination. Consequently, this paper adds 
managerial ownership to the analysis as a control variable. 
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5.7  RESEARCH DESIGN  
This part explains the research design of the current study. It is outlined as follows. 
Section 5.7.1 details the definitions and measurements of variables. The empirical 
model and the statistical issues are discussed in sections 5.7.2 and 5.7.3, respectively. 
Finally, section 5.7.4 explains the sample and the collection of data. 
5.7.1 Variables: Definitions and measurements 
This section defines the variables employed in this study and explains how each 
variable is measured. It starts by defining the dependent and independent variables then 
show how the variables are measured. 
5.7.1.1 Dependent variable 
To examine investors’ response to the changes in FLFD, firm value is used as 
dependent variable in this study. Following prior research (e.g., Ntim, Opong, & 
Thomas, 2012b; La porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2002; Lins, 2003), the Tobin’s 
Q ratio is used as a measure of the value of a firm.  
Tobin’s Q is defined as "the ratio of the market value of the outstanding financial claims 
on the firm to the current replacement cost of the firm's asset” (Lewellen & Badrinath, 
1997, p. 77-78). The idea is that the replacement cost is a logical measure of the 
alternative use-value of the assets (Hassan et al., 2009). If Tobin’s Q is greater than 1, 
this means that the company exceeds its assets replacement costs and thus the perceived 
value of a firm by its shareholders will increase due to effective use of firm assets and 
vice versa. The Tobin’s Q ratio is a market based measure and reflects the current stock 
market value of the firm (Thomsen, Pedersen, & Kvist, 2006) and it measures the extent 
to which the firm is expected to earn more than the average return on its invested capital 
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(Abdullah & Page, 2009). 
Some prior research (e.g., Bauer et al., 2010; Epps & Cereola, 2008) uses the return on 
assets ratio as a measure for firm value. The return on assets ratio has been criticised as 
a measure of a firm value due to the following reasons. First, it is dependent on the 
estimated value of firm assets which is based on historical costs rather than market 
values. In addition, the values of firm assets may be changed based on change in the 
accounting policies such as depreciation method. Second, the return on assets may be 
manipulated by firm management because of the flexibility given in the estimation 
methods (Lev & Sunder, 1979).  Third, beside the above criticisms, the return on asset 
ratio focuses entirely on back word orientation as it depends on historical data.  
The current study uses the natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q three months after the date of 
the annual report
48
. The study refers to this variable as LnTQ+3. Following prior 
research (e.g., Beak et al., 2004; Klapper & Love, 2004; Beiner et al., 2006) TQ+3 is 
computed as [(total debt + market value of equity) / book value of total assets]. All the 
data used in measuring TQ+3 is collected from Datastream. Total debt is the Datastream 
item (WC03255) and book value of total assets is the Datastream item (WC02999). The 
market value of equity is calculated as the number of outstanding shares at the year-end, 
Datastream item (WC05301), multiplied by the market value of the share at three 
months after the date of annual report (the closing price of the share at three month of 
the annual report date which has not been historically adjusted for bonus and rights 
                                                 
48
 In principle, Hassan et al. (2009) allow six months after the financial year-end, assuming that the 
annual report is usually published three months later, and then allow three months to capture information 
disclosed. Following prior research in the UK (e.g., Hussainey et al., 2003) the value of a firm is 
calculated at three months after its annual report date. To be more precise, each firm’s annual report 
publication date is identified when the stock price over three months is calculated. 
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issues.)
49
. The procedures to use market value of equity three months after the date of 
annual report is to ensure that stock prices capture the new information released by 
change in forward-looking financial disclosure.  
5.7.1.2 Independent variables  
5.7.1.2.1 The change in the level of FLFD 
The change in the level of FLFD represents the absolute change in the level of FLFD 
between year t and year t-1. For more details about how this variable is measured, 
please see chapter (3) sections 3.4 & 3.5 
5.7.1.2.2 Control variables   
These variables include: firm size, firm current earnings, firm leverage, firm dividend, 
firm liquidity, firm growth, firm capital expenditures, and firm managerial ownership.  
Firm size: It is measured as the natural logarithm of market value of equity at the end of 
the current year and refers to the variable as LnMK. The data of the market value of 
equity at the end of the current year is collected from the DataStream. The Datastream 
code for the market value of equity at the end of the current year is (WC08001). 
Firm current earnings: It is measured using a firm’s return on equity ratio and refers to 
the variable as ROE. This variable is collected from Datastream. The Datastream code 
for ROE is (WC08301). 
Firm leverage: It is measured using the firm’s debt-to-equity ratio and refers to the 
variable as Lev. The variable data is collected from Datastream. The Datastream code 
for Lev is (WC08231). 
                                                 
49
This figure, therefore, represents the actual or raw prices of the shares as recorded.  
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Firm dividend: It is measured using the dividend yield ratio and refers to the variable as 
DY. The data of DY is collected from DataStream. The DY is the Datastream code 
(WC09404).  
Firm liquidity: It is measured using the current ratio, and refers to the variable as CR. 
The CR data is collected from the DataStream. The current ratio is the Datastream code 
(WC08106).  
Firm growth: it is measured as the firm’s sales growth ratio at 3 years and refers to the 
variable as GRTH. This variable is collected from Datastream. The Datastream code of 
firm’s sales growth ratio is (WC08633). 
Firm capital expenditures: It is measured using the capital expenditures-to-assets ratio 
at 5 years and refers to the variable as CAPEX. This variable is collected from 
DataStream. The Datastream code of capital expenditure to asset ratio is (WC08420) 
Firm managerial ownership: It is measured as the percentage of total shares in issue of 
5% or more held by employees, or by those with a substantial position in a company 
that provides significant voting power at an annual general meeting. It is referred to this 
variable as %MO. The data for this variable is collected from Datastream. This variable 
has a Datastream code (NOSHEM). 
Table 5.2 delineates the variables and identifies the measurement for each variable. 
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Table 5.2  
Variables: Definitions and measurements  
Definition Acronym Operationalization 
Firm value  LnTQ+3 
Natural logarithm of Firm’s Tobin’s Q three month 
after the date of annual report: Tobin’s Q = [(total 
debt + market value of equity) / book value of total 
assets].Total debt is the Datastream item 
(WC03255) and book value of total assets is the 
Datastream item (WC02999). The market value of 
equity is calculated as the number of outstanding 
shares at the year-end, Datastream item 
(WC05301), multiplied by the market value of the 
share at three months after the date of annual report 
(closing price). 
Change score in  
FLFD 
|ΔFLFD| 
Change score in FLFD as measured in chapter 3 
sections 3.4 & 3.5. 
Firm size  LnMK 
Natural logarithm of market value of equity at the 
end of the current year. Datastream code 
(WC08001). 
Current earnings  ROE 
Firm return on equity. Datastream code 
(WC08301). 
Leverage  Lev Debt to equity ratio. Datastream code (WC08231). 
Dividend  DY Dividend yield ratio. Datastream code (WC 09402) 
Liquidity  CR Current ratio. DataStream code (WC08106). 
Firm growth  GRTH 
Firm sales growth ratio. Datastream code 
(WC08633). 
Capital expenditure  CAPEX 
Capital expenditure to assets ratio. Datastream 
code (WC08420). 
Managerial 
ownership 
%MO 
The percentage of total shares held by employees, 
or by those with a substantial position in a 
company that provides significant voting power at 
an annual general meeting. Datastream code 
(NOSHEM). 
This Table provides the definitions and variables of the variables  
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5.7.2 Empirical model  
The following model, Model 2, is developed to test the hypothesis related to investors’ 
response to the changes in FLFD which is H3. Particularly, this model examines the 
association between firm Tobin’s Q and the change in its FLFD. 
𝑳𝒏𝑻𝑸+𝟑 =  𝜷𝟎 +  𝜷𝟏|𝜟𝑭𝑳𝑭𝑫| + 𝜷𝟐𝑳𝒏𝑴𝑲 + 𝜷𝟑𝑹𝑶𝑬 + 𝜷𝟒𝑳𝒆𝒗 +  𝜷𝟓𝑫𝒀 +  𝜷𝟔𝑪𝑹
+ 𝜷𝟕𝑮𝑹𝑻𝑯 + 𝜷𝟖𝑪𝑨𝑷𝑬𝑿 + 𝜷𝟗%𝑴𝑶 +  𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓 𝑭𝒊𝒙𝒆𝒅 𝑬𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕
+ 𝑰𝒏𝒅𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒚 𝑭𝒊𝒙𝒆𝒅 𝑬𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕
+  𝜺                                                                                                                     (𝟐)   
Where:  
 
𝜷𝟎  The regression intercept  
𝜷𝟏….. 𝜷𝟗 The regression coefficients  
𝜺 The error term  
 
Table 5.2 summarises the definitions and measurements of the variables  
 
 
5.7.3 Statistical issues  
The study estimates using the same econometric procedures used in model (1) in 
chapter 4, section 4.5.3.  Summary of these statistical issues is provided below. 
The study estimates model (2) using OLS regression with clustered robust standard 
errors. This method allows standard errors to be clustered by firms in order to account 
for any residual dependence created by firm effects. The clustered standard error is used 
to mitigate the problem of time series dependence (auto-correlation). Petersen (2009) 
shows that this estimation method yields unbiased standard errors and consequently 
would improve the accuracy of the analyses. In addition, the study uses the year-fixed 
effect to address the effect of cross-sectional dependence or time effect 
(heteroscedasticity). In addition, the industry-fixed effect is used to control for industry-
specific characteristics that may affect firm value. We do not cluster by years in the 
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analysis because the panel data set is short in the time series and clustering by six years 
may only add noise to the system (Petersen, 2009). To mitigate the effect of outliers, all 
continuous variables are winsorised at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentile. 
5.7.4 Sample selection and data collection  
The current study examines the association between changes in FLFD and the firm 
value for FTSE all shares firms listed in the main market of the London Stock Exchange 
over the period from 2005 to 2011
50
. The sample of the current study is the same as that 
of chapter 4 section 4.5.4. It consists of 1912 firm year observations. Please, check the 
following Tables in chapter 4: Table 4.2 which displays the sample selection process, 
Table 4.3 which shows the distribution of the sample amongst industries, and Table 4.4 
which presents different titles that report the OFR contents. 
As previously mentioned, all financial data is collected from the Datastream. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
50
 However, because we calculate change in FLFD from the previous year, we lose one year observations, 
particularly, the observations of the year 2005. 
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5.8 THE RESULTS  
This part reports and discusses the results of the current study. It starts with reporting 
the descriptive statistics of the variables in section 5.8.1. Then, it displays the 
correlation analysis in section 5.8.2. Section 5.8.3 reports and discusses the regression 
results of model 2. Finally, further analysis and robustness test are introduced in section 
5.8.4. 
5.8.1 Descriptive statistics 
Panel A of Table 5.3 shows the descriptive statistics of the firm value (LnTQ+3) for all 
sample firms and by years. The maximum value of LnTQ+3 in the sample firms is 0.894 
while the minimum value is -0.823. This range indicates that a variation exists between 
the UK firms in terms of their values. The sample firms have an average value of -.0106. 
There are some variations in the mean value of LnTQ+3 over the sample period. It was 
0.230 in 2006 then decreased to -.171 and -.127 in 2007 and 2008 respectively. Then, 
decreased again in 2009 and become -.000020 and increased in 2010 to -.030 and 
continued to increase in 2011 to become .035. There is some variation in the values of 
UK firms over years. 
In addition, panel B of Table 5.3 shows the descriptive statistics for LnTQ+3 for all 
sample firms and by industries. The mean values of LnTQ+3 across industries are as 
follows; industrial (-.125), basic material (.153), technology (.111), consumer goods (-
.022), consumer service (-.072), health care (.423) oil and gas (.085), utilities (.025) and 
telecommunication (-.161). There is a variation in the mean value of LnTQ+3 across 
industries. The highest mean value of LnTQ+3 is in the health care industry (.423), while, 
the lowest value is in the industrial industry (-.125). This is consistent with Abdullah 
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and Page (2009) who argue that the Tobin’s Q as a measure of firm value is widely 
varies from one industry to another. 
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Table 5.3 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of the firm value (LnTQ+3) for all the sample and by years  
 All 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Mean  -.0106 .230 -.171 -.1271 -.000020 -.030 .035 
Minimum -.823 -.823 -.823 -.823 -.823 -.823 -.823 
25% -.451 -.108 -.668 -.523 -.401 -.485 -.399 
Medium  -.031 .237 -.249 -.190 -.045 -.067 .040 
75% .397 .680 .223 .249 .396 .372 .461 
Maximum .894 .894 .894 .894 .894 .894 .894 
N 1912 318 321 315 320 317 321 
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics of the firm value (LnTQ+3) for all the sample and by industries  
 All Industrial 
Basic 
material 
Technology 
Consumer 
goods 
Consumer 
service 
Health 
care 
Oil and 
gas 
Utilities Tel. 
Mean  -.0106 -.125 .153 .111 -.022 -.072 .423 .085 .025 -.161 
Minimum  -.823 -.823 -.823 -.823 -.823 -.823 -.698 -.823 -.299 -.823 
25% -.451 -.561 -.292 -.352 -.428 -.470 .205 -.334 -.081 -.334 
Medium  -.031 -.203 .211 .138 -.061 -.113 .437 .060 .032 -.171 
75% .397 .251 .669 .616 .407 .292 .832 .464 .124 .033 
Maximum .894 .894 .894 .894 .894 .894 .894 .894 .547 .450 
N 1912 661 149 191 211 427 115 100 36 22 
This Table shows the descriptive statistics of the firm value (LnTQ+3) for all sample firms, by year and by industry. Panel A shows the descriptive statistics for all 
sample firms and by year. While, Panel B shows the descriptive statistics for all sample firms and by industries. The definitions of industries are based on the Industry 
Classification Benchmark (ICB). N indicates the number of observations. 
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Table 5.4 presents the descriptive statistics for the independent variables. Panel A 
displays the descriptive statistics of change score |ΔFLFD|, the main explanatory 
variable, for all sample firms and by years. The maximum value of |ΔFLFD| of the 
sample firms is 58 while the minimum is 0. This range indicates that a variation exists 
between UK firms in terms of their decision to change their financial forward-looking 
disclosure from year to year. The sample firms have on average change score of 4.20. 
The mean values of change score over the sample period depict monotonic increase in 
the change score over the period from 2006 to 2011. It ranges from 3.72 in 2006 to 5.58 
in 2011. This small range may be due to the soft talk nature of financial forward-looking 
disclosure which reduces the variation of change from period to period. 
Panel B of Table 5.4 shows the descriptive statistics of the control variables for all 
sample firms and by years. The Firm size (LnMK) measured as the natural logarithm of 
firm’s market value of equity at the end of the current year has a mean value of 12.40 in 
the sample firms with minimum value of 9.59 and maximum value of 15.43. The firm 
current earnings measured using the return on equity ratio (ROE) has a mean value of 
16.40 in all the sample firms with minimum value of -8.944 and maximum value of 
65.57. 
The firm leverage measuring using debt to equity ratio (Lev) has mean value of 52.69 
with minimum value of .00 and maximum value of 166.96 in all the sample firms. In 
terms of dividend, it is measured using dividends yield ratio (DY) and it has mean value 
of 2.65 and minimum value of .00 and maximum value of 6.21.  
The firm liquidity measured using the current ratio (CR) has a mean value of 1.61 and 
minimum value of .68 and maximum value of 3.35 in the sample firms. The firm growth 
measured using firms growth rate in sales percentage (GRTH) has a mean value of 8.75 
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and minimum value of -6.86 with maximum value of 26.48. The firm capital 
expenditure measured as firm expenditure to total assets ratio (CAPEX) has a mean 
value of 5.07 with minimum and maximum values of 1.05 and 11.91, respectively.  
The firm managerial ownership (%MO) measured as the percentage of ownership by 
firm directors has a mean value over the sample period of .087. This value is quite 
consistent to Wang and Hussainey (2013) who find that the percent of director 
ownership in UK firms is 7%. The %MO variable varies significantly in the sample 
with a maximum value of 99% and a minimum value of 0%.  
Table 5.4 
Descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables   
 All 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
 
Panel A: Change in FLFD (|ΔFLFD|) 
 
Mean  4.20 3.72 3.51 4.07 4.05 4.26 5.58 
Minimum  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
25% 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Medium  3.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 
75% 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
Maximum 58 24 27 58 58 29 35 
N 1912 318 321 315 320 317 321 
 
Panel B: control variables    
 
Firm size (LnMK)  
Mean  12.40 12.58 12.58 12.12 12.20 12.48 12.46 
Minimum  9.59 9.59 9.59 9.59 9.59 9.59 9.59 
25% 10.72 11.10 11.11 10.45 10.38 10.72 10.69 
Medium  12.33 12.50 12.51 11.94 12.12 12.47 12.38 
75% 13.96 14.05 14.04 13.53 13.81 14.15 14.07 
Maximum 15.43 15.43 15.43 15.43 15.43 15.43 15.43 
N 1912 318 321 315 320 317 321 
 
Firm current earnings ( ROE) 
Mean  16.40 18.87 21.35 15.42 11.69 16.15 14.88 
Minimum  -8.944 -8.44 -8.44 -8.44 -8.44 -8.44 -8.44 
25% 4.92 6.86 8.92 4.95 -.067 4.26 5.05 
Medium  13.80 16.61 17.43 14.33 10.52 11.69 13.42 
75% 22.70 26.42 26.85 23.23 19.49 21.25 21.89 
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Maximum 65.57 65.57 65.57 65.57 65.57 65.57 65.57 
N 1912 318 321 315 320 317 321 
 
Firm leverage (Lev)  
Mean  52.69 52.52 52.98 57.83 55.80 50.08 47.03 
Minimum  .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
25% 6.11 6.09 6.57 7.19 5.44 5.87 4.28 
Medium  38.20 36.00 39.84 44.38 40.67 35.55 34.04 
75% 78.67 81.37 82.56 90.25 84.83 66.20 66.71 
Maximum 166.96 166.96 166.96 166.96 166.96 166.96 166.96 
N 1912 318 321 315 320 317 321 
 
Firm dividend (DY) 
Mean  2.65 2.01 2.40 4.02 2.52 2.29 2.66 
Minimum  .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
75% .782 .89 .96 2.02 .00 .43 .77 
Medium  2.56 2.06 2.43 4.81 2.44 2.13 2.78 
75% 4.17 2.293 3.60 6.21 4.20 3.68 4.02 
Maximum 6.21 6.21 6.21 6.21 6.21 6.21 6.21 
N 1912 318 321 315 320 317 321 
 
Firm liquidity (CR) 
Mean  1.61 1.64 1.59 1.56 1.61 1.64 1.62 
Minimum  0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 
25% 0.960 1.02 0.97 0.90 0.94 0.97 0.94 
Medium  1.41 1.43 1.35 1.38 1.41 1.43 1.46 
75% 1.98 2.03 1.98 1.91 1.97 2.00 2.00 
Maximum 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.35 
N 1912 318 321 315 320 317 321 
 
firm growth (GRTH) 
Mean  8.75 9.44 10.74 11.54 8.56 6.84 5.39 
Minimum  -6.86 -6.86 -6.86 -6.86 -6.86 -6.86 -6.86 
25% 1.08 1.85 2.57 4.12 .117 -.07 -1.88 
Medium  7.86 8.05 9.87 10.64 8.26 6.45 4.72 
75% 15.77 17.36 19.37 7.90 15.53 12.89 9.91 
Maximum 26.48 26.48 26.48 26.48 26.48 26.48 26.48 
N 1912 318 321 315 320 317 321 
 
Firm capital expenditure (CAPEX) 
Mean  5.07 5.29 5.21 5.23 5.14 4.88 4.65 
Minimum  1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05 
25% 2.03 2.38 2.31 2.15 1.91 1.83 1.62 
Medium  4.16 4.78 4.51 4.23 3.88 3.67 3.51 
75% 7.51 7.21 7.45 7.90 8.01 7.47 7.01 
Maximum 11.91 11.91 11.91 11.91 11.91 11.91 11.91 
N 1912 318 321 315 320 317 321 
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Firm managerial ownership (%MO) 
Mean  .087 .088 .091 .085 .087 .085 .088 
Minimum  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
25% 0.00 0.00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
Medium  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
75% 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.11 
Maximum .99 .98 .99 .99 .99 .99 .99 
N 1912 318 321 315 320 317 321 
This Table reports the descriptive statistics of all explanatory variables for all sample firms and by years. 
N indicates the number of observations 
The definitions and measurements of variables are included in Table 5.2 
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5.8.2 Correlation analysis 
The Pearson correlation matrix is an initial tool to detect multi-colinearity. Table 5.5 
presents the Pearson correlation matrix among dependent and all explanatory variables 
of the current study. The Pearson correlation coefficients among all variables are 
relatively low, less than 0.80, suggesting that there is no variable exhibit multi-
collinearity problem (Gujarati & Porter, 2009).  
Further check for multi-collinearity is performed by calculating the Variance Inflation 
Factor (VIF) after carrying out each regression model. As previously indicated, if the 
VIF value is more than 10, this suggests a problem of multi-collinearity (Field, 2009). 
The mean and maximum values of the VIF tests are tabulated with the regression results 
and indicate that there is no concern about this problem.  
In addition to diagnose the multi-colinearity problem among variables, the Pearson 
correlation matrix is used to measure the strength and direction of the linear correlation 
between any pair of variables. The correlation coefficients of 0.0255 between firm value 
(LnTQ+3) and change in FLFD (|ΔFLFD|) is not statistically significant under any level 
of significance (P= 0.3052). This correlation result suggests that firm value (LnTQ+3) is 
not statistically correlated with changes in FLFD (|ΔFLFD|). 
However, the Pearson correlation matrix indicates significant correlation between firm 
value (LnTQ+3) and all other explanatory variables except leverage (Lev). It presents 
statistical positive correlation at 1% level of significance between the value of the firm 
(LnTQ+3) and some explanatory variables such as firm size (LnMK), firm earnings 
(ROE), firm liquidity (CR), firm growth (GRTH) and firm capital expenditure 
(CAPEX). However, it reports negative statistical correlation between firm value 
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(LnTQ+3) and some other explanatory variables such as dividends policy (DY) and 
percent of managerial ownership (%MO). 
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Table 5.5   
Pearson Correlation Matrix 
 
LnTQ+3 |ΔFLFD| LnMk ROE Lev DY CR GRTH CAPEX %MO 
LnTQ+3 1.0000          
           
|ΔFLFD| 0.0255 1.0000 
        
 0.3052          
LnMk 0.3331*** 0.2774*** 1.0000 
       
 0.0000 0.0000         
ROE 0.3253*** 0.0516** 0.4034*** 1.0000 
      
 0.0000 0.0235 0.0000        
Lev -0.0211 0.1288*** 0.2592*** 0.1385*** 1.0000 
     
 0.2698 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000       
DY -0.1949*** 0.0464** 0.0849*** 0.1728*** 0.1639*** 1.0000 
    
 0.0000 0.0426 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000      
CR 0.1301*** -0.1022*** -0.2333*** -0.1386*** -0.4121*** -0.2202*** 1.0000 
   
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000     
GRTH 0.2039*** -0.0225 0.1496*** 0.1867*** -0.0003 -0.1133*** 0.0012 1.0000 
  
 0.0000 0.3258 0.0000 0.0000 0.9902 0.0000 0.9586    
CAPEX 0.1712*** 0.0673*** 0.2307*** -0.0683*** 0.0954*** -0.1729*** 0.0920*** 0.1685*** 1.0000 
 
 0.0000 0.0036 0.0000 0.0031 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000   
%MO -0.0662*** -0.1469*** -0.3561*** -0.0872*** -0.1374*** -0.0481** 0.1638*** -0.0763*** -0.0361 1.0000 
 0.0032 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0359 0.0000 0.0009 0.1191  
This Table presents the Pearson Correlation Matrix among all variables in Model 2 
Variables’ definitions and measurements are the same as summarized in Table 5.2 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively. 
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5.8.3 Empirical results  
Table 5.6 reports the multivariate results which are robust to heteroscedasticity and 
auto-correlation. Model (2) is statistically significant at 1% level of significance (P<.01) 
and the adjusted R-squared value is 36.53%. These values imply a good overall model 
fit which indicate that the model explains some variation in the values of the UK firms. 
The t-statistics presented in parentheses are based on standard error clustered by firms. 
The current study finds that the coefficient for LnTQ+3 on |∆FLFD| is -.0059 and is 
statistically significant at 5% level of significance (t = -2.16). This result indicate that 
LnTQ+3 is negatively associated with |∆FLFD|, meaning that negative association exists 
between firm Tobin’s Q and change in FLFD. In other words, the result suggests that 
the value of the firm decreases as long as the firm changes its FLFD from the previous 
year. Because the main objective of the current study is not the direction of the relation 
but only the existence of such association between firm value and change in FLFD, the 
researcher accepts H3 hypothesis that an association exists between change in FLFD 
and firm value in the UK narratives. 
This result is consistent with the current study theoretical expectations. For instance, 
based on agency theory, the information released by change in FLFD decreases the 
information asymmetry and agency costs. This in turn reduces the uncertainty 
surrounding firm’s future performance and reduces the private benefits that controlling 
shareholders and management might get from controlling the firm which could increase 
the expected cash flow to shareholders. In addition, finance theory suggests that the new 
information released as a result of change in FLFD from the previous year may help 
investors build their expectations about the required rate of return and expected cash 
flows which in turn affect the value of a firm. Besides, the EMH suggests that share 
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prices are adjusted up and down in response to information available. This is in turn 
affects the value of the firm. 
However, the result is not consistent with prior research (e.g., Beak et al., 2004; Da-
Silva & Alves, 2004; Clarkson et al., 2011; Plumlee et al., 2010; Cheung et al., 2010; 
Balic & Bwakira, 2002; Elzahar et al., 2015) who argue that voluntary disclosure adds 
to firm value. 
Given that FLFD are more likely to be used by un-profitable firms and based on the 
finding on chapter 4 that poorly performing firms are likely to change their FLFD more 
than well-performing firms. The further analysis in section 5.8.4 investigates whether 
change in FLFD can have different effect on the value of well and poor performing 
firms. This analysis may provide more understanding of the association between the two 
variables. 
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Table 5.6 
Model (2) results: Association between |∆FLFD| and LnTQ+3 
 
Variables 
Pred. 
Sign 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Constant   
-1.6249*** 
(-6.70) 
Forward-looking financial 
disclosure  
|∆FLFD| +/- 
-.0059** 
(-2.16) 
Firm’s size   LnMK +/- 
.0871*** 
(7.09)   
Current earnings  ROE + 
.0110*** 
(7.49) 
Leverage   Lev +/- 
.00005 
(0.16) 
Dividend   DY +/- 
-.0350*** 
(-4.36) 
Liquidity  CR + 
.08597*** 
(3.08) 
Firm growth  GRTH + 
.0034** 
(2.13) 
Capital expenditures  CAPEX + 
.0095** 
(2.33) 
Managerial ownership  %MO +/- 
.1051 
(0.72) 
Fixed effect 
Year&  
Industry  
Standard error clustering  Firm  
Model F 
Prob > F 
74.42*** 
.0000 
Adjusted R- squared 36.53% 
VIF: Mean 
         Max. 
1.33 
1.49 
Observation (N) 1,912 
This Table reports the coefficients estimates of model (2). The t-Statistics in parentheses are 
based on robust standard error clustered by firms to control for auto-correlation and 
heteroscedasticity. 
Variables’ definitions and measurements are the same as discussed in Table 5.2. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively 
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In terms of control variables, Table 5.6 presents the results of the association between 
firm value and control variables that are LnMK, ROE, Lev, DY, CR, GRTH, CAPEX, 
and %MO.  
The coefficient of LnTQ+3 on LnMK is .0871 and is statistically significant at 1% level 
of significance (t = 7.09). This result indicates that LnMK is positively associated with 
LnTQ+3, meaning that a significant positive relationship exists between a firm size and 
its value. The result suggests that firm value is higher for larger firms than for smaller 
firms. 
This finding is consistent with the theoretical argument that larger firms have more 
skilled managers and large assets base which enable them to enhance their values (Beak 
et al., 2004; Klapper & Love, 2004). Consistently, prior research supports this positive 
association between firm size and its value (e.g., Hassan et al., 2009; Beak et al., 2004; 
Liu et al., 2010). However, this result is not consistent with other prior research (e.g., 
Black et al., 2006a&b; Cho & Kang, 2002; Ammann et al., 2009) who find negative 
association between the size of a firm and its value. 
The coefficient of LnTQ+3 on ROE is .0110 and is statistically significant at 1% level of 
significance (t = 7.49). This result indicates that ROE is positively associated with 
LnTQ+3, meaning that a significant positive relationship exists between the current 
earnings of a firm and its value. The result suggests that firms with good earnings 
performance are more likely to have higher values in the future.  
This result is consistent with Chaney and Lewis (1995) augment that firms with good 
performance are perceived to have higher value because their investors expect this good 
performance to be maintained in the future. Empirically, prior research (e.g., Hassan et 
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al., 2009; Elzahar, 2013) finds consistent result that firms with higher earnings have 
higher values.  
The coefficient of LnTQ+3 on Lev is .00005 and is not statistically significant at any 
level of significance (t = 0.16). This result indicates that Lev is not statistically 
associated with LnTQ+3, meaning that the value of the firm is not affected by its 
leverage. This result is not consistent with prior empirical research who find significant 
association between the value of the firm and its leverage either positively (e.g., 
McConnell & Servaes, 1995) or negatively (e.g., Ammann et al., 2009; Jackling & Johl, 
2009; Mangena et al., 2012). 
The coefficient of LnTQ+3 on DY is -.0350 and is statistically significant at 1% level of 
significance (t = -4.36). This result indicates that DY is negatively associated with 
LnTQ+3, meaning that a significant negative relationship exists between firm dividend 
and its value. This result suggests that firms with good dividends policy (higher 
dividends yield) are likely to have lower values in the future. 
This result is consistent with the argument of Officer (2011). He argues that dividends 
initiating limits the ability of management to make future investments which in turn 
lowers the value of the firm in the future. Consistently, officer (2011) finds that firms 
with a lower firm value (Tobin’s Q) have significantly more positive dividend initiation 
announcement returns than other firms.  
The coefficient of LnTQ+3 on CR is .0859 and is statistically significant at 1% level of 
significance (t = 3.08). This finding indicates that CR is positively associated with 
LnTQ+3, meaning that a significant positive association exists between firm liquidity 
and its value. The result suggests that firms with higher liquidity status (measured using 
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current ratio) have higher values in the future. 
Theoretically, this result is consistent with the argument that firms with higher liquidity 
have more freedom for investments, consequently, higher growth opportunities and 
higher values in the future (Beak et al., 2004). Empirically, prior research (e.g., Fazzari 
et al., 1988; Hoshi et al., 1991; Whited, 1992) finds significant positive association 
between liquidity of a firm and its investment level. This investment level consequently 
affects the growth opportunity of the company and, therefore, affects its future value.  
The coefficient of LnTQ+3 on GRTH is .0034 and is statistically significant at 5% level 
of significance (t = 2.13). This result indicates that GRTH is positively associated with 
LnTQ+3, meaning that a significant positive association exists between firm growth and 
its value. This result suggests that firms with higher growth are likely to have higher 
values in the future than firms with smaller growth. 
This result is consistent with the argument of Henry (2008) that the growth of the firm is 
accompanied by better valuation. Empirically, prior research (e.g., Haniffa & Hudaib, 
2006; Henry, 2008; Laidroo, 2009; Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003) supports the 
above argument and finds a positive and significant relationship between firm growth, 
and its performance.  
The coefficient of LnTQ+3 on CAPEX is .0095 and is statistically significant at 5% level 
of significance (t = 2.33). This result indicates that CAPEX is positively associated with 
LnTQ+3, meaning that a significant positive relationship exists between firm capital 
expenditure and its value in the future. The result suggests that firms with increasing 
capital expenditure are likely to have higher values in the future. 
This result is consistent with the prediction that the increase in capital expenditure in 
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current years makes the value of the company to increase in the future. In addition, the 
result is consistent with some prior research. For instance, McConnell and Muscarella 
(1995) find positive association between firm capital expenditure and its stock return. 
Moreover, some prior research (e.g., Weir et al., 2002) finds positive association 
between capital expenditure and firm performance. However, the result is not consistent 
with other research (e.g., Jackling & Johl, 2009; Mangena et al., 2012) who finds 
negative association between the two variables. 
Finally, the coefficient of LnTQ+3 on %MO is .1051 and is not statistically significant at 
any level of significance (t = 0.72). This result indicates that %MO is not statistically 
associated with LnTQ+3, meaning that the value of a firm is not affected by the 
percentage of its managerial ownership. The result is not consistent with prior research 
(e.g., Cheng et al., 2012) who finds an association between the percentage of managerial 
ownership and its value. 
In sum, the empirical result on control variables suggest that firm size, current earnings, 
liquidity, growth and capital expenditure affect the value of a firm positively. However, 
dividends affect the firm value negatively. The current study finds that firm leverage 
and its managerial ownership have no effect on the value of the firm.  
Table 5.7 presents a summary of the results of the of the hypotheses’ test. 
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Table 5.7  
Summary of hypotheses tests 
Variables Hypotheses 
Regression 
results 
Notes 
Change in FLFD 
H3: An association exists between 
change in forward-looking financial 
disclosure and firm value in UK 
narratives. 
A 
- 
 
Control variables 
Firm size effect  
A 
+ 
 
Firm earnings effect  
A 
+ 
 
Firm leverage effect  
R 
+ 
Due to 
insignificance  
Firm dividends effect  
A 
- 
 
Firm liquidity effect  
A 
+ 
 
Firm growth effect  
A 
+ 
 
Firm capital expenditure effect  
A 
+ 
 
Percentage of managerial ownership 
effect  
R 
+ 
Due to 
insignificance 
This Table provides summary of the hypotheses test. A means acceptance that there is significant association, R 
means rejection that there is significant association, + means positive direction, - means negative direction. 
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5.8.4 Further analysis 
This section examines whether change in FLFD can affect the value of well-performing 
firms and poorly performing firms differently. In addition, it reports a sensitivity 
analysis test to assess the robustness of the results 
5.8.4.1 Well and poorly performing firms  
To better understand the results of Table 5.6, we examine whether the change in FLFD 
can affect the value of well and poor performing firms differently. The regression model 
(2) is run separately for samples of well-performing firms and poorly performing firms. 
Table 5.8 reports the results of the model for both well and poorly performing firms 
separately. Column (1) reports the regression results for well-performing firms sample, 
while, column (2) shows the results for poorly performing sample. 
In terms of well-poorly performing firms, the coefficient of LnTQ+3 on |∆FLFD| is -
.0040 and is not statistically significant at any level of significance (t = -1.26). This 
result indicates that |∆FLFD| is not statistically significant with LnTQ+3, meaning that 
no association exists between change in firm FLFD and the future value of well-
performing firms. This result suggests that the future value of well-performing firms is 
not affected by managers’ decisions to change their FLFD over years. This result is 
consistent with the findings of Hassan et al. (2009) who find no association between a 
firm value and managers’ decisions to provide voluntary disclosure. This is may be due 
to the lack of the timeliness of the annual report.  
With regard to poorly performing firms, the coefficient of LnTQ+3 on |∆FLFD| is -.0074 
and is statistically significant at 5% level of significance (t = -2.26). This result 
indicates that |∆FLFD| is negatively associated with LnTQ+3, meaning that a significant 
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negative association exists between change in firm FLFD and its future value. This 
result suggests that values of poorly performing firms decrease as long as firms change 
their FLFD from the previous year. 
This result could be rationalized from two different perspectives. First, given that 
forward-looking information is more likely to be used by unprofitable firm, the value of 
the firm may be driven by its performance. Accordingly, managers may use their 
discretion in preparing narrative disclosure to strategically obfuscate the financial 
results – that is actually poor – and this may be perceived as a way of misleading 
investors about a firm’s actual performance. Consequently, investors respond negatively 
to disclosure. Second, information could cause noise to investors (Cheng et al., 2012). 
Therefore, it may negatively affect the value of the firm.  
To conclude, the results suggest that new information revealed as a result of changes in 
FLFD from the previous year has no effect on the value of well-performing firms. In 
addition, this information does not enhance the investors’ valuation of poorly 
performing firms.  
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Table 5.8 
Model (2) results: Well-performing and poorly performing firms  
   (1) 
ΔROE>0 
(2) 
ΔROE<0 
 
Variables 
Pred. 
Sign 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Constant   
-1.6590*** 
(-7.34)   
-1.4050*** 
(-6.85) 
Forward-looking 
financial disclosure  
|∆FLFD| +/- 
-.0040 
(-1.26) 
-.0074** 
(-2.26)   
Firm’s size   LnMK +/- 
.0880*** 
(6.05) 
.0874*** 
(6.77) 
Current earnings  ROE + 
.0120*** 
(6.55) 
.0098*** 
(6.39) 
Leverage   Lev +/- 
-.0003 
(-0.83) 
.0005 
(0.213) 
Dividend   DY +/- 
-.0348*** 
(-3.28) 
-.03853*** 
(-4.28) 
Liquidity  CR + 
.0917*** 
(2.98) 
.0837*** 
(2.68) 
Firm growth  GRTH + 
.0063*** 
(3.18) 
.0006 
(0.34) 
Capital expenditures  CAPEX + 
.0068 
(1.45) 
.0106** 
(2.43) 
Managerial ownership  %MO +/- 
.0914 
(0.65) 
.1265 
(0.71) 
Fixed effect 
Year& 
Industry  
Year & 
Industry 
Standard error clustering  Firm  Firm  
Model F 
Prob > F 
27.46*** 
.0000 
29.56*** 
.0000 
Adjusted R- squared 37.21% 34.85% 
VIF: Mean 
        Max. 
1.42 
1.84 
1.46 
1.92 
Observation (N) 946 966 
This Table reports the coefficients estimate of model (2) for well and poorly performing firms. 
Column (1) provides the estimates for well-performing while column (2) reports the estimation 
for poorly performing firms. The t-Statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard error 
clustered by firms to control for auto-correlation and heteroscedasticity. 
The variables’ definitions and measurements are the same as discussed in Table 5.2 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively 
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5.8.4.2 Robustness test 
This section presents a sensitivity analysis test to assess the robustness of the results on 
the usefulness of change in FLFD.  
One of the concerns of Tobin’s Q as a measure of firm value is that it widely varies 
from one industry to another (Abdullah & Page, 2009). Consequently, a failure to 
industry adjustments of Tobin’s Q could lead to distortion of the regression results. 
Therefore, an alternative measure of firm value is used to test the robustness of the 
results. 
The current study computes an industry median adjusted Tobin’s Q for each year. This 
Tobin’s Q controls for potential bias arising from industry (Bebchuk, Cohen, & Ferrell, 
2009), and rules out the potential for simultaneity (Brown & Caylor, 2006). In addition, 
it helps to mitigate endogeneity. The industry-median adjusted Tobin’s Q is computed 
as a firm’s Tobin’s Q minus the median Tobin’s Q in the firm’s industry in the 
observation year. The industry classification Benchmark (ICB) is used to identify the 
industry. 
Model (2) is re-estimated using the industry median adjusted Tobin’s Q as the 
dependent variable. The results are presented in Table 5.9 for all sample firms and for 
well and poorly performing firms separately. Column (1) reports the result for all 
sample firms while columns (2) and (3) present the result for well and poorly 
performing firms, respectively. The results are similar to those shown in Table 5.6 (for 
the all sample firms) and Table 5.8 (for well-performing firms and poorly performing 
firms). 
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Table 5.9 
Model (2) results: The Industry median adjusted Tobin’s Q  
   (1) 
All firms 
(2) 
ΔROE>0 
(3) 
ΔROE<0 
 
Variables 
Pred. 
Sign 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Constant   
-1.3642*** 
(-5.19) 
-1.5688*** 
(-5.95) 
-1.3695*** 
(-5.95) 
Forward-looking 
financial disclosure  
|∆FLFD| +/- 
-.0070** 
(-2.12) 
-.0049 
(-1.19) 
-.0094** 
(-2.53) 
Firm’s size   LnMK +/- 
.0876*** 
(6.13) 
.0878*** 
(5.08) 
.09040*** 
(6.24) 
Current earnings ROE + 
.0121*** 
(6.55) 
.0136*** 
(6.04) 
.0101*** 
(5.36) 
Leverage   Lev +/- 
-.0001 
(-0.33) 
-.0006 
(-1.17) 
.0004 
(0.83) 
Dividend   DY +/- 
-.0426*** 
(-4.80) 
-.0452*** 
(-3.86) 
-.0435*** 
(-4.46) 
Liquidity  CR + 
.1158*** 
(3.47) 
.1184*** 
(3.12) 
.1150*** 
(3.07) 
Firm growth  GRTH + 
.0041** 
(2.15) 
.00711*** 
(3.02) 
.0014 
(0.65) 
Capital expenditures  CAPEX + 
.0099* 
(1.97) 
.0073 
(1.30) 
.01098** 
(2.04) 
Managerial ownership  %MO +/- 
.1340 
(0.82)   
.05418 
(0.34) 
.2204 
(1.11) 
Fixed effect 
Year& 
Industry  
Year& 
Industry  
Year & 
Industry 
Standard error clustering  Firm  Firm  Firm  
Model F 
Prob > F 
10.33*** 
.0000 
7.82*** 
.0000 
8.02*** 
.0000 
Adjusted R- squared 24.22% 24.99% 21.95% 
VIF: Mean 
        Max 
1.34 
1.52 
1.46 
1.86 
1.52 
1.94 
Observation (N) 1,912 946 966 
This Table reports the coefficients estimates of model (2) for all sample firms, and for well and poorly performing 
firms. Column (1) provides the estimates for all sample firms. Columns (2) & (3) report the estimation for well and 
poorly performing firms respectively. The t-Statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard error clustered by 
firms to control for auto-correlation and heteroscedasticity. 
The definitions’ and measurements of variables are the same as discussed in Table 5.2. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively 
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5.9 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter provides the answer to the research question Q3. It investigates 
theoretically and empirically the association between change in a firm FLFD over years 
and its future value for large sample of the UK all-shares firms over an extended period 
of time. 
Theoretically, disclosure can affect the value of the firm either by affecting its cost of 
capital or its expected cash flow to its shareholders, or both. According to agency theory, 
the information released by change in FLFD decreases the information asymmetry and 
agency costs. This in turn reduces the uncertainty surrounding firm’s future 
performance and reduces the private benefits that controlling shareholders and 
management might get from controlling the firm which could increase the expected cash 
flow to investors. In addition, finance theory suggests that the new information released 
as a result of change in FLFD from the previous year may help investors build their 
expectations about the required rate of return and expected cash flows which in turn 
affect the value of a firm. Besides, the EMH suggests that share prices are adjusted up 
and down in response to new information available. This is in turn affects the value of  
A review of the literature reveals that limited research exists with respect to the direct 
association between disclosure level and firm value. Furthermore, prior studies vary 
regarding the disclosure type, the proxies used for the information disclosure, and 
measures of firm value. However, they share the same expectation that disclosure has an 
impact on the market value of the firm. In addition, none of prior research examines the 
association between change in FLFD and firm value.  
The study estimates using the OLS regression with clustered robust standard errors and 
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uses year-fixed effect. This estimation method accounts for any residual dependence 
created by firm effects (auto-correlation) and time effect (heteroscedasticity). 
The multivariate analysis suggests that the value of a firm decreases as long as it 
changes its FLFD from the previous year. This result is consistent with the theoretical 
expectations However, it is not consistent with prior research (e.g., Beak et al., 2004; 
Da-Silva & Alves, 2004; Clarkson et al., 2011; Plumlee at al., 2010; Cheung et al., 
2010; Balic & Bwakira, 2002; Elzahar et al., 2015) who argue that voluntary disclosure 
adds to firm value. Further, when we distinguishe between well and poorly performing 
firms, the study finds that new information revealed as a result of changes in FLFD 
from the previous year has no effect on the value of well-performing firms. In addition, 
it does not enhance the investors’ valuation of poorly performing firms.  
In terms of control variables, the multivariate analysis reports that firm size, current 
earnings, liquidity, growth and capital expenditure affect the value of a firm positively. 
However, dividends affect the firm value negatively, and both leverage of a firm and its 
managerial ownership have no effect on the value of the firm.  
This chapter offers two contributions to narrative reporting literature in general and 
forward-looking disclosure in particular. First, it contributes to the body of knowledge 
on methodological developments in the estimation method in empirical tests. The study 
uses OLS regression with robust standard error clustered by firm to mitigate the residual 
dependence problems caused by time effect (heteroscedasticity) and firm effect (auto-
correlation). This estimation method accounts for the residual dependency problems 
frequently neglected in market-based accounting research (Gow et al., 2010).  
Second, prior empirical research assesses the value relevance of forward-looking 
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statements in UK narratives for predicting firm’s future earnings (e.g., Hussainey et al., 
2003; Schleicher et al., 2007; Wang & Hussainey, 2013). This study extends the 
literature on the infomativeness of FLFD by examining the effect of the change in these 
statements on firm value. The findings indicate that new FLFD revealed in narratives 
does not enhance the investors’ valuation of UK firms. These findings add to our 
understanding on the usefulness of forward-looking information in narrative reporting. 
The study, despite of the robustness tests, has some limitations which have to be 
considered as potential avenues for future research. For instance, the study uses the 
future value of the firm as a proxy for the investors’ response to changes in FLFD. 
Firm’s Tobin’s Q three months after the date of annual report is used to measure the 
future value of the firm. However the firm’s Tobin’s Q is commonly used measure for 
the value of the firm in disclosure studies (e.g., Hassan et al., 2009), it has some 
limitations. The market value of the firm may be closely associated with the economic 
status such as recession which may negatively affect the value of the firm (Mangena et 
al., 2012). Employing other measures for investors’ response to information may be a 
potential area for future research. Future research may use a stock market reaction 
analysis either alone or in conjunction with future earnings to test investors’ response to 
disclosed information. 
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CHAPTER 6 : CONCLUSION  
6.1 OVERVIEW  
This is the first study that uses the change in the level of FLFD over years for a large 
sample of UK FTSE all-shares firms over the period from 2005 to 2011 using the 
automated content analysis technique. The study, also, adopts the OLS with robust 
standard error clustered by firms and the year-fixed effect to overcome the residual 
dependence problems created by firm effect and time effect.  
This study examines the extent to which change in firms’ earnings performance 
influences managers of firms to the change in FLFD. In addition, it identifies the firm 
characteristics that may drive managers of firms to change FLFD from year to year. 
Finally, it examines the association between change in FLFD and the future value of a 
firm. These objectives provide an indication on the informativeness of FLFD in the UK 
narrative statements. 
This chapter, therefore, is outlined as follows. Section 6.2 summarises the main findings 
set out in chapters 3, 4 & 5. Then, the main implications of the results are highlighted in 
section 6.3, followed by discussing the limitations of the study, and providing 
suggestions for future research in section 6.4.  
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6.2 SUMMARY  
In order to achieve the objectives, the study measures the change in forward-looking 
financial disclosure (FLFD) in OFR statements from year to year. We refer to this 
variable as a change score. Before commencing in measuring the change score, all the 
OFR sections are identified and separated from the annual reports. Then, they (OFR 
sections) are converted into text files in order to be readable by QSR N6 software. The 
sentence is used as the unit of analysis; therefore, the OFR sections are parsed into 
sentences. 
The change score is measured using the automated content analysis technique. Four 
main steps are performed to capture the changes in the level of FLFD over years. 
Chapter 3 details these four steps. For brevity, we summarize the key aspects below. 
In the first step, forward-looking sentences from the OFR statements are extracted based 
on list of 33 forward-looking keywords. The final list of the keywords and extracting 
the forward-looking sentences are based on the following steps: (1) developing 
preliminary list of forward-looking keywords, (2) refining the preliminary list of 
forward-looking keyword, and approving the final keywords list, (3) writing command 
file, running the command, and saving the output. The output of this step is saved in a 
separate file entitled “Forward-looking Statements” 
In the second step, financial-related sentences are extracted from the OFR statements 
based on list of 62 financial-related keywords. The steps with respect to forward-
looking keywords are followed for the financial-related keywords. These steps include: 
(1) developing preliminary list of financial-related keywords, (2) refining the 
preliminary list of the financial-related keywords, and approving the final keywords list, 
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(3) writing the command file, running the command, and saving the output. The output 
of this step is saved in saved in a separate file entitled “Financial-related Statements” 
In the third step, forward-looking financial statements are extracted from the OFR 
statements. This is done by finding the intersection between the “Forward-looking 
Statements” output of step 1 and the “Financial-related Statements” output of step 2. 
The output of this step is saved in separate file entitled “Forward-looking financial 
Statements”. This output represents the level of forward-looking financial statements in 
a firm’s OFR statements each year (FLFD). 
In the fourth step, the change in the level of FLFD over years is measured. The change 
in firm FLFD, Δ FLFD, between OFR statements in period t-1 and period t is equal to 
firm FLFD in period t minus the same firm FLFD in period t-1. In the empirical analysis, 
the study is not concerned with the direction of the change in FLFD. However, it is 
concerned with the existence and magnitude of such change in FLFD. The absolute 
values preserve the magnitude of changes. Therefore, the absolute change in FLFD, 
|ΔFLFD|, is used. For simplicity, we refer to the variable, |ΔFLFD|, as changes score.  
The reliability and validity tests have been considered. Reliability test suggests that 
change score based on the automated content analysis is reliable. Whilst, the validity 
test adds credibility to the idea that: as long as the company changes its level of 
disclosure, it will disclose relatively new information. Hence, it ensures that the change 
score captures new information. 
Thereafter, the study uses the change score to address the following three objectives.  
First, it examines the extent to which change in firms’ earnings performance influences 
managers of firms to change FLFD. In addition, it aims to identify which firm 
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characteristics may influence managers of firms to change FLFD. Finally, it aims to 
investigate investors’ response to change in FLFD. 
Chapter 4 addresses the first and second objectives. Accordingly, the main variables are 
classified into two groups: change in firm performance and firm characteristics 
variables.  
The change in firm performance is measured using the changes in firm’s return on 
equity ratio, over years. Whilst, firm characteristics include the following variables: 
firm size, competitive environment, litigious environment, managerial ownership, and 
auditor type.  
Firm size is measured as the natural logarithm of the market value of equity at the end 
of the current year. The competitive environment is measured using Herf index. The 
general assumption in the literature is that the lower the Herf value, the less 
concentrated the industry, the higher the competition, and the higher the potential 
proprietary costs. The industry classification is used to identify firms that are exposed to 
high litigation risk. Accordingly, litigious environment is measured using dummy 
variable that is equal to 1 if the firm is in the technology industry and 0 otherwise.  
In terms of managerial ownership, it is measured as the percentage of total shares in 
issue of 5% or more held by employees, or by those with a substantial position in a 
company that provides significant voting power at an annual general meeting. The 
auditor type variable is measured as a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm is 
audited by one of the big-4 audit firms and 0 otherwise. Besides, the study controls for 
some economic environment variables that are identified as determinants of forward-
looking disclosure in prior research. These variables include: firm leverage, dividend, 
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liquidity, and market risk exposure.  
Furthermore, the study control for change in the length of the narrative document using 
change in its total statements. Finally, FLFD may be changed from the previous year 
because of the implementation of new narrative reporting requirements and accounting 
standards. Therefore, the year-fixed effect is used to control for change in FLFD due to 
this reason 
The study estimates using the OLS regression with clustered robust standard errors and 
the year-fixed effect. This estimation method accounts for any residual dependence 
problems created by firm effects (auto-correlation) and time effect (heteroscedasticity). 
The correlation analysis provides evidence that change in FLFD is statistically 
correlated positively with change in firm earnings performance. In terms of firm 
characteristics, there are statistical positive correlation between change in FLFD and 
some firm characteristics such as firm size, competitive environment, and auditor type. 
However, negative correlation exists with other firm characteristics such as litigious 
environment and managerial ownership.   
The regression results suggest that firms change their FLFD in response to changes in 
their earnings performance. This result is consistent with the managers’ incentives 
theories, suggesting that managers with new information relative to prior year are 
motivated to provide it voluntarily in order to reduce both information asymmetry and 
agency costs. The result is, also, consistent with prior empirical research that suggests 
that change in firm disclosure is associated with change in its performance (e.g., Lang & 
Lundholm, 1993; Miller, 2002; Abraham & Tonks, 2006; Merkley, 2014). 
Afterward, the study uses the quartile ranking of absolute change in earnings 
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performance with 1 being the smallest absolute change group and 4 being the largest 
absolute change group. This allows examining whether firms with larger change in their 
earnings performance are likely to change FLFD more than those with smaller 
performance changes. The study finds that firms with larger change in their earnings 
performance are likely to change FLFD more than those with smaller performance 
changes. 
Obviously, there is a weak statistical significance level (10%) that firms with larger 
change in their earnings performance are likely to change their FLFD more than those 
with smaller performance changes. This may be due to the qualitative soft talk nature of 
FLFD. This nature may encourage managers to use the previous year’s FLFD as 
templates without making extremely significant changes, which in turn reduces the 
variation of change in FLFD.  
In the further analysis, the study examines whether the association between change in 
FLFD and change in earnings performance differ based on the sign of earnings change. 
To this end, the sample is divided into two subsamples: well-performing and poorly 
performing firms based on the direction of change in firm ROE. Firms with positive 
change in ROE from the previous year are regarded as well-performing firms, while, 
firms with negative change in ROE from the previous year are regarded as poorly 
performing firms.  
The regression model (1) is re-run for samples of well-performing and poorly 
performing firms, separately. The results indicate that a positive association exists 
between change in earnings performance and change in FLFD for both well-performing 
and poorly performing firms. However, this association is more positive and statistically 
significant for poorly performing firms compared to well-performing firms. This result 
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suggests that poorly performing firms are more likely to provide informative narrative 
disclosure than well-performing firms.  
Holding constant changes in firm earnings performance, and examining which firm 
characteristics may influence managers to change FLFD over years, the study finds the 
following: 
First, a positive association exists between firm size and the change in FLFD. In other 
words, larger firms are more likely to change their FLFD to greater degree than smaller 
firms. This may be because large firms are politically visible and so they are likely to 
update their disclosure periodically in order to avoid the political costs of being 
perceived as being ambiguous. In addition, large firms can afford the preparation costs 
of disclosure and have sufficient resources to update their disclosure, or small firms are 
more likely to cut and paste narratives from previous years to save the preparation costs. 
Second, a negative association exists between competitive environment and change in 
FLFD. In other words, firms facing more competition are less likely to change their 
FLFD from the previous year. This result is consistent with the proprietary cost of 
disclosure expectation that firms in more competitive environment are likely to provide 
less informative disclosure in order to maintain their competitive position in the market. 
Consequently, these firms are less likely to change FLFD over years. The result is, also, 
consistent with prior empirical research (e.g., Brown & Tucker, 2011) who finds that 
firms facing more competition are less likely to change their narratives reporting in 
MD&A from year to year and consequently they provide less informative narrative 
reporting in their MD&A. 
Third, a negative association exists between litigious environment and change in FLFD. 
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In other words, firms in more litigious environment are less likely to change FLFD from 
the previous year. The result is consistent with the litigation cost of disclosure 
prediction that firms in highly litigious environment tend to reduce their obligation to 
update their forward-looking disclosure from year to year in order to avoid litigation 
costs. The result, therefore, supports Healy and Palepu (2001) theoretical prediction that 
firms reduce their future oriented disclosure when they face risk of being penalised 
against their forecast. 
Fourth, a negative association exists between percentage of managerial ownership and 
change in FLFD. This result suggests that firms dominated by managerial ownership are 
less likely to change their FLFD from the previous year, and, thus, provide less 
informative FLFD. Theoretically, this result is not consistent with agency theory that 
suggests that managerial ownership might serve to align the interests of firm 
management with the interest of its shareholders. However, it could be explained from 
management entrenchment perspective. Under this perspective, high managerial 
ownership can be counterproductive to the firm because managers are more likely to 
maximise their private controlling benefits by providing less informative disclosure 
(Randall et al., 1988).  
Fifth, in terms of auditor type, the study finds non-significant association between 
auditor type and change in FLFD. This result suggests that there is no role of the auditor 
in overseeing FLFD in the UK narratives. The non-significant association between 
auditor type and change in FLFD could be explained from two different perspectives. 
First, these statements are qualitative in nature. This nature makes FLFD difficult to be 
audited. Second, the risks of ASB enforcement actions on auditors are small because 
narratives are soft talk not hard facts.  
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However, in the further analysis, when we distinguish between well-performing and 
poorly performing firms, the study finds a positive association between auditor type and 
the change in FLFD when firms are poorly performing. On the other hand, this result is 
not existed for either all sample firms or for well-performing firms sample. The result 
may suggest that the role of the auditor in overseeing the UK narratives is observable 
only when firms are poorly performing.  
The results with respect to firm characteristics, especially firm size (LnMK), 
competitive environment (Herf), and litigious environment (Litig) and managerial 
ownership (%MO) are consistent with prior research (e.g., Brown & Tucker, 2011), 
which add validity that the change score capture new information. In other words, this 
result adds validity to the idea that changes in the level of disclosure (change score) 
captures relatively new information. 
Chapter 5 addresses the third objective that examines the investors’ response to change 
in FLFD.  
To investigate the investors’ response to changes in FLFD, firm value at three months 
of the annual report date is used as a proxy for investors’ response. It is measured as the 
natural logarithm of firm Tobin’s Q three months after the date of the annual report. 
Besides, the study controls for some factors that may affect the value of a firm. These 
factors include: firm size, firm current earnings, firm leverage, firm dividend, firm 
liquidity, firm growth, firm capital expenditures, and firm managerial ownership.  
The study estimates using the OLS regression with clustered robust standard errors and 
uses the year-fixed effect. This estimation method accounts for any residual dependence 
created by firm effects (auto-correlation) and time effect (heteroscedasticity). Besides 
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the year-fixed effect, the industry-fixed effect is used to account for any dependence due 
to industries’ effect.  
The multivariate analysis suggests a negative association exists between change in 
FLFD and firm Tobin’s Q. In other words, the result suggests that the value of the firm 
decreases as long as it changes its FLFD from the previous year. This result is consistent 
with the current study theoretical expectations. For instance, based on agency theory, 
the information released by change in FLFD decreases the information asymmetry and 
agency costs. This in turn reduces the uncertainty surrounding firm future performance 
and reduces the private benefits that controlling shareholders and management might 
get from controlling the firm which could increase the expected cash flow to investors. 
In addition, finance theory suggests that the information released as a result of change in 
FLFD from the previous year may help investors build up their expectations about the 
required rate of return and expected cash flows which in turn affect the value of a firm. 
Besides, the EMH suggests that share prices are adjusted up and down in response to 
information available. This is in turn affects the value of the firm. 
In the further analysis, the study examines whether change in FLFD can affect the 
values of firms with earnings increase and decrease differently. To this end, the 
regression model (2) is re-run for well-performing sample and poorly performing 
sample, separately. The regression results indicate that the future values of well-
performing firms are not affected by their managers’ decision to change FLFD. The 
result is consistent with the findings of Hassan et al. (2009) who find no association 
between a firm value and the disclosure of voluntary information. This may be due to 
the lack of the timeliness of the annual report.  
With regard to poorly performing firms, the regression results indicate that values of 
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poorly performing firms decrease as long as these firms change their FLFD from the 
previous year. This negative effect could be explained from two different angles. First, 
managers may use their discretion in preparing narrative disclosure to strategically 
obfuscate the financial results – that is actually poor – and this may be perceived as a 
way of misleading investors about a firm actual performance. Consequently, investors 
respond negatively to disclosure. Second, information could cause noise to investors 
(Cheng et al., 2012). Therefore, it may affect negatively the value of a firm.  
In terms of the control variables, the study finds the following: 
First, a positive association exists between size of a firm and its value. In other words, 
larger firms exhibit higher future values than smaller firms. This is consistent with the 
theoretical expectations that larger firms have more skilled managers and large assets 
base which enable them to enhance their values (Beak et al., 2004; Klapper & Love, 
2004). In addition, it is consistent with prior empirical research (e.g., Hassan et al., 
2009).  
Second, a positive association exists between firm current earnings and its value. In 
other words, firms with better current earnings are likely to have higher values in the 
future. Firms with good performance are perceived to have higher values because their 
investors expect this good performance to be maintained in the future (Chaney & Lewis, 
1995).  
Third, a negative association exists between firm dividend policy and its value. In other 
words, firms that pay higher dividend are likely to have lower values in the future. This 
result is consistent with Officer (2011) expectation that dividend initiating limits the 
ability of management to make future investments, which in turn lowers the value of the 
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION   
 
 
 
A
p
p
en
d
ice
s 
260 
firm in the future.  
Fourth, a positive association exists between firm liquidity and its value. In other words, 
firms with higher liquidity are likely to have higher values in the future. Firms with 
higher liquidity will have more freedom in investments, and, consequently, higher 
growth opportunities and higher values in the future (Beak et al., 2004).  
Fifth, a positive association exists between firm growth and its future value. In other 
words, firms with higher growth are likely to have higher values in the future. This is 
consistent with the expectation of Henry (2008) that growth of the firm is accompanied 
by better valuation. 
Sixth, a positive relationship exists between firm capital expenditure and its value. In 
other words, firms with higher current capital expenditure are likely to have higher 
values in the future. The increase in capital expenditure creates more investments’ 
opportunities, and, consequently, the value of the company will increase. 
Seventh, the study finds that the future value of the firm is not affected by its current 
leverage level. In addition, there is non-significant association between the future value 
of a firm and its current percentage of managerial ownership. 
The study runs a sensitivity analysis test to assess the robustness of the results on the 
usefulness of change in FLFD. In this test, it uses the industry median adjusted Tobin’s 
Q as an alternative measure for firm value. Model (2) is re-estimated using the industry 
median adjusted Tobin’s Q as dependent variable. The study obtains similar results to 
that in the main and further analyses. 
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6.3 RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS  
The results of the current study provide important implications at the academic and 
research levels, and to regulatory bodies and other users of the narrative reporting 
statements of the annual reports. Therefore, the study has important practical and 
methodological implications as follows. 
In terms of practical implications, the study has the following distinctive implications 
for regulatory bodies and for users of narrative reporting in the annual reports. 
First, the results of the current study should be relevant to regulatory bodies within the 
UK. It has implications for the emphasis in the UK regulatory bodies (e.g., IASB) on 
setting clear best practise guidance for narrative reporting in OFR, business review and 
management commentary. In the UK, although, the topics of narrative reporting are 
broadly prescribed, managers have flexibility in terms of the amounts and contents of 
narrative reporting. This room of discretion may encourage managers of firms to 
strategically obscure the financial results of the company in their narrative discussion. 
In this case, narratives are a mean for managers to mislead investors. Thus, guidance 
has to be set for managers while preparing their narrative discussions in order to provide 
value relevant information to investors. 
Second, the results have important implications for users of narrative reporting 
statements of the annual reports. The importance of the narrative discussion and 
analysis in the annual report depends concomitantly on firm performance. In the UK, 
the narrative discussion and analysis is not currently subject to external audit or 
assurance from independent party. The results suggest that users of the annual reports 
may desire some element of assurance that this narrative discussion of a firm is 
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consistent with its performance. The external auditors may be able and willing to 
provide such assurance. However, some enforcement actions from regulatory bodies 
may be required. 
Third, there is some evidence acquired over long time period (e.g. Hussainey et al., 
2003; Schleicher et al., 2007) that investors expect companies to provide timely and 
value relevant information. The results of the study call for more in-depth narrative 
discussion and analysis of a firm performance and financial position in order to reflect 
clearly the changes in its business economic environment. This enables investors to see 
clearly the company from the eyes of its board of directors which is consistent with the 
spirit of narrative reporting (See the principles of: ASB 2005, ASB 2006, and IFRS 
2010). Providing disclosure that is consistent with firm performance (relevant 
disclosure) helps investors to modify and adjust any prior over estimation of the firm 
value (Healy & Palepu, 2011). In addition, it calls for more timeliness in the publication 
date of annual report. The annual report is the official disclosure medium of a firm, and 
lack in its timeliness makes it loses its importance. 
Beside the practical implications, the study has some methodological implications. First, 
it is suggested that distinguishing between firms with earnings increase and firms with 
earning decrease is important because each category of them has its own different 
drivers. The result, therefore, support those studies (e.g., Schleicher et al., 2007) that 
distinguish between firms with earnings increase and earnings decrease. The current 
study finds that poorly performing firms provide more value relevant information to 
investors compared to well-performing firms. In addition, the role of the auditor in 
overseeing narrative reporting is observable only when the firm is poorly performing. 
Therefore, the results suggest that well-performing and poorly performing firms should 
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be analysed separately. 
Second, the variations in FLFD between firms in the UK and the low explanatory power 
of model (1) indicates that there are other chances to expand the current study design by 
adding other explanatory variables that may reduce the unexplained variations in FLFD 
and enhances the explanatory power of the model. The explanatory variables, therefore, 
used in the current study continued significantly in the interpretations of the observed 
variations among UK firms. However, the study calls for more variables that may 
explain some variations in the FLFD over the period of the study (2005 - 2011). The 
explanations of these variables will be discussed in more details in section 6.4; the 
limitations and suggestions for future research. 
The third methodological implication of the results of this study is utilising the OLS 
regression with robust standard error clustered by firms as shown in the empirical 
models of chapters 4 & 5. This estimation method helps to overcome any residual 
dependence problems created by time effect (heteroskadiciticity) and firm effect (auto-
correlation). 
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6.4 LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
By utilizing the automated content analysis technique and the multivariate analysis 
(OLS with robust standard error clustered by firms), the current study examined to what 
extent change in firms’ earnings performance influenced managers to the change FLFD 
of their firms. In addition, it identified the firm characteristics that influence firms’ 
managers to change FLFD over years. Finally, it investigated the effect of such change 
in FLFD on the future value of a firm. This study, therefore, extends the empirical 
knowledge and contributes to forward-looking disclosure literature. The study, however, 
has some limitations which have to be considered as potential avenues for future 
research. 
First, the change score employed in the current study is based on the idea that as long as 
the company changes its level of disclosure, it will disclose relatively new information. 
This idea is supported in prior research which suggests that change in the level 
disclosure is associated with change in firm performance (e.g., Miller, 2000; Merkley, 
2014). In addition, it is validated in the validity test (chapter 3). This means that when 
the company changes its level of disclosure, it will disclose new information to users. 
However, the change in the level of disclosure may not be the suitable measure to all the 
new information of a firm. This may be because a firm may keep its level of FLFD the 
same from year to year, but, this firm discloses relatively new information each year. 
Perhaps for this reason, it would be an interesting area for future research to look for 
other sophisticated measures of change in narrative reporting such as Turnitin software 
widely used to check for plagiarism. However, our change measure is not perfect; it is 
one step forward in understanding the behaviour of managers of firms while preparing 
the narrative discussion and analysis of their firm. 
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Second, the study uses firm earnings (return on equity ratio, ROE) as a measure for firm 
performance. The main limitation in this is related to the use of just only one variable to 
measure performance of a firm. The use of more than one variable to measure 
performance of a firm (e.g., return on equity; return on assets; earnings per share, profit 
margin) could be an area of interest for future research. 
Third, the study uses five variables as main variables for firm characteristics. These 
variables are: firm size, competitive environment, litigious environment, managerial 
ownership, and auditor type. Some other variables have been suggested in disclosure 
studies. Therefore, using variables such as the number of analysts following the firm 
(e.g., Khalif & Souissi, 2010) or/and environmental incentives (e.g., Elshandidy & 
Shrives, 2015) may be an interesting area for future research.  
Furthermore, the study uses only two proxies for corporate governance mechanisms that 
are percentage of managerial ownership and auditor type. Not considering other 
corporate governance mechanisms such as the characteristics of the board of directors 
(e.g., Elshandidy et al., 2013) could be a limitation of the current study and, also, may 
be an area of interest for future research.  
Fourth, the study uses Tobin’s Q ratio as a measure for the value of a firm. However, 
firm Tobin’s Q is commonly used as a measure for its value in prior disclosure studies 
(e.g. Ntim et al., 2012b), it has some limitations. For instance, the market value of the 
firm may be closely associated with the country economic status such as recession 
which may affect negatively the value of the firm (Mangena et al., 2012). Therefore, 
measuring a firm value using alternative measures of Tobin’s Q such as scale efficiency 
and cost discipline (as suggested by Dybvig & Warachka, 2015), may be an interesting 
area for future research.  
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In addition, the use of other proxies to measure investors’ response to information 
disclosed by firms may be a potential area of interest for future research. For instance, 
future research may use the stock market reaction analysis either alone or in conjunction 
with future earnings to test investors’ response to disclosed information. 
Fifth, the study focuses only on narrative reporting statements in the UK. Other 
countries, however, could have different approaches for narrative reporting. 
Investigating narrative reporting (particularly FLFD) in other countries, such as Egypt 
or/and Gulf countries
51
, could be useful in understanding the incentives for providing 
informative narrative disclosure. 
Furthermore, extending the current research design to include other countries may be an 
area of interest for future research. This may help in observing the impact of country 
characteristics (e.g., inflation; culture; legal system; political factors) on the 
informativness of narrative reporting. 
 
 
                                                 
51 These countries have characteristics that are different from those of developed countries (e.g., UK & 
US). Thus, by investigating narrative reporting in these countries, we may obtain different results. 
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APPENDICES  
APPENDIX 1: FORWARD-LOOKING COMMAND FILE 
(build-tree "FW0RD") 
 
(search-text "likely" pattern-search? no whole-word? no case-sensitive? no node (11 1) 
node-title "$likely") 
(search-text "[future|will|eventual|well poitioned|well placed|shortly|soon]" pattern-
search? yes whole-word? yes case-sensitive? no node (11 2) node-title "future$") 
(search-text "[look forward|looks forward|looking forward]" pattern-search? yes whole-
word? yes case-sensitive? no node (11 3) node-title "looking forward$") 
(search-text "[look ahead|looks ahead|looking ahead]" pattern-search? yes whole-word? 
yes case-sensitive? no node (11 4) node-title "looking ahead$") 
(search-text "[year ahead|years ahead]" pattern-search? yes whole-word? yes case-
sensitive? no node (11 5) node-title "year ahead$") 
(search-text "[next fiscal|next month|next months|next twelve months|next six 
months|next quarter|next year|next years|next period|next periods]" pattern-search? yes 
whole-word? yes case-sensitive? no node (11 6) node-title "next$") 
(search-text "[coming fiscal|coming month|coming months|coming twelve 
months|coming six months|coming quarter|coming year|coming years|coming 
period|coming periods]" pattern-search? yes whole-word? yes case-sensitive? no node 
(11 7) node-title "coming$") 
(search-text "[incoming fiscal|incoming month|incoming months|incoming twelve 
months|incoming six months|incoming quarter|incoming year|incoming years|incoming 
period|incoming periods]" pattern-search? yes whole-word? yes case-sensitive? no node 
(11 8) node-title "incoming$") 
(search-text "[upcoming fiscal|upcoming month|upcoming months|upcoming twelve 
months|upcoming six months|upcoming quarter|upcoming year|upcoming 
years|upcoming period|upcoming periods]" pattern-search? yes whole-word? yes case-
sensitive? no node (11 9) node-title "upcoming$") 
(search-text "[following fiscal|following month|following months|following twelve 
months|following six months|following quarter|following year|following years|following 
period|following periods]" pattern-search? yes whole-word? yes case-sensitive? no node 
(11 10) node-title "following$") 
(search-text "[subsequent fiscal|subsequent month|subsequent months|subsequent twelve 
months|subsequent six months|subsequent quarter|subsequent year|subsequent 
years|subsequent period|subsequent periods]" pattern-search? yes whole-word? yes 
case-sensitive? no node (11 11) node-title "subsequent$") 
(search-text "[forthcoming fiscal|forthcoming month|forthcoming months|forthcoming 
twelve months|forthcoming six months|forthcoming quarter|forthcoming 
year|forthcoming years|forthcoming period|forthcoming periods]" pattern-search? yes 
whole-word? yes case-sensitive? no node (11 12) node-title "forthcoming$") 
(search-text "[anticipate|anticiaptes|anticipating|is anticiated|are anticipated]" pattern-
search? yes whole-word? yes case-sensitive? no node (11 13) node-title "anticipate$") 
(search-text "[expect|expects|expecting|is expected|are expected]" pattern-search? yes 
whole-word? yes case-sensitive? no node (11 14) node-title "expect$") 
(search-text "[seek|seeks|seeking|is seeked|are seeked]" pattern-search? yes whole-
word? yes case-sensitive? no node (11 15) node-title "seek$") 
APPENDICES  
 
 
 
A
p
p
en
d
ice
s 
297 
(search-text "[intend|intends|intending|is intended|are intended|intention|intentions]" 
pattern-search? yes whole-word? yes case-sensitive? no node (11 16) node-title 
"intend$") 
(search-text "[predict|predicts|predicting|is predicted|are 
predicted|prediction|predictions]" pattern-search? yes whole-word? yes case-sensitive? 
no node (11 17) node-title "predict$") 
(search-text "[we forecast|management forecasts|manager forecasts|managers 
forecasts|company forecasts|firm forecasts|is forecasting|are forecasting|is forecasted|are 
forecasted|normally forecast|normally forecasts|currently forecast|currently 
forecasts|also forecast|also forecasts|to forecast]" pattern-search? yes whole-word? yes 
case-sensitive? no node (11 18) node-title "forecast$") 
(search-text "[we plan|management plans|manager plans|managers plan|company 
plans|firm plans|is planning|are planning|is planned|are planned|normally plan|normally 
plans|currently plan|currently plans|also plan|also plans|to plan]" pattern-search? yes 
whole-word? yes case-sensitive? no node (11 19) node-title "plan$") 
(search-text "[we project|management projects|manager projects|managers 
project|company projects|firm projects|is projecting|are projecting|is projected|are 
projected|normally project|normally projects|currently project|currently projects|also 
project|also projects|to project]" pattern-search? yes whole-word? yes case-sensitive? no 
node (11 20) node-title "project$") 
(search-text "[we hope|management hopes|manager hopes|managers hope|company 
hopes|firm hopes|is hoping|are hoping|is hoped|are hoped|normally hope|normally 
hopes|currently hope|currently hopes|also hope|also hopes|to hope]" pattern-search? yes 
whole-word? yes case-sensitive? no node (11 21) node-title "hope$") 
(search-text "[we estimate|management estimates|manager estimates|managers 
estimate|company estimates|firm estimates|is estimating|are estimating|is estimated|are 
estimated|normally estimate|normally estimates|currently estimate|currently 
estimates|also estimate|also estimates|to estimate]" pattern-search? yes whole-word? yes 
case-sensitive? no node (11 22) node-title "estimate$") 
(search-text "[we aim|management aims|manager aims|managers aim|company 
aims|firm aims|is aiming|are aiming|is aimed|are aimed|normally aim|normally 
aims|currently aim|currently aims|also aim|also aims|to aim]" pattern-search? yes whole-
word? yes case-sensitive? no node (11 23) node-title "aim$") 
(search-text "[we prospect|management prospects|manager prospects|managers 
prospect|company prospects|firm prospects|is prospecting|are prospecting|is 
prospected|are prospected|normally prospect|normally prospects|currently 
prospect|currently prospects|also prospect|also prospects|to prospect]" pattern-search? 
yes whole-word? yes case-sensitive? no node (11 24) node-title "prospect$") 
(search-text "[we believe|management believes|manager believes|managers 
believe|company believes|firm believes|is believing|are believing|is believed|are 
believed|normally believe|normally believes|currently believe|currently believes|also 
believe|also believes|to believe]" pattern-search? yes whole-word? yes case-sensitive? 
no node (11 25) node-title "believe$") 
(search-text "[2012-2013|2012/2013]" pattern-search? yes whole-word? yes case-
sensitive? no node (11 26) node-title "2003$2004") 
 
(search-nodes (collect (11)) node (N 20) node-title "FWORD(2011)") 
(delete-node (11)) 
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APPENDIX 2: FINANCIAL-RELATED COMMAND FILE 
(build-tree "FINANCIAL") 
 
(search-text 
"[sales|revenue|revenues|return|returns|income|profit|profits|profitability|dividend|divide
nds|tax|taxes|margin|margins|EBI|EBIT|IBITDA|earning|earnings|gains|losses|expense|e
xpenses|costs|cost of goods sold|COGS|cost of 
sales|depreciation|amortization|depletion|impairment]" pattern-search? yes whole-word? 
yes case-sensitive? no node (21 1) node-title "income statement$") 
(search-text 
"[assets|liabilities|debt|debts|equity|capital|inventories|payable|payables|receivable|receiv
ables|provisions|property, plant and equipment|investment property]" pattern-search? 
yes whole-word? yes case-sensitive? no node (21 2) node-title "balance sheet$") 
(search-text "[cash flows|cash inflow|cash inflows|cash outflow|cash outflows|free cash 
flow|free cash flows]" pattern-search? yes whole-word? yes case-sensitive? no node (21 
3) node-title "cash flow statement$") 
(search-text "[liquidity ratio|current ratio|quick ratio|gearing|leverage|interest 
cover|turnover|return on equity|ROE|return on assets|ROA|return on capital 
employed|ROCE|return on investment|earnings per share|EPS]" pattern-search? yes 
whole-word? yes case-sensitive? no node (21 4) node-title "ratios$") 
 
(search-nodes (collect (21)) node (N 21) node-title "FINANCIAL") 
(delete-node (21)) 
 
